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63 Executive summary 
This  brochure summarises  12 reports - the first in  a 
series  of Innovation Policy Studies undertaken for the 
European  Commission's  Enterprise  Directorate-
General.  Nine  were  commissioned  to  examine  the 
trends and impacts of European innovation policy, or 
to shed  light on specific aspects of interest to policy-
makers- many make use of the unique dataset about 
firm-level  innovation activity in  Europe assembled  by 
the  Community Innovation  Survey.  The  other three 
assess  specific  actions  addressing  respectively  the 
financing of innovation, the promotion of innovation 
management techniques among small  and  medium-
sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  and  the  development  of 
regional  innovation  strategies.  All  serve  to  improve 
understanding of the dynamics of European  innova-
tion  - its  mechanisms,  its  strengths  and  its  bottle-
necks.  They therefore reinforce the ability of regional, 
national  and  EU  policy-makers  to  develop  Europe's 
innovative capacity with legislation and support meas-
ures  that  are  effective,  appropriately  targeted,  and 
mutually reinforcing. 
The  topics  addressed  here  are  diverse.  The  reports 
summarised are the outputs of separate studies by dif-
ferent independent research  teams.  Yet  a number of 
key messages emerge from this material with a degree 
of consistency that is  striking. 
First,  innovation is  ever more important in  today's 
increasingly  global,  increasingly  knowledge-based 
economy.  Competitiveness  depends,  to  a  far  larger 
extent today than in the past, on the ability of manu-
facturing  and  service  sectors  to  meet fast-changing 
market  needs  quickly  and  efficiently  through  the 
application of new technology. This capacity to assim-
ilate  and  apply new knowledge in  order to improve 
productivity  and  create  new  products  and  services 
relies  on  scientific  inventiveness  and  entrepreneurial 
flair.  But it is  also  affected fundamentally by the con-
ditions which permit, encourage and sustain  innova-
tive creativity and  investment,  or which impede and 
limit it. In  the 21st century, innovation will be the pri-
mary  driver of successful  industrial  and  enterprise 
policy,  but must also  inform  policy in  areas  such  as 
education, employment law and taxation. 
Second, innovation is pervasive and diverse. It does 
-and should -take place in firms of all  size,  in  every 
region and in  every sector,  not just in 'naturally inno-
vative'  high-tech  sectors  such  as  biotechnology and 
information technology.  These  emerging  sectors  are 
crucial  as  engines  of economy-wide innovation,  and 
may be crucial  as  sources  of future employment, but 
today still  account for a relatively small  share  of the 
European  Union's  GOP.  Innovation  policy  which  fo-
cuses  exclusively  on  high  technology therefore  risks 
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missing  the  much  larger opportunities for improved 
competitiveness and  new products and  processes  in 
more  traditional  industries,  which  remain  the  EU's 
major employers. New knowledge is  not only created 
through research and development. It is also acquired 
as  a result of investment in plant and machinery, and 
through human resources  development.  Even  in  the 
high-tech electrical  and  electronic equipment sector, 
R&D  expenditure  only  amounts  to  27%  of  overall 
investment in innovation. 
Although  pervasive,  innovation is  unevenly distrib-
uted. The innovation performance of Member States, 
and  of  different  regions  within  individual  Member 
States,  varies  very  widely.  More  specifically,  the 
innovative  capacity  of  industry  is  highly  skewed 
towards  larger firms.  There  is  a growing  number of 
nimble  and  dynamic  technology-based  European 
SMEs.  Many are  making a vital  contribution to tech-
nological  progress,  are  achieving  great  success  in 
international  markets,  and  are  growing  rapidly.  But 
these  cases  cannot mask the fact that the innovative 
capacity  of  most  technology-using  SMEs  remains 
weak.  SMEs  tend to lack  both the internal resources 
and the external networks necessary for easy access to 
the  knowledge,  skills,  technologies  and  finance  on 
which innovation depends. Furthermore, technology-
oriented  SMEs  are  disproportionately  affected  by 
many institutional barriers and costs- for 49%, fear of 
the  cost  of  patent-defence  litigation  is  a  significant 
deterrent to investment in invention, for example. 
Fourth,  innovation  is  systemic  rather  than  linear. 
That is,  the  processes  of innovation  are  multidimen-
sional. They involve many different players, and often 
take  place  over extended periods of time.  Successful 
innovation  may entail  a transfer of technology - for 
instance,  from  a  university  or  research  centre  to  a 
company - but this  is  rarely  an  isolated  event.  The 
speed and the success of the transfer almost certainly 
depends  on  other interactions,  before  and  after the 
transfer itself,  and  is  heavily influenced by conditions 
in  the  local  and  national  'innovation  environment'. 
Innovation therefore  requires  the development,  over 
time, of highly interconnected systems. Well function-
ing  innovation  systems  in  particular serve  to ensure 
the  free  flow  of  information  across  the  interfaces 
between  large  firms,  researchers,  entrepreneurs, 
investors of all  kinds,  consultants,  patent agents and 
other  intermediaries,  local  authorities  and  other 
actors.  Such  systems  may have technical components 
but are, above all, networks of individuals. Proximity is 
an  important feature of most innovation systems, and 
policy-makers rightly devote resources to attempts to 
create  self-sustaining  local  and  regional  innovative 
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clusters, often in science parks centred around univer-
sities or large multinational technology firms. 'Vertical' 
interconnections are  also  vital - for example,  linking 
business  angels,  banks,  venture  capital  funds  and 
stock markets to create  a seamless  equity market for 
innovation.  Finally,  inter-regional  and  transnational 
links are  essential  for the efficient exchange of know-
ledge,  people and  good practice,  and the frictionless 
diffusion  of  new  technologies,  between  individual 
local and regional innovation systems. There are signs 
that  a  'European  Innovation  Area'  is  developing 
around infrastructures put in place by EU  actions such 
as  the  Regional  Innovation and  Technology Transfer 
Strategies and Infrastructures (RITTS) scheme and the 
Innovation Relay Centre (IRC) network. Much remains 
to  be  done,  however.  Among  technology-oriented 
European  firms,  the  United  States  remains  a  more 
popular  location  than  other  EU  Member  States  for 
research  activity and technological collaboration out-
side  their own  national  borders.  In  1990-95, for ex-
ample,  53.1% of patents  resulting from the research 
activities of European  companies  outside their home 
countries  originated  in  the  US,  compared with only 
40.4% in  Europe. 
These  12 studies demonstrate the crucial  role  played 
by  innovation  in  business  competitiveness  and 
growth. Innovation is the source of new and improved 
products,  services  and  processes,  and  may  create 
entirely new markets,  opening  up new areas  of eco-
nomic and social  activity. It is  enterprises which must 
meet  the  challenges  of  innovation,  and  grasp  its 
opportunities. But public authorities play a vital part in 
creating conditions in which innovation's wider social 
and  economic  benefits  can  be  maximised.  The 
insights  offered  by  these  studies  provide  valuable 
support to public policy-makers' efforts in this increas-
ingly important area. Note de synthese 
Cette brochure synthetise douze rapports, concluant 
une premiere serie d'etudes sur Ia  politique d'innova-
tion realisees a  Ia  demande de Ia  Direction generale 
Entreprises  de  Ia  Commission  europeenne.  Neuf de 
ces rapports ont ete commandes dans le  but d'exam-
iner  les  tendances  et  Ia  portee  de  Ia  politique 
europeenne en matiere d'innovation ou pour eclairer 
certains aspects specifiques  interessant les  instances 
politiques.  Un  certain  nombre d'entre elles  utilisent 
!'ensemble  unique  de  donnees  rassemblees  par 
I'Enquete  communautaire  sur  !'innovation  relatives 
aux  activites  innovantes  des  entreprises  en  Europe. 
Les trois autres evaluent certaines mesures specifiques 
qui  concernent  respectivement  le  financement  de 
!'innovation, Ia  promotion des techniques de gestion 
de !'innovation au sein des petites et moyennes entre-
prises (PME)  et le  developpement de strategies d'in-
novation regionales. Toutes ces etudes sont destinees 
a  mieux  comprendre  Ia  dynamique  de  !'innovation 
europeenne, a  travers ses  mecanismes, ses vertus et 
ses  limites.  Elles  renforcent  done  !'aptitude  des 
responsables politiques regionaux, nationaux et com-
munautaires a developper les capacites novatrices de 
I'Europe  a  l'aide  d'une  legislation  et de  mesures de 
soutien efficaces, adequatement ciblees et qui se ren-
forcent mutuellement. 
Divers themes sont abordes. Les  rapports compiles ici 
decoulent  d'etudes  separees,  menees  par  plusieurs 
equipes  de  chercheurs  independantes.  Un  certain 
nombre de messages des emergent pourtant de ce 
materiel, avec un degre de consistance frappant. 
Tout d'abord, !'innovation est plus importante que 
jamais au sein de l'economie actuelle, de plus en plus 
mondialisee et fondee sur le  savoir.  La  competitivite 
repose beaucoup plus largement que par le  passe sur 
!'aptitude des secteurs de l'industrie et des services a 
satisfaire  les  besoins  extremement  fluctuants  du 
march€ avec celerite et efficacite grace a !'application 
de nouvelles technologies. Cette faculte d'assimiler et 
d'appliquer  de  nouvelles  connaissances  en  vue 
d'ameliorer Ia  productivite et de creer de nouveaux 
produits et services repose sur notre inventivite scien-
tifique et sur Ia  perspicacite des entrepreneurs. Mais 
elle est aussi  profondement influencee par les  condi-
tions  qui  permettent,  encouragent  et  soutiennent 
l'esprit de creation et l'investissement ou celles qui les 
entravent et les limitent. 
Au  21 e siecle, !'innovation sera au centre de toute 
politique  d'entreprise  et  industrielle  fructueuse, 
mais  elle  devra  egalement  influencer  les  politiques 
menees dans  des  domaines  tels  que  !'education,  Ia 
legislation de l'emploi et Ia  taxation. 
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Ensuite, !'innovation est diffuse et varh~e. Elle est-
et doit etre - presente dans les  entreprises de toutes 
envergures,  dans  chaque  region  et  dans  taus  les 
secteurs,  au-dela  des  secteurs de  pointe  consideres 
comme  "naturellement  innovants"  tels  que  Ia 
biotechnologie ou les  technologies de !'information. 
Ces  secteurs  emergents  sont  les  moteurs  d'innova-
tions essentiels pour toute notre economie et peuvent 
s'averer d'importantes sources de futurs emplois, mais 
ils  n'interviennent pour le  moment que pour une part 
relativement faible du PIB  de I'Union europeenne. En 
se concentrant exclusivement sur les  technologies de 
pointe,  Ia  politique  d'innovation  risque  de  passer a 
cote  d'opportunites  beaucoup  plus  importantes  en 
vue  d'ameliorer  Ia  competitivite  des  industries  plus 
traditionnelles  et de creer de  nouveaux  produits et 
procedes  dans  ce  secteur,  qui  regroupe  encore  les 
principaux  employeurs  de  I'Union  europeenne.  Les 
activites de recherche et de developpement ne sont 
pas  Ia  seule  source  de  nouvelles  connaissances. 
Celles-ci proviennent egalement d'investissements en 
termes d'installations et de machinerie industrielles et 
du developpement des ressources  humaines.  Meme 
dans  le  secteur de  l'equipement electrique  et elec-
tronique  de  pointe,  les  depenses  reservees  a  Ia 
recherche et au developpement ne representent que 
27% des investissements globalement affectes a  !'in-
novation. 
Bien  qu'elle soit omnipresente, !'innovation est dis-
tribuee  inegalement.  Les  performances  des  Etats 
membres et de leurs differentes regions varient enor-
mement  en  termes  d'innovation.  Plus  specifique-
ment, les  capacites novatrices de l'industrie sont par-
ticulierement concentrees autour des entreprises plus 
importantes.  II  y  a  en  Europe  de  plus  en  plus  de 
petites  et  moyennes  entreprises  (PME)  alertes  et 
dynamiques qui exploitent les  technologies.  Un  cer-
tain nombre d'entre elles apportent une contribution 
vitale  au  progres technologique,  prosperent sur  les 
marches internationaux et croissent rapidement. Mais 
leur cas ne peut pas masquer le fait que les capacites 
novatrices  de  Ia  plupart  des  PME  a  vocation  tech-
nologique  restent faibles.  Les  PME  ont tendance  a 
manquer  a  Ia  fois  des  ressources  internes  et  des 
reseaux externes necessaires pour acceder facilement 
aux connaissances, aux competences, aux technolo-
gies et au financement dont depend !'innovation. De 
plus,  les  PME  axees  sur  les  technologies  sont 
entravees par de nombreux obstacles institutionnels 
et par des frais disproportionnes- 49% par exemple 
hesitent a  investir  dans !'invention,  craignant de  ne 
pouvoir assumer, en cas de litige, les frais associes a Ia 
defense des brevets. 
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Quatriemement,  !'innovation  est  plus  systemique 
que lineaire. C'est-a-dire que les  processus d'innova-
tion sont multidimensionnels. lis  impliquent de nom-
breux partenaires distincts et s'etendent souvent sur 
de longues periodes.  Une innovation fructueuse peut 
occasionner un transfert de technologie - par exem-
ple d'une universite ou d'un centre de recherche vers 
une  entreprise - mais  c'est  rarement un  evenement 
isole.  La  rapidite et Ia  reussite du transfert dependent 
tres  probablement  d'autres  interactions,  avant  et 
apres  le  transfert  lui-meme,  et elles  sont largement 
soumises aux conditions de "l'environnement d'inno-
vation" local et national. Par consequent, !'innovation 
requiert le  developpement, sur  une longue periode, 
de systemes intimement connectes. Ce sont done des 
systemes  d'innovation efficaces  qui assurent  Ia  libre 
circulation  de  !'information au  travers  des  interfaces 
qui relient les  grandes entreprises,  les  chercheurs,  les 
entrepreneurs,  les  investisseurs  de  toutes  sortes,  les 
consultants,  les  agents en  brevets et autres  interme-
diaires et les autorites locales et autres acteurs. De tels 
systemes  peuvent avoir des  composants  techniques 
mais  il  s'agit  avant tout de  reseaux  qui  regroupent 
des  individus.  La  proximite  est  une  caracteristique 
importante de Ia  majorite des  systemes d'innovation, 
et les  responsables  politiques consacrent opportune-
ment  des  ressources  a  des  projets  de  creation  de 
groupements  autonomes  d'innovateurs  locaux  et 
regionaux, souvent situes dans des pares scientifiques 
centres  autour d'universites ou  de  grandes  multina-
tionales technologiques.  Des  interconnections "verti-
cales"  sont  egalement  indispensables  - reliant  par 
exemple des investisseurs informels, des banques, des 
fonds de capitaux a risque et des  marches financiers 
en  vue  de  creer  un  systeme  de  "  capital  investisse-
ment " de !'innovation complet. Enfin,  l'echange effi-
cace des connaissances, des personnes et des bonnes 
pratiques  et  Ia  diffusion  sans  heurts  des  nouvelles 
technologies  entre  les  systemes  d'innovation  indi-
viduels  locaux  et  regionaux  necessitent  des  liens 
interregionaux  et  internationaux.  Certains  signes 
indiquent qu'un  "Espace  europeen  d'innovation" est 
en  train  de  se  constituer  autour  d'infrastructures 
mises  en  place  par  des  initiatives  de  I'Union 
europeenne comme le  plan "Infrastructures et strate-
gies  regionales  d'innovation  et  de  transfert  tech-
nologiques"  (RITIS)  et  le  reseau  des  Centres  Relais 
Innovation  (CRI).  Mais  il  reste  encore  beaucoup  a 
faire. Pour les societes europeennes axees sur les tech-
nologies,  les  Etats-Unis  restent  un  lieu  privilegie par 
rapport  aux  autres  Etats  membres  de  I'Union 
europeenne pour mener des activites de recherche et 
de  collaboration  technologique  en  dehors  de  leurs 
propres frontieres. Entre 1990 et 1995, par exemple, 
53,1%  des  brevets  emanant  des  activites  de 
recherche  de  compagnies  europeennes  a  l'exterieur 
de leur pays d'origine ont ete deposes aux Etats-Unis, 
tandis que seulement 40,4% l'ont ete en  Europe. 
Ces douze etudes demontrent le role majeur joue par 
!'innovation en  matiere de competitivite et de crois-
sance  economique.  L'innovation  est  source  de  pro-
duits,  de  services  et  de  procedes  nouveaux  et 
ameliores.  Elle  peut  etre  a  l'origine  de  marches 
entierement  neufs,  ouvrant  de  nouveaux  secteurs 
d'activite economique et sociale.  Ce  sont  les  entre-
prises  qui doivent relever  les  defis de  !'innovation et 
en  saisir  les  opportunites.  Mais  les  pouvoirs  publics 
ont un role preponderant a jouer en creant les condi-
tions  qui  permettent  de  tirer  le  meilleur  parti  des 
avantages  sociaux  et  economiques  de  !'innovation. 
Les  eclaircissements  apportes  par ces  etudes  offrent 
un  precieux  soutien  aux  efforts fournis  par les  pou-
voirs publics dans ce  domaine d'importance grandis-
sante. Uberblick 
Diese Broschure stellt zwolf Berichte in Kurzform vor. 
Sie  ist  die  erste  in  einer  neuen  Studienreihe  zur 
lnnovationspolitik,  die  im  Auftrag  der 
Generaldirektion  Unternehmen  der  Europaischen 
Kommission  erscheint.  Neun  Berichte  untersuchen 
die  Trends  und  Auswirkungen  europaischer 
lnnovationspolitik  oder  beleuchten  spezifische,  fUr 
politische  Entscheidungstrager  relevante  Aspekte. 
Viele  dieser  Berichte  greifen  auf  den  einzigartigen 
Datenbestand  uber  die  lnnovationstatigkeit  auf 
Unternehmensebene  in  Europa  zuruck,  der  im 
Rahmen  der lnnovationserhebung der Gemeinschaft 
zusammengetragen wurde.  Drei der Berichte bewer-
ten  spezifische  Maf1nahmen  in  den  Bereichen 
lnnovationsfinanzierung,  Forderung  von  Techniken 
des  lnnovationsmanagements in  kleinen und mittle-
ren  Unternehmen (KMU) und der Entwicklung regio-
naler lnnovationsstrategien. Aile  Berichte haben das 
gleiche  Ziel:  ein  besseres  Verstandnis  der Dynamik 
europaischer  Innovation,  d.h.  ihrer  Mechanismen, 
Starken und Hindernisse. Sie  helfen damit den regio-
nalen,  nationalen  und  EU-Politikern  ein 
Instrumentarium wirksamer, zielgerichteter und sich 
gegenseitig  befruchtender  Gesetzes- und 
Fordermaf1nahmen  zur  Starkung  der 
lnnovationsleistung in  Europa zu  entwickeln. 
Die  hier  angeschnittenen  Themenkomplexe  sind 
vielschichtig.  Die  zusammengefassten  Berichte  sind 
zwar  das  Ergebnis  von  Untersuchungen  einzelner, 
unabhangiger  Forscherteams,  doch  sie  enthalten 
eine  Reihe  auffallend  ubereinstimmender 
Schlusselbotschaften. 
Erstens:  Innovation  ist  ein  immer  wichtigeres 
Element  in  unserer zunehmend  globalisierten,  wis-
sensbasierten  Wirtschaft.  Mehr  denn  je  hangt 
Wettbewerbsfahigkeit heute  davon  ab,  wie  es  dem 
Fertigungs- und Dienstleistungssektor mit Hilfe neuer 
Technologien gelingt, sich rasch  und effizient auf die 
schnellebigen  Marktbedurfnisse  einzustellen.  Diese 
Fahigkeit,  neues  Wissen  zur  Steigerung  der 
Produktivitat und fUr  die Schaffung  neuer Produkte 
und Dienstleistungen aufzugreifen und anzuwenden, 
beruht einerseits auf wissenschaftlichem  Erfindungs-
geist  und  andererseits  auf  unternehmerischem 
Spursinn.  Sie  werden  zudem  ganz  entscheidend 
beeinflusst  von  den  Bedingungen,  die  innovative 
Kreativitat und lnvestitionen anregen und nachhaltig 
fordern bzw. ihre Entwicklung hemmen und begren-
zen.  lm  21.  jahrhundert  wird  Innovation  die 
Hauptantriebskraft  fur  erfolgreiche  lndustrie- und 
Unternehmenspolitik sein,  und sie  muss gleicherma-
11en  auch  andere  Politikbereiche wie etwa  Bildung, 
Arbeitsgesetzgebung und Steuerwesen betreffen. 
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Zweitens: Innovation ist omniprasent und vielfaltig. 
Innovation findet in  jedem Unternehmen statt bzw. 
sollte in jedem stattfinden, ungeachtet seiner Grof1e, 
der Region und des Sektors; sie  beschrankt sich  nicht 
nur auf die, per se  innovativen" High-Tech-Sektoren 
wie  Biotechnologie  und  lnformationstechnologie. 
Diese  aufstrebenden  Sektoren  sind  zwar  als  Motor 
wirtschaftsweiter  Innovation  von  entscheidender 
Bedeutung  und  konnen  auch  zu  einem  wichtigen 
Quell  kunftiger  Beschattigungsmoglichkeiten  wer-
den. Heute stellen sie indes noch immer einen relativ 
geringen Anteil des  BIP  der Europaischen Union dar. 
Eine  lnnovationspolitik,  die  ausschlief11ich  in 
Hochtechnologiesektoren greift,  lauft daher Gefahr, 
sehr  viel  grof1ere  Chancen  fUr  eine  erhohte 
Wettbewerbsfahigkeit sowie fUr  neue  Produkte und 
Prozesse  in  eher  traditionellen  lndustrien,  die  nach 
wie  vor  die  Eckpfeiler  der  Wirtschaft  in  der 
Europaischen  Union  bilden,  zu  vereiteln.  Neues 
Wissen  wird  nicht  nur  durch  Forschung  und 
Entwicklung gebildet, sondern ist auch das  Ergebnis 
von  lnvestitionen  in  Fertigungsanlagen  und 
Maschinen  sowie  der  Entwicklung  von 
Humanressourcen.  Selbst  im  High-Tech-Sektor  der 
Elektro- und  Elektronikgerate  betragen  die  FuE-
Ausgaben nur rund 27% der Gesamtinvestitionen in 
Innovation. 
Drittens:  Innovation,  wenngleich  omniprasent,  ist 
ungleichmaBig verteilt. Die lnnovationsleistung der 
Mitgliedstaaten und verschiedenen Regionen  in den 
einzelnen  EU-Mitgliedslandern stellt sich  sehr unter-
schiedlich  dar.  Oder  konkreter:  Die  lnnovations-
leistung  der lndustrie ist  hauptsachlich  in  grof1eren 
Unternehmen  konzentriert.  Allerdings  wachst  die 
Zahl flexibler und dynamischer technologiebasierter 
kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen (KMU) in Europa. 
Viele leisten einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum techno-
logischen  Fortschritt,  fassen  mit grof1em  Erfolg  auf 
internationalen  Markten  Fuf1  und  erreichen  ein 
schnelles  Wachstum.  Doch  diese  positiven  Beispiele 
konnen  nicht  daruber  hinwegtauschen,  dass  die 
lnnovationsfahigkeit der meisten technologienutzen-
den  KMU  nach  wie  vor  schwach  ist.  Gewohnlich 
fehlt es den KMU sowohl an  internen Ressourcen wie 
auch  an  externen  Netzwerken,  den  unabdingbaren 
Voraussetzungen  fur  den  einfachen  Zugang  zu 
Wissen,  Fahigkeiten,  Technologien  und 
Finanzierungsmoglichkeiten,  von  denen  Innovation 
abhangt. Daruber hinaus sind technologieorientierte 
KMU  unverhaltnismaf1ig stark von zahlreichen  insti-
tutionellen Barrieren und Kosten betroffen- fur 49% 
ist  die  Angst vor  Patentprozesskosten  ein  entschei-
dender  Hinderungsgrund,  um  beispielsweise  in 
Erfindungen zu  investieren. 
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Viertens:  Innovation ist  ein  systemischer  Prozess, 
sie  verlauft  nicht  linear.  lnnovationsprozesse  sind 
folglich  multidimensional:  sie  konnen  sich  unter 
Mitwirkung ganz unterschiedlicher Akteure uber lan-
gere  Zeitraume  erstrecken.  Erfolgreiche  Innovation 
kann  zwar  einen  Technologietransfer  - etwa  von 
einer  Universitat  oder  Forschungseinrichtung  zu 
einem Unternehmen - bewirken, aber dies ist nur in 
seltenen  Fallen  ein  isolierter  Vorgang.  Geschwin-
digkeit und Erfolg eines Technologietransfers hangen 
fast immer von anderen lnteraktionen, vor und nach 
dem  Transfer  selbst,  ab  und  sind  stark  von  den 
Bedingungen  des  lokalen  und  nationalen 
,lnnovationsumfelds"  beeinflusst.  Innovation  erfor-
dert  daher  die  Entwicklung  eng  miteinander  ver-
zahnter  Systeme  uber einen  langeren  Zeitraum.  Es 
sind  vor  allem  gut  funktionierende 
lnnovationssysteme,  die  datur  sorgen,  dass  der 
lnformationsfluss  frei  uber  die  Verbindungsstellen 
zwischen  Grof1unternehmen,  Forschern, 
Unternehmern,  lnvestoren  aller  Art,  Beratern, 
Patentanwalten  und  anderen  Vermittlern,  lokalen 
Behorden  wie auch  anderen  Akteuren  lauft.  Solche 
Systeme mogen zwar technische Komponenten mit-
beinhalten, sie zeichnen sich aber vornehmlich durch 
die  Kontakte  von  Einzelpersonen  aus.  Nahe  ist  das 
Schlusselwort bei den meisten lnnovationssystemen, 
und  Politiker  stellen  mit  gutem  Grund  Mittel  fUr 
Projekte bereit, die auf die Schaffung sich  selbst tra-
gender  lokaler  und  regionaler  innovativer  Cluster 
abzielen,  sei  es  in  Technologieparks im  Umfeld von 
Universitaten  oder  Technologiekonzernen.  Auch 
,vertikale"  Verbindungen  sind  unerlasslich  - etwa 
urn  Verbindungen  zwischen  Business  Angels, 
Banken,  Risikokapitalfonds  und  Aktienmarkten  im 
Hinblick  auf  die  Schaffung  eines  nahtlosen 
Aktienmarktes  fur  Innovation  herzustellen. 
Schlief11ich  tragen  auch  interregionale und transna-
tionale Verbindungen entscheidend zum wirksamen 
Austausch  von  Wissen,  Personen  und  guter  Praxis 
sowie  zur  problemlosen  Verbreitung  neuer 
Technologien zwischen einzelnen lokalen und regio-
nalen lnnovationssystemen bei. Erste Anzeichen wei-
sen  auf  die  Entstehung  eines  "Europaischen 
lnnovationsraums" urn lnfrastrukturen hin, die durch 
EU-Maf1nahmen  wie  die  Regionalen  lnnovations-
und  Technologietransfer-Strategien  und 
-lnfrastrukturen  (RITTS)  und  das  Netz  der 
lnnovationszentren  (Innovation  Relay  Centre,  IRC) 
geschaffen  wurden.  Trotzdem  bleibt noch vieles  zu 
tun.  Als  Standort  fUr  Forschungstatigkeit  und  fUr 
technologische Zusammenarbeit auf1erhalb der eige-
nen  Landesgrenzen  bevorzugen  technologieorien-
tierte europaische Unternehmen nach wie vor nicht 
andere  EU-Mitgliedstaaten,  sondern  die Vereinigten 
Staaten.  So  stammten  zwischen  1990  und  1995 
53,1% der  Patente,  die aus  Forschungsarbeit euro-
paischer Unternehmen im Ausland  hervorgegangen 
sind, aus den USA, wah rend es fUr Europa nur 40,4% 
waren. 
Die  12 vorliegenden  Studien  belegen  die  tragende 
Rolle  von  Innovation  fur  die  Wettbewerbsfahigkeit 
und das Wachstum von Unternehmen. Innovation ist 
der  Quell  neuer  und  verbesserter  Produkte, 
Dienstleistungen  und  Verfahren.  Sie  kann  ganzlich 
neue  Markte schaffen  und neue wirtschaftliche und 
gesellschaftliche Tatigkeitsfelder erschlief1en. Aber es 
liegt  an  den  Unternehmen,  sich  den 
Herausforderungen der Innovation zu  stellen und die 
Chancen  zu  ergreifen.  Doch  die  offentliche 
Behorden  spielen  einen  wesentlichen  Part:  sie  mus-
sen  die Bedingungen schaffen,  unter denen sich  die 
breiteren  gesellschaftlichen  und  wirtschaftlichen 
Vorteile von Innovation voll ausschopfen  lassen.  Die 
im  Rahmen  dieser  Studien  gewonnenen  Einsichten 
stellen  eine  wertvolle  Hilfe  fUr  politische 
Entscheidungstrager  in  diesem  immer  wichtigeren 
Bereich dar. BUILDING  AN  INNOVATIVE  ECONOMY  IN  EUROPE 
Introduction 
Understanding Innovation's levers 
In today's increasingly global, increasingly knowledge-based economy, innovation -the capacity to apply 
new knowledge in  order to improve productivity and create new products and services - assumes an 
unprecedented significance. This capacity relies not only on scientific inventiveness and entrepreneurial 
flair  but, critically, on the conditions which permit, encourage and sustain this innovative creativity, or 
which restrict it.  Effective policy-making depends on authoritative analysis of the multiple institutional 
and regulatory levers which stimulate or stifle company-level innovation. 
To  remain competitive, today's companies need to do 
more than simply deliver products or services that are 
better or cheaper than those of their rivals. They must 
also  add  features,  improve performance  and  reduce 
prices  more quickly.  They  must  be  faster  to  launch 
new products. If they want to grow, they may have to 
enter - or even  create - new markets.  The  real  stars 
reinvent  themselves  not  once,  but  over  and  over 
again. 
Innovation is now the single most important engine of 
long-term competitiveness, growth and employment. 
The  OECD  estimates  that  between  1970 and  1995 
more than half the total growth in  output of the de-
veloped world resulted from innovation, and the pro-
portion  is  increasing  as  the economy becomes  ever 
more knowledge-intensive. 
For  the  past  half-century,  and  especially  during  the 
1990s,  the European  Union  has  failed  to match  the 
dynamic,  self-sustaining  technological  innovation 
which has  characterised  the United States'  economy. 
But  the  objective  of  increasing  Europe's  innovative 
capacity, in  particular by strengthening networks and 
improving framework conditions through the removal 
of fiscal and regulatory disincentives, is  now very high 
on the EU's  political agenda. 
In  March  2000,  the  European  Council  in  Lisbon 
emphasised  innovation's central  role  as  an  engine of 
growth in employment and competitiveness, and as a 
cornerstone of enterprise policy. It called for a series of 
benchmarking  exercises  as  a  means  of  monitoring 
progress  by the  EU  and  Member States  towards the 
implementation of effective policies - and in  particu-
lar,  in support of innovation. 
In  September  2000,  the  European  Commission  res-
ponded  to  this  request  in  its  Communication 
Innovation  in  a  knowledge-driven  economy1). This  de-
scribes,  among  other  objectives,  the  Commission's 
intention to contribute to the improved coherence of 
innovation policy in  Europe by: 
• examining  and  benchmarking  the  innovation 
policies  and  performance  of  Member  States,  and 
(1) COM(2000) 567 final.  The  full text can be downloaded from 
http://www.cordis.lu/innovation-smes/communication2000/ home.html 
comparing them with those of their main competi-
tors - the US  and japan 
•  establishing a European innovation scoreboard 
•  contributing to regular reports on Europe's competi-
tiveness  performance  from  the  perspective  of 
innovation 
The  Commission  plans  to  develop  a  framework for 
dialogue on innovation policy-making and policy co-
ordination,  to improve the  availability of innovation 
statistics,  and to help identify 'best practice' in  inno-
vation policy.  As  part of this overall  effort, it will also 
undertake  analysis  of key  developments  around  the 
world and studies on specific innovation-related the-
mes. 
Innovation Policy Studies 
EU innovation policy is concerned not only with research 
and  development,  although  it  has  done  much  to 
make  possible  the  rapid  diffusion  of  new  scientific 
knowledge across  national and sectoral  borders. And 
although it supports the creation and growth of high-
tech start-up firms as  the most dynamic components 
of regional  innovation systems,  it spans traditional as 
well as  emerging sectors, and addresses investors and 
educationalists as well as  entrepreneurs. 
The interactions between the components of an  innov-
ation system, and the elements of the regulatory frame-
work in which it operates, are highly complex. Effective 
EU,  Member  State  and  regional  innovation  policy 
depends on real  understanding of what drives innov-
ation  at company level,  the external  barriers which 
prevent or  delay  it,  and  its  impacts  on  competiti-
veness and employment. 
This  brochure  reviews  and  summarises  the  first  12 
reports  in  a series  of Innovation  Policy  Studies  com-
missioned  by  the  Innovation  Directorate  of  the 
European  Commission's  Directorate-General  for 
Enterprise  as  part  of the  Innovation  and  SMEs  pro-
gramme  of  the  EU's  Fifth  Research  Framework 
Programme. Many make detailed use of the dataset -
unique in  the world - assembled  by the Community 
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Innovation  Survey,  which  gathers  comparable  data 
about firm-level  innovation activity across the EU  in  a 
joint action of the Enterprise DG  and Eurostat, the EU 
statistical office. Following a 1992 pilot project (CIS1 ), 
the second survey (CIS2) was conducted in  1997-98, 
and examined both manufacturing and service sectors. 
These  studies,  carried  out  by  the  Innovation 
Directorate  with  the  assistance  of external  technical 
experts, are designed to enhance Europe's capacity to 
understand and improve its  innovative performance. 
Addressing  innovation policy issues  identified  by the 
Commission as  priorities in  relation to company-level 
innovation  and  its  framework  conditions,  they  give 
Europe's political, industrial and institutional decision-
makers  access  to  international  experience,  to  the 
results  of authoritative and  up-to-date research,  and 
to assessments of existing policy instruments. Taken  as 
a whole,  the study series  will  help them to develop 
reliable and meaningful benchmarks, to identify, share 
and  adapt  best  practice,  and  to  introduce  practical 
and mutually reinforcing support measures with max-
imum efficiency. 
This brochure 
The  12 study summaries  contained  in  this  brochure 
are  grouped together by topic in five chapters which 
address,  respectively: 
0  broad national and EU  innovation policy 
fJ  technology transfer - the conversion  of research 
results into commercial products and services 
II the  financing  of  innovation  - in  particular,  by 
banks and venture capital funds 
0  innovation management within firms, and especi-
ally within small and medium-sized enterprises 
0  regional issues and approaches 
Although it is  hoped that each  summary will serve  to 
reinforce and elucidate those around it, no attempt has 
been made to impose overall consistency not present in 
the reports themselves.  Instead, the summaries outline 
the most significant findings and recommendations of 
each  study.  Full  publication  details  (including,  where 
relevant,  the  price)  are  also  given  for  each  report. 
Finally,  a table of references  (pages  64-65) identifies 
passages  in each of the 12 reports which treat 20 pri-
ority  topics  such  as  innovation  financing  and 
university-industry interfaces,  while details  of future 
Innovation Policy Studies either in progress or planned 
are set out in 'Forthcoming Studies' (pages 66-67). chapter I  Innovation Policy 
The  regular  collection  and  analysis  of 
information about innovation behaviour 
by individual firms, and about measures 
implemented by Member States to assist 
innovative enterprises, constitutes a vital 
input  to  regional,  national  and  EU 
policy-making.  It  provides  a  platform 
for the assessment  of actual  innovation 
performance,  and  for  the  efficient 
development  of  policies  to  stimulate 
and  support innovation as  a key  source 
of future  competitiveness,  employment 
and economic growth in Europe. 14 
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Key Findings 
•  Over  half  of  all  European  manufacturing  enterprises  (51%)  and  40%  of  those  in  the  service  sector  are 
technological innovators, but these proportions vary widely between countries. 
•  The larger the firm, the more likely it is  to be an  innovator. Among all manufacturing firms, large firms spend 
nearly twice as  large a proportion of their turnover (4.2%) on innovation activities as  do small  ones (2.5%). 
•  SMEs account for 29% of Europe's total manufacturing sales,  but for only 18% of sales of innovative products. 
•  Even  in  the low-tech sectors 36% of small, 49% of medium and 71% of large firms are innovators. 
•  The acquisition  of machinery and equipment is  a source  of product or process  innovation for 60% of small 
innovators, and for 69% of medium-sized ones_ 
•  Universities and public research  institutes are considered to be key sources of innovation information by less 
than 5% of innovating firms,  and patents by only 3% of manufacturing innovators and 1% of those in  the 
service sector. 
•  Among collaborating innovators, 84% of manufacturers and  74% of service  sector firms work with domestic 
partners, while 50% of manufacturers and 37% of service sector firms work with partners in  other EU  countries. 
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T
he  challenges and opportunities presented  by globalisa-
tion and  the new knowledge-driven economy require a 
radical  transformation of enterprise policies in the European 
Union. The  EU's  robust current economic and employment 
growth coexist with persistent structural unemployment and 
a widening skills gap, especially in emerging high-tech fields. 
The  strategic  goal  set  at the  European  Council  Summit in 
Lisbon  in  March  2000,  "to make  the  European  Union  the 
most competitive and  dynamic knowledge-based  economy 
in the world" by the end of the decade, necessitates new pol-
icy initiatives -at EU,  national and regional levels- to make 
Europe more entrepreneurial and more innovative. 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is undertaken joint-
ly by the European  Commission and the statistical offices of 
the  European  Economic  Area's  Member  States  (EEA).  It 
assembles  information  on  technological  innovation  in 
Europe,  as  a  contribution  to  the  development of  effective 
policies supporting innovation and the spread  of new tech-
nologies. Using  a common methodology, CIS  gathers inter-
nationally  comparable  data  on  the  resources  devoted  to 
innovation at firm  level,  as  well  as  its  impacts on  competi-
tiveness. 
Statistics on Innovation in  Europe presents an  overview of the 
results of the second CIS (1997-98), by country and firm size, 
and makes a detailed comparison between high-tech indus-
tries  and  other manufacturing sectors.  For  the  purposes  of 
the CIS,  innovative firms ('innovators') are  those which have 
introduced a technologically new product, process or service 
during the previous three years.  The survey covers  not only 
R&D  inputs but also  the acquisition of machinery,  software 
or other technology,  as  well  as  training  and  market  intro-
duction.  In  respect  of product innovations,  it distinguishes 
between those which are  simply new to the firm itself and 
those which are also  new to its market ('novel'). 
How much innovation? 
Over half of all  European  manufacturing enterprises (51%) 
are  technological  innovators,  but  this  proportion  varies 
widely  between  countries  - from  around  70%  in  Ireland, 
Denmark  and  Germany to  around  30% in  Belgium,  Spain 
and Portugal. In almost every Member State, there are fewer 
innovators in the service sector than in manufacturing indus-
try- just 40% across the EU  as  a whole. 
Among  manufacturing  innovators,  12%  reported  only 
process  innovations  and  24%  only  product  innovations, 
while  64%  had  implemented  both  product  and  process 
innovations. Process innovation is more likely to rely on tech-
nologies  developed  outside  the firm.  Only 48% of process 
innovations were carried  out on the basis  of in-house R&D, 
compared  with  73%  of  product  innovations.  just  8%  of 
product  innovators  and  28%  of  process  innovators  relied 
exclusively on externally developed technologies. 
Among product innovators, which represent 44% of all  EU 
manufacturing enterprises, slightly less than half were 'novel 
innovators' - that is,  having introduced products not simply 
new to the firm but new to its market. Italy and France,  both 
with a relatively small proportion of product innovators, nev-
ertheless have a high share of novel innovators. In  Germany 
and  the  United  Kingdom,  by contrast,  the overall  share  of 
product innovators  is  high,  while  the  proportion  of  novel 
innovators is  low. 
Overall,  the  larger the firm,  the  more  likely  it  is  to be  an 
innovator  (Figure  1 .1  ).  On  average  across  the  EU,  innov-
ations were introduced by 79% of large manufacturing firms 
(those with more than 250 employees), by 58% of medium-
sized  ones  (50-249  employees)  and  by  just 44% of small 
ones  (fewer than  50 employees).  In  the service  sector,  the 
corresponding figures were 73% for large, 49% for medium 
and 37% for small firms. 
By  industrial  sector,  the  average  proportion  of innovators 
across  the  EU  ranges  from  close  to  70%  in  the  coke  and 
chemicals,  electrical  and optical equipment, and  machinery 
and  equipment  industries,  to  just  35%  in  the  textile  and 
leather industry. There  is  little variation in the sectoral  distri-
bution of innovators between countries. 
When manufacturing industry as  a whole is  divided accord-
ing to level  of technology - with the aerospace,  computer, 
office machinery, electronics,  communications and  pharma-
ceuticals industries classified as high tech - a slightly different 
picture  emerges.  Unsurprisingly,  innovators  form  a  large 
- - -
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majority  (71 %)  of  high-tech  sector  firms,  but  a  minority 
(43%) of those in  the low-tech sectors. Even  in the low-tech 
sectors, however, 36% of small, 49% of medium and 71% of 
large firms are  innovators. Whatever the level of technology, 
large  firms  include  a  considerably  higher  proportion  of 
innovators than medium-sized and small ones. 
The  high-tech sectors  account for only 3% of all  European 
manufacturing firms,  and  generate only 9% of total  manu-
facturing sales. But the high and  medium-high tech sectors 
together contribute a disproportionately large share  of sales 
of new and improved products- 70% and 71% respectively. 
The medium-high tech sectors in  particular (scientific instru-
ments, motor vehicles, electrical machinery, chemicals, other 
transport equipment and  non-electrical  machinery) can  be 
characterised as the engines of product innovation in Europe, 
contributing 56% of new and 63% of improved products. 
The impacts of innovation 
Innovative  (recently  introduced  or  improved)  products 
account for  fully  one-third  of  all  European  manufacturing 
sales  - but this  means  that the  great  majority of Europe's 
industrial  turnover  derives  from  products  which  have 
remained unchanged for at least three years. 
Sales  of  innovative  products  as  a  proportion  of  total 
turnover increase with firm size- from 15% for small firms to 
21% for medium-sized  and  38% for large ones.  Small  and 
medium-sized enterprises account for 29% of Europe's total 
manufacturing sales,  but for only 18% of sales  of innovative 
products. 
In  general,  in  countries with a large proportion of innovat-
ing companies,  new or improved products also  represent a 
comparatively large share of total manufacturing sales.  But in 
Spain, with only 29% of innovators among its manufacturing 
firms,  new or improved products generate around  28% of 
manufacturing  turnover,  close  to  the  EU  average  of  32%, 
outperforming  Denmark,  where  71%  of  all  manufacturers 
are innovators. 
Among innovators alone, sales of new or improved products 
represent  over  40%  of  turnover.  Significantly,  this  share 
varies remarkably little with firm size- while small innovating 
firms  devote  proportionately more resources  to  innovation 
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(see  below),  larger  ones  may  benefit  from  economies  of 
scale. 
The share  of total turnover generated by new or improved 
products  varies  widely  between  manufacturing  sectors 
(Figure  1.2).  In  the transport equipment and  electrical  and 
optical  equipment  sectors  they  account  for  over  50%  of 
sales,  but in the wood, pulp and printing and basic and fab-
ricated metals sectors only 15%. Novel products, new to the 
market, represent by some margin the highest proportion of 
total  sales  (12%)  in  the  electrical  and  optical  equipment 
sector. 
Patents  are  a traditional  indicator of innovation activity.  In 
the three  previous years,  25% of innovating manufacturers 
and  7% of service sector innovators applied for at least one 
patent. Among  manufacturers,  patent applications increase 
markedly  with  firm  size  - only  15%  of  small  innovators 
applied for a patent, compared with 28% of medium-sized 
and 51% of large ones.  Use  of the patent system also varies 
widely  by  country.  In  Finland,  40%  of  innovative  firms 
applied for a patent, compared with only 11% of Portuguese 
innovators. 
Expenditure on innovation 
Innovation  among  enterprises  encompasses  not  only  the 
creation  of knowledge through  research  and  technological 
development but also  the various  processes  by which  new 
technology  is  diffused,  absorbed  and  applied.  Innovation 
may involve investment in capital equipment or intermediate 
goods which  embody  new technologies,  as  well  as  in  the 
development of intangible assets  of knowledge and  skill.  In 
both cases,  such activity may be carried out in-house or may 
involve  the  acquisition  of  equipment,  goods,  services  or 
know-how from outside the firm. The  CIS  collects  informa-
tion about firms' expenditure on all  these aspects,  allowing 
comparative analysis  of investment in  innovation using  the 
ratio  of expenditure on  innovation  activities  to total  com-
pany turnover- called 'innovation intensity'. 
Across the EU,  innovation intensity is  3.7% in manufacturing 
sectors,  and  2.8% in  service  sectors  (Figure  1.3).  In  manu-
facturing sectors,  Portugal,  Spain  and  Belgium,  which  have 
the  smallest  proportion  of innovating  firms,  also  have  the lowest innovation intensity - 2% or less.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, however, the innovation intensity of Sweden's 
manufacturing sectors is  as  high as  7%, despite the relative-
ly low proportion of innovating firms. In  Sweden, therefore, 
innovation is tightly concentrated in a small number of high-
ly  innovation-intensive firms.  Ireland's  innovation  intensity, 
by contrast,  is  below the  EU  average,  although  it has  the 
highest proportion of innovating firms (74%) of any Member 
State. 
On average,  among all  manufacturing firms,  large compa-
nies  spend  nearly  twice  as  large  a  proportion  of  their 
turnover  (4.2%)  on  innovation  activities  as  do  small  ones 
(2.5%).  This  difference is  especially pronounced in  Sweden, 
Finland  and  France,  while  in  Denmark  and  Austria,  small 
firms spend  on average a higher proportion of turnover on 
innovation  than  do medium-sized  and  large  ones.  Among 
innovating firms, across the EU  as  a·whole small companies' 
innovation intensity (5.1  %) is  higher than that of large ones 
(4.7%). This  is  true both in  manufacturing and  service  sec-
tors - strong evidence that innovating SMEs  play as  large a 
part in  European innovation as  large innovators. 
Innovation intensity varies  from over 10% in  the high-tech 
sectors to less than 2% in the low-tech ones. In the high-tech 
market analysis, staff training and a range of other factors are 
also likely to be involved. 
In European manufacturing industry, around 80% of innova-
tive  firms  make  use  of  R&D  - 58%  employing  in-house 
resources.  But  the  acquisition  of  technology  embodied  in 
machinery  purchased  from  third-party  suppliers  is  also  a 
source of innovation for over 65%. Innovation activities other 
than  R&D  are  especially  important for  medium-sized  and 
small enterprises - while over 80% of innovating large firms 
engage in  in-house R&D,  this  is  a feature of the innovation 
process for only 45% of small  innovators. The acquisition of 
machinery and equipment is  a source of product or process 
innovation  for  60%  of  small  innovators,  and  for  69%  of 
medium-sized ones. 
In  the service  sector,  research  and  development is  an  ele-
ment of the innovation process for only 55% of innovators, 
and only 40% rely on in-house R&D. Here, the acquisition of 
machinery  and  disembodied  technology  in  the  form  of 
know-how,  licences,  trademarks  and  consultancy  services 
constitutes  the  most  significant  innovation  input,  while 
training  and  other investment in  intangible assets  are  also 
proportionately more important than they are  for manufac-
turing industry. 
Share of manufacturers valuing sources of information for innovation, EEA,  1996 
Source. CIS/, Eurostat!Enterprise  DG 
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sectors,  innovation intensity ranges  by firm size from 1  0. 7% 
among large firms to 7.7% for small ones and just 5.7% for 
medium-sized  ones.  Among  innovators  alone,  innovation 
intensity  is  naturally  higher,  but especially  among  smaller 
firms which, in the low and medium low-tech sectors devote 
4.8% of turnover to expenditure on  innovation,  compared 
with  2.6%  for  large  companies.  In  the  high-tech  sectors, 
small  firms  spend  around  11 %  of turnover on  innovation 
activities,  compared  with  7%  among  medium-sized  firms 
and 12% among large ones. 
Innovation activities 
A firm's capacity to carry technological innovation through 
to  commercial  success  depends,  as  already  stated,  on  far 
more than investment in research and development. Design, 
"~ R&D  periormer·s 
"- Non R&D  perion-ner ·s 
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The  size  of expenditures  on  different types  of  innovation 
activity does not necessarily reflect their relative importance. 
Training, for example,  accounts for less  than 2% of innova-
tion expenditure in  manufacturing sectors,  and  around  3% 
in  the service sector,  but is  likely to have a disproportionate 
significance as  an  integrated element of a successful  innova-
tion  process.  Overall,  R&D  (internal  and  external)  absorbs 
over  60% of innovation  expenditure  in  manufacturing  and 
over 50% in services. The acquisition of machinery and other, 
disembodied technology represents  25% of total innovation 
expenditure in  manufacturing and 30% in  services. 
R&D does not dominate innovation expenditure in all coun-
tries,  however.  In-house R&D accounts for over 60% of the 
total in manufacturing industries in France and Germany, but 
only around 30% in  Italy and the United Kingdom, and  less 
- - -
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than  1  0% in  Portugal.  The  purchase  of embodied technol-
ogy  represents  over  40%  of  innovation  expenditure  in 
Portugal,  Italy,  Denmark,  Ireland  and  the  UK.  Similarly, 
expenditure  on  R&D  is  heavily  skewed  towards  high-tech 
and  medium-high tech  sectors.  Manufacturers  in  low- and 
medium-low tech  sectors  spend  a disproportionate amount 
on the purchase of machinery and equipment, and on other 
intangibles (licences,  know-how, training, and  so  on), while 
expenditure on external (contracted-out) R&D among those 
in  medium-low tech sectors is also  relatively high. 
Innovation information 
Far from being the result of a linear flow of new knowledge 
from the laboratory to the  market place,  innovation  is  sys-
temic  - it  depends  upon  complex  interactions  between 
many stakeholders.  Access  to relevant  information  is  there-
fore  a critical  element of any successful  innovation system, 
whether at local,  regional,  national or European level. 
The CIS  identifies four main sources of information essential 
relies on internal information sources. In both manufacturing 
and service sectors, 60% of large innovators consider internal 
sources to be critical, while only 51% of small innovators in the 
service  sector  and  43% in  manufacturing  do so.  Small  and 
medium-sized  innovators in  both manufacturing and  service 
sectors rely to a much greater extent than large ones on trade 
fairs and exhibitions for innovation-related information. 
Trade events are  key  sources  of information for more small 
innovating  manufacturers than any  other external  informa-
tion  source  other than  their customers.  In  every  Member 
State,  more innovators rely on trade events than use  univer-
sities,  public  research  institutes,  computer-based  networks, 
professional  conferences,  consultants or patent disclosures. 
In  Spain,  Italy, Austria and Portugal, trade events rank as  the 
third  most important source  of information for innovating 
manufacturers, and across the EU  as  the fourth most impor-
tant.  They  are  slightly  less  important in  the  service  sector, 
where innovators  make  greater use  of computer networks, 
professional conferences and consultants. 
Share of European collaborative innovators by partner location, EEA,  1996 
Source: C/52, Eurostot/Enterpnse DG  Figure  1 .5 
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to the design  and  implementation of innovation  projects -
sources within the enterprise itself (or its group of enterprises), 
market  information  acquired  from  customers,  competitors, 
suppliers  or  consultants,  publicly  available  information  from 
trade fairs  and  exhibitions,  journals  and  computer-based  net-
works, and patent databases, and information supplied by uni-
versities and research  institutes. 
In  both manufacturing and service sectors,  internal sources 
(around 50%) and clients or customers (around 40%) are the 
most  common  suppliers  of  innovation-related  information 
(Figure  1  .4).  Notably,  universities and  public research  insti-
tutes are considered to be key  sources of information by less 
than  5% of innovating  firms,  and  patents  by  only  3%  of 
manufacturing innovators and 1% of those in the service sec-
tor.  As  might be  expected,  high-tech  manufacturers  make 
greatest  use  of  conferences  and  patent  disclosures,  while 
12%  use  universities  and  public  research  bodies  as  key 
sources of information. 
An even greater proportion of large firms than of small ones 
Manufacturing 
Services 
Among  manufacturing  innovators,  around  64%  of  firms 
which carry out in-house R&D consider internal information 
sources critical, compared with just 40% of those with no in-
house research  capacity. The same group is  also  more likely 
to make use of information from their customers. 
Innovation networks 
Commercial  relationships  - with  customers  and  suppliers, 
and  to a lesser  extent with competitors - clearly constitute 
the dominant form  of interaction  between firms.  However, 
'non-market  interactions'  are  increasingly  common,  and 
increasingly  important,  especially  among  innovating firms. 
For these firms, collaboration can help to lower the costs and 
risks  of innovation, as  well as  to extract value from new sci-
entific and technical knowledge. 
Such  interactions include formal and informal collaborative 
arrangements.  Innovation  networks  or  'clusters'  usually 
involve both horizontal and vertical inter-firm collaboration-
both between companies operating in the same industry and Factors causing innovation projects to be seriously delayed, EEA,  1996 
Source: C/52, Eurostat!Enterprise DG 
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between suppliers and customers along supply chains. 
On average,  around a quarter of European  innovative firms 
were  involved  in  collaborative  arrangements  - 27%  in  the 
manufacturing and  24% in  the service  sectors.  In  the high-
tech  manufacturing  sectors  as  many as  44% of innovators 
were involved in collaboration, and in the medium-high tech, 
32%.  Among  innovating  manufacturers,  partnership  was 
most commonly with other enterprises within the same com-
pany group (59%), followed  by suppliers (49%),  customers 
(48%),  universities  (38%)  and  public  research  institutes 
(33%). In the service sector,  68% of innovating collaborators 
worked with other enterprises in the same group, and collab-
orations with competitors were more than twice as  common 
as those among manufacturers. 
Innovation  collaboration  is  especially  common  in  the 
Scandinavian countries.  Nearly 60% of Swedish  and  Danish 
innovating  manufacturers,  and  fully  70%  of  Finnish  ones, 
had  a  collaborative  arrangement.  In  southern  Europe,  by 
contrast, only around 20% of Spanish and Portuguese innov-
ators  collaborate,  and  only  1  0%  of  Italian  ones.  In  most 
countries,  more  innovators  in  the  manufacturing  sectors 
engage  in  collaboration  as  part  of the  innovation  process 
than  in  the  service  sector.  But  in  Denmark,  Belgium  and 
Portugal,  a  larger  proportion  of  service  sector  innovators 
collaborate. 
Both in manufacturing and in services, the rate of collabora-
tion  among  innovating  firms  increases  with  size.  While 
around 20% of small  innovators have collaborative arrange-
ments, approximately 50% of large ones in the manufactur-
ing sectors do so,  and around 35% in the service sector. 
Collaboration  still  occurs  mainly  between  partners  in  the 
same country (Figure 1.5). Among collaborating innovators, 
84% of manufacturers and 74% of service sector firms work 
with  domestic  partners,  while  50%  of  manufacturers  and 
37% of service  sector firms work with partners  in  other EU 
countries. Outside the EU, the United States is the most com-
mon location for innovation partners - 25% of innovating 
collaborators  in  manufacturing,  and  28%  of  those  in  the 
service sector,  have partners in the US. 
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Manufacturing 
Among  firms  of all  sizes,  collaboration  is  correlated  with 
innovations new to the market. While only 36% of manufac-
turing  innovators  not involved  in  collaboration  had  intro-
duced  novel  products  in  the previous  three years,  50% of 
those  with  innovation  partnerships  had  done so.  Similarly, 
while only 28% of all  manufacturing innovators are involved 
in  a collaborative agreement, these account for 50% of the 
turnover  attributable  to  new  or  improved  products.  In 
Finland,  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark and  France,  collabora-
tors  generate  over  75%  of  the  turnover  from  innovative 
products, but in Germany only 37%. 
Barriers to innovation 
Not  all  innovation  projects  are  successfully  completed  -
some are aborted or seriously delayed, and others are  never 
started.  Financial  factors,  such  as  perception of market risk 
or inability to secure  appropriate finance,  are  not the only 
barriers,  however.  Lack  of information  or skills,  regulatory 
constraints and organisational rigidities within the firm itself 
may also  impede or prevent innovation. 
Serious delays had affected at least one innovation project 
of 27% of innovators in the manufacturing and 37% in the 
service sectors in  the previous three years,  while 16% and 
15%  respectively  had  abandoned  at  least  one  project 
entirely. 
Where projects were seriously delayed,  internal factors - in 
particular,  lack  of  qualified  personnel  and  organisational 
rigidities - were the commonest cause,  and especially so  in 
the service  sector (Figure  1  .6).  Where  projects  were  aban-
doned  or not even  started,  on  the other hand,  financial 
barriers were most often to blame. 
Financial  barriers,  and  in  particular the costs  of innovation 
and  the  difficulty  of  identifying  appropriate  sources  of 
finance, affect small firms disproportionately, contributing to 
serious delays and decisions not to start an  innovation proj-
ect for a significantly larger proportion of small  innovators 
than large ones in  both manufacturing and service sectors. 
- - -
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Key Findings 
• The knowledge-based industrial and service sectors are  increasing their share of overall  economies, while the 
resources devoted to the production of knowledge are also increasing. 
•  The efficiency of innovation systems is  a  key determinant of national and  regional  competitiveness  in the 
global, knowledge-driven economy. 
•  Innovation and knowledge generation take place as  a result of a variety of activities, many of them outside the 
formal research process. 
•  All firms must integrate more different types of knowledge today than in the past. They must also learn to inte-
grate people in a new way, as  carriers of tacit knowledge. 
•  Greater dynamism and greater willingness to take risks with respect to innovation are required. European venture 
capital funds are still less willing to invest in firms without a proven track record than their US counterparts. 
•  When European firms locate their R&D in foreign countries, they would rather do so  in the US than in  another 
EU  country. 
•  While  34% of large R&D-performing firms  use  patent disclosure as  an  information input to their innovation 
activities, only 18% of those with fewer than 500 employees do so. 
S
ince the publication of the European Commission's 1996 
First  Action  Plan  for Innovation in  Europe(l),  the  European 
Union has  adopted a system-based  approach to innovation 
policy.  In  this  conceptual framework,  technical  change and 
innovation are understood to take place within local, region-
al,  national and  European  systems  which are  both dynamic 
and complex,  involving many different processes  and many 
different actors and institutions. 
The  ultimate  goal  of  innovation  policy  is  to  support  an 
increase in the productivity, profitability and market share of 
European  firms  through the development and  adoption  of 
new or improved products, processes and services.  However, 
measures  designed  to  raise  the  quantity and  efficiency  of 
innovative activities should not focus exclusively on the pro-
duction and exploitation of new technologies, but must take 
account of the highly interdependent links  between all  the 
many 'innovation actors'. These include not only universities, 
research centres and industrial firms, but also investors, tech-
nology transfer  professionals,  national  and  regional  policy-
makers,  patent attorneys and consultants, trade associations 
and chambers of commerce, and others. 
The  vitality  and  effectiveness  of  innovation  systems  has 
always  depended  on  the  efficient  flow  of  information 
between  these  players.  In  today's  global  knowledge-based 
(1 ) COM(96) 589 final, see  Bulletin of the European  Union, Supplement 3/ 97,  7  997. economy  innovation  systems  are,  increasingly,  the  critical 
components of both industrial competitiveness and regional 
prosperity. 
Innovation  policy  in  a  knowledge-based  economy draws  on 
recent academic insights into the nature of knowledge and 
innovation systems,  and  their role  in  modern economies.  It 
considers  empirical evidence - in  particular,  concerning the 
form  and  impacts of the progressive  globalisation  of tech-
nology markets,  innovation patterns in  the rapidly growing 
service sector, and the role of intellectual property rights as a 
mechanism for the dissemination of new knowledge. Finally, 
it identifies policy priorities for the European Union, based on 
the foregoing analysis. 
Knowledge in the driving seat 
In  all  human societies,  economic activity of whatever kind 
has  been  based  on  knowledge.  There  is  general  consensus 
that its  role  in  today's developed economies  is  qualitatively 
different - but neither the precise  nature of this difference, 
nor its  implications, are  yet clear.  However,  it seems  certain 
that  the  dynamics  of  advanced  economies  increasingly 
depend less on investments in physical capital, and more on 
investments in learning and the creation of knowledge. 
Today,  knowledge  is  increasingly treated  as  a commodity, 
which is packaged, bought and sold in ways and to an extent 
never seen before - most obviously, in the form of licences to 
exploit  intellectual  property.  Information  and  communica-
tions technologies (ICTs)  play a central role. They reduce the 
costs  and  increase  the  speed  of transporting  knowledge in 
the form of data,  information and  ideas,  as  well  as  greatly 
enhancing  our  ability  to  exploit  it.  The  growth  of  those 
industrial  sectors which produce ICTs'  various components, 
driven  by  rapidly  increasing  investment  in  hardware,  soft-
ware  and  telecommunications  equipment  in  every  sector, 
has also been a major contributor to recent economic expan-
sion. Yet the development of a knowledge-driven economy is 
not synonymous with, nor is  it encompassed  by,  the devel-
opment of ICTs.  ICTs are not themselves knowledge, and do 
not necessarily create or extend knowledge. They are,  rather, 
a resource- albeit one whose growing use accelerates and is 
in turn accelerated by economic dependence on knowledge. 
If knowledge has always been the basis of economic activity, 
and  if  the  decline  in  the  cost  of communication  brought 
about by ICTs  merely continues a long historical trend, what 
is  now different is  the rate of technological change, and the 
extent to  which  knowledge  lies  at  the  heart  of economic 
growth. Both are of a different order of magnitude from any-
thing seen  in the past. 
These  trends are  mutually reinforcing.  In  OECD  countries, 
the  knowledge-based  industrial  and  service  sectors  are 
growing faster than GDP,  and thus increasing their share of 
overall economies. Meanwhile, the resources devoted to the 
production  of knowledge - expenditures  on  research  and 
development,  software,  and  education  and  training - are 
also  increasing,  as  are  both the quality and the importance 
of human resources. According to the OECD's 1999 Science, 
Technology  and Industry  Scoreboard,  in  the  United  States, 
investment in  intangibles and  knowledge grew by 3.1% as 
a share of GDP in the decade 1985-95, and now amounts to 
40%  of  that  devoted  to  fixed  capital  formation.  In  this 
respect, Europe lags behind the US,  but only slightly- in the 
same period, European Union investment in intangibles and 
knowledge grew by 2.9% as  a share of GDP. 
Knowledge and innovation 
The  increasing  importance of knowledge  as  an  economic 
driver has major implications for innovation systems- whose 
efficiency  is,  in  turn,  a  key  determinant  of  national  and 
regional  competitiveness  in  the  global,  knowledge-driven 
economy. 
The systems approach to innovation recognises that innova-
tion and  knowledge generation  take  place  as  a  result  of a 
variety  of  activities,  many  of  them  outside  the  formal 
research  process.  A  successful  innovation  system  must  be 
able  to  take  advantage  of  such  'learning  without formal 
research',  for example  in  the  service  sector  where  formal 
R&D plays a very much less significant role than in manufac-
turing  sectors.  In  the  EU,  investment  in  R&D  ranges  from 
25% of total  innovation  expenditures  in  the electrical  and 
electronic  equipment sector  to  just  1  0%  in  the  pulp  and 
paper sector. The  balance is  devoted to investment in  plant 
and equipment, software, training, design and market intro-
duction (Figure 1.7). 
Composition of innovation expenditures by industry (share of total innovation expenditures) 
Source: Community Innovation  Survey  1992 
Figure  1.7 
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Knowledge  is  thus  generated  not  just  in  universities  and 
research centres, but in a very wide variety of locations with-
in the economy, and notably as  a by-product of production 
(learning by doing) or of consumption (learning by using). 
More  generally,  an  innovation  system's  performance  is 
determined  by  the  rate  and  efficiency  with  which  new 
knowledge is  diffused throughout the entire system,  so  that 
its full economic impact can  be realised.  In  part as a result of 
the  adoption  of  ICTs,  the  degree  of  connectivity  among 
knowledge agents - individuals,  institutions and firms - has 
dramatically increased.  The  falling  cost  of connectivity  has 
made possible an  increase in the density of the connections 
within an  innovation system,  changing its  diffusion  proper-
ties by expanding the number of knowledge sources, and the 
number of knowledge clients, accessible to each  actor. 
The  importance  and  difficulty  of the  task  of knowledge 
management faced  by individual companies  has  increased 
correspondingly.  In  all  sectors,  the  knowledge  base  is 
becoming broader and more complex at the same  time as 
the speed with which it changes  is  also  increasing. In  inno-
vative industries in particular, companies are looking beyond 
generally,  trans-sectoral  and  trans-disciplinary  collaboration 
are likely to offer less costly routes to the effective diffusion of 
tacit knowledge. 
It should  be  noted that while the new ICTs  have facilitated 
the  diffusion  of  codified  knowledge,  irrespective  of  geo-
graphical distance, they have not yet done so for tacit know-
ledge,  which  must  be  communicated  face  to face.  Direct 
interactions remain  crucial,  and geographical clustering can 
raise the efficiency of innovation, especially in industries built 
around  new,  rapidly  developing  technologies.  Clusters, 
whether of high-tech firms in and around the science parks 
of academic centres of excellence, or of supply chains around 
major manufacturers, tend to become self-sustaining by cre-
ating an  'innovation culture' which attracts new players who 
both benefit from and contribute to it. 
Diffusion and absorption 
An  effective  process  of knowledge diffusion  needs  to be 
matched by adequate 'absorptive capacity'. The availability 
of information is  not enough. It only becomes useful where 
the ability to absorb and integrate it exists. For firms,  this 
New strategic technological partnerships by EU firms, by location of partner, 1980-94  I 
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their 'traditional' knowledge  bases  in  their search  for new 
ways  to improve products and  processes.  Innovation  con-
sists predominantly of the recombination of existing ideas or 
knowledge, assembled in a novel way. Today,  all firms must 
integrate  more  different  types  of  knowledge  than  in  the 
past.  Even  industries  which  perform  little  or  no  formal 
research  and development, such  as  the Norwegian offshore 
and  food-processing  sectors,  are  frequently  major users  of 
knowledge generated elsewhere. 
In  addition, firms must learn  to integrate people in  a new 
way,  as  carriers of tacit knowledge - that is,  knowledge not 
recorded  or codified  as  reusable  information. For  while our 
ability  to  codify  and  transmit  knowledge  grows,  and  the 
costs of doing so fall, as  the result of the ICT revolution, our 
capacity to exploit it successfully depends on even more rap-
idly advancing tacit knowledge. The  mobility of knowledge 
is  critical,  but fast staff turnover resulting from shortages of 
qualified staff is an  extremely inefficient way to achieve such 
mobility. joint research  or training,  secondment and,  more 
means  maintaining their human capital  - through  hiring, 
training and  participation in  research  activities - at a level 
where staff are able to observe, evaluate and integrate new 
knowledge developed elsewhere. 
At the  level  of regions  and  countries,  both  research  and 
development  and  education  and  training  are  key  factors. 
R&D  is  important not only as  a producer of 'hard' innova-
tions,  but as  a producer of skills. Public education systems, 
meanwhile, are the major suppliers of the qualified personnel 
required by industry. They must be sufficiently specialised to 
meet industry's human capital needs,  but over-specialisation 
is  also  a  real  danger.  Diversity  and  heterogeneity  in  the 
knowledge base  are  often vital  in  allowing potential innov-
ators to move beyond the product development trajectories 
which  they  have  inherited  from  the  past,  and  to develop 
novel  products  or to add  entirely  new features  to existing 
ones. To  produce graduates capable of renewing a region's 
industrial  base  by  absorbing  knowledge  from  outside  its 
established domains, and to enable it to ride out major shifts Non-domestic patenting activity of European firms, by host region, 1991-95  Figure  1.9 
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in  the  markets  it addresses,  a  regional  education  system 
must be  broader than the innovating industries it serves. 
Not only are  many of the costs  of acquiring and exploit-
ing  new knowledge falling,  and  the  potential  benefits of 
doing so increasing, for any individual innovator. The same 
is  also  true for each  of his  competitors. The cost of failure 
to  innovate - in  terms  of rapid  and  catastrophic  loss  of 
competitiveness  - has  therefore  vastly  increased.  The 
knowledge-driven  economy  calls  for  greater  dynamism 
and greater willingness to take  risks  with respect to inno-
vation, and in  particular requires a greater emphasis on the 
role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Young,  knowledge-based firms are  not only more numer-
ous than in the past, especially in  high-tech industries such 
as  biotechnology,  software  and  advanced  chemicals,  but 
also  play  an  increasingly  important  role  as  innovation 
agents,  as  large  industrial  concerns  outsource  to  smaller 
specialists  a growing share  of their research  and  develop-
ment activities. However,  the assets  of start-up companies 
of this  kind  are,  at least  in  the early  stages,  largely intan-
gible- often, they consist of little more than the knowledge 
and  skills  of the founders  and  a few  key  employees.  The 
impossibility of assessing  the  market value  of such  intan-
gibles  using  conventional  methods,  even  in  more mature 
knowledge-based  companies,  underlies  the  volatility  of 
publicly-quoted  high-tech  stocks.  Among  early-stage 
innovative start-ups, it constitutes a real  barrier to the rapid 
growth of which many are capable, since uncertainty in the 
valuation of a business idea is a powerful deterrent to a risk-
averse  investor. 
As  a percentage of GDP,  venture capital in Europe remains 
roughly half that in  the US.  Further, while 'early stage' cap-
ital  accounts  for  fully  40%  of  all  US  venture  capital,  in 
Europe  it is  only around  15%. Although the overall  avail-
ability of venture capital has  grown rapidly in the EU  since 
1995, European  funds  still  appear  less  willing to invest in 
firms without a proven track record - or are  less  skilled at 
assessing  and managing the risks  involved in doing so. 
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Innovation and globalisation 
The  globalisation  of technology is  taking  place  primarily 
along three routes - first,  the international exploitation of 
nationally produced technology; second, the global gener-
ation of innovations by multinational enterprises; and third, 
global technological collaborations. 
An  estimated  89% of the total  R&D  expenditures of the 
world's largest companies is  spent in  their home countries, 
and  smaller  firms  tend  to  be  even  less  internationalised, 
concentrating high value-adding activities such  as  research 
at home.  In  1995, the most technologically intensive sec-
tors accounted for around 20% of all  world trade,  having 
more than doubled in  the 25 years since 1970. In the same 
period,  however,  Europe's  share  of total world  exports  in 
these 'science-based' sectors fell from 48.6% to 33.8% - a 
fall  of approximately three percentage points greater than 
that experienced by the US. 
Flows  of  disembodied  knowledge  - as  opposed  to  that 
embodied  in  products  and  services  - can  be  indirectly 
assessed  using  data  on  patenting  activity,  since  foreign 
patents may also be used to sell  new technologies into non-
domestic markets in disembodied form, as  licences. Since it 
outstripped  growth  in  industrial  R&D  expenditures,  the 
robust worldwide expansion of external patent applications 
in the decade 1985-95 indicates increased efforts to exploit 
innovations in overseas  markets.  European companies par-
ticipated  in  this  trend,  but remain  disadvantaged  by the 
fact  that  in  order to  exploit their  innovations  across  the 
wider 'domestic'  Single  European  Market they must bear 
the cost and  complexity of dealing with different national 
regulations and courts. 
In  the three  largest  EU  economies,  foreign  multinational 
enterprises  account  for  between  1 3%  and  15% of  total 
industrial  R&D  expenditure,  but  from  21%  to  28%  of 
industrial production. These figures are not significantly dif-
ferent from those for the US,  where foreign multinationals 
account  for  11.3%  of  R&D  and  15.5%  of  production. 
However, the overseas  R&D activities of European firms are 
heavily  concentrated  in  the  US  (Figure  1.8),  where  they 
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Innovation expenditures as a percentage of sales, by country 
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represent  almost  70%  of  all  foreign-controlled  R&D. 
Indeed, there is  evidence that when European firms locate 
their R&D in foreign countries, they prefer to do so  in  the 
US  rather than in  another EU  country.  In  the period 1990-
95, 53.1% of patents resulting from the research  activities 
of European  companies  outside  their home countries  ori-
ginated in the US,  and only 40.4% in  Europe (Figure 1 .9). 
Service sector innovation 
Data on innovation activities in the service sectors are still 
patchy, both geographically and sectorally. Nevertheless, it 
is  clear that innovation is  by no means solely the preserve 
of  manufacturers.  At  66%,  the  proportion  of  innovating 
firms in Germany's 'modern' service sectors is  precisely the 
same  as  the  proportion  in  its  manufacturing  industries  -
and 'traditional' service sectors do not lag far behind, with 
innovators having a 56% share. 
However, while innovation expenditure represents around 
5% of turnover in manufacturing, in the service sectors it is 
typically  only  1%  (Figure  1  .1 0).  Outside  the  information 
technology industry, R&D is  insignificant in the service sec-
tors,  with  non-research-based  innovation  playing  a corre-
spondingly larger part.  In  particular,  in the service sectors, 
human capital - and  to  a lesser  extent the acquisition  of 
knowledge embodied in capital goods - appear to replace 
R&D  as  the  main  inputs for the development and  imple-
mentation of innovations. 
Among the new technologies employed by service  sector 
firms in their own product or process innovations, informa-
tion  technology  (IT)  plays  a  dominant  part.  In  every 
I  t~  I 
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German service  industry,  the great majority of innovating 
firms depended on IT investments- from 87% in  the retail 
trade to 1 00% in the telecommunications sector. 
In all service sectors, and especially in those which rely par-
ticularly  heavily  on  IT,  innovating firms  employ a  signifi-
cantly higher proportion of high-skilled and medium-skilled 
staff.  Reaping  the full  rewards of investment in  IT  appears 
to require  complementary,  and  often  prior,  investment in 
human capital.  Indeed,  as  a proportion of total innovation 
expenditures,  spending  on  staff  training  is  considerably 
higher among service sector innovators than among those 
in  the manufacturing industries. However, Italian data sug-
gest that training investment tends to be  concentrated on 
the  most  highly  qualified  personnel,  with  few  resources 
devoted to training for low-skilled workers (Figure 1.11 ). 
Service  sector innovation is  predominantly based  on tacit 
knowledge stored  in  the brains  of employees and  in  par-
tially  undocumented  business  and  management  proce-
dures.  Customers,  and  other firms  in  the same  industries 
(including competitors), are  more important as  sources of 
the information on which innovation  is  based  than  in  the 
manufacturing sectors. Intellectual property rights are more 
difficult to  acquire  and  to  defend  than  in  manufacturing 
industry,  so  successful  innovations tend to spread  rapidly 
through imitation. However, this also  reduces the incentive 
to innovate, since  the ease  with which a new product can 
be  copied  limits the potential  return  on  investment in  its 
development. Impact of innovation on the skill structure of Italian service industries, 1993-95 
(net share of companies expecting increases/decreases per skill group) 
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Intellectual property rights 
Patents stimulate innovation in two ways. First, they create 
an  incentive to innovate by giving an  inventor a temporary 
monopoly to  exploit  a  specific  new technology.  Second, 
patents  require  patent-holders  to  publish  details  of  their 
inventions. This accelerates the dissemination and applica-
tion of new knowledge by enabling others to build on the 
current state of the art,  as  well as  improving the efficiency 
of economy-wide innovation by minimising the duplication 
of effort. 
Disproportionate reliance on secrecy and speed-to-market 
as  a means of protecting intellectual property,  rather than 
on patents, has  long been suspected as  a major contributor 
to  Europe's  relative  failure  to  commercialise  and  capture 
value  from  its  scientific  and  technological  creativity. 
Factoring  out differences  in  the  rate  of invention,  and  in 
industry  structure,  to  arrive  at  rough  'patent  propensity 
rates' for Europe and the United States, it appears that 44% 
of  European  product  innovations  and  26%  of  European 
process  innovations are patented, while the corresponding 
figures for the US are 52% and 44%. It seems probable that 
European  firms do indeed patent less  than their American 
counterparts. 
In  the realm of product innovation in particular,  European 
firms consider speed-to-market to be twice as important as 
patents as  a source of competitive advantage.  US  firms,  by 
contrast, consider it to be  less than 1  .5  times as  important, 
while in japan it is  hardly thought to be more important at 
all.  A similar,  although smaller,  discrepancy is  found in the 
field  of process  innovations.  With  the  exception  of small 
high-tech firms in the fields of biotechnology and software, 
"'<•·  High-skilled 
Medium-skilled 
~, Low-skilled 
where adequate protection of intellectual property is  essen-
tial  in  attracting venture capital,  the importance attached 
to patents falls  as  company size  decreases  - SMEs  make the 
least use of the patent system. In seven  European countries in 
1993, 38.2% of innovative firms with over 1,000 employees 
stated that patents were 'very important' or 'crucial' to their 
ability  to  maintain  competitive  advantage,  compared  to 
20.6% of those with fewer than 1  00 employees. 
It is  also  uncertain how effective patents are as  a means of 
diffusing new knowledge- the second innovation function 
theoretically performed by the patent system. Patent data-
bases  clearly  have  some  way  to  go  before  they  become 
genuine clearing houses for new knowledge, although the 
internet is now rapidly increasing the accessibility of patent 
information. In  this respect,  too, SMEs  seem  to make least 
use  of the  patent system.  While  34%  of  large  R&D  per-
forming firms use patent disclosure as  an  information input 
to their innovation activities, only 18% of those with fewer 
than 500 employees do so.  Among small companies which 
do not perform R&D, the proportion falls to 6%. These fig-
ures  compare with the 50%  of all  small  companies which 
consider trade fairs,  suppliers and customers to be  impor-
tant information sources. 
- - -
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•  EU  Member States still devote considerable efforts to the three traditional innovation policy levers of research 
programmes, measures to stimulate innovation financing, and special help for innovating SMEs. 
•  Three areas of action are emerging as new priorities - industrial-academic interfaces, clustering and networking, 
and the creation of new technology-based firms (NTBFs). 
• While countries with weak private R&D  employ general  programmes and tax incentives,  those with stronger 
private  R&D  tend  to target specific  types  of companies,  specific  industrial  sectors  or strategically  important 
technologies. 
•  Growing emphasis on the dual role of the private sector as technology user and as translator of market needs into 
research problems has led to the emergence of the science-industry interface as a new focus of policy initiatives. 
•  In most Member States, innovation finance policy has paved the way for broader policies designed to support the 
creation of new high-tech companies. 
•  Policy-makers  are  beginning  to  back  practical  targeted  innovation  support  programmes  and  schemes  with 
reforms of the larger legal and administrative framework. 
• There is  a widespread shift from support for individual companies to measures supporting consortia. 
T
he  Trend  Chart  was  launched  in  1999  as  part  of  the 
Innovation  and  SMEs  programme  of  the  EU's  Fifth 
Research  Framework  Programme.  Experts  in  each  Member 
State continuously gather information about national meas-
ures designed to stimulate or facilitate innovation. The work 
focuses  on  four key  areas -financing, protection of intellec-
tual property,  the creation  of high-tech start-up companies, 
and the transfer of new technologies from the research  base 
to industry. Its aim  is to provide policy-makers and managers 
of innovation support schemes with summarised information 
and statistics on innovation policies, performance and trends 
in  the  EU.  It will also  form the  basis  for the  benchmarking 
and  exchange of policy good practice in the area of innova-
tion. 
Innovation Policy in Europe 2000 outlines the current position 
in  each  Member State,  summarising  the  substantial  report 
produced by the Trend  Chart's pilot phase,  which was com-
pleted in  1999. 
Innovation's technological, economic and social dimensions 
make  it  a  complex  process,  and  policies  and  measures 
designed to foster and encourage it are of a variety of differ-
ent  kinds.  They  may  be  broadly  based,  touching  many 
aspects  of the  process,  for example,  or may target specific 
problems  requiring  particular  attention.  The  Trend  Chart 
(7) COM(96) 589 final. 
project  uses  the  structure  of  the  European  Commission's 
1996 First Action Plan for Innovation in Europ£!
1
! as a framework 
for the classification  and  analysis  of innovation policies and 
schemes.  This employs a system-based  approach to innova-
tion, which acknowledges the diversity and interdependence 
of the  components that make  up an  'innovation system'  -
which  include  the  educational  system,  the  regulatory,  leg-
islative and  fiscal  framework,  the competitive environment, 
the  legislation  on  patents  and  intellectual  property,  the 
research  infrastructure,  and  innovation  support services,  as 
well as  research  centres and companies. 
In summary, the 1999 data show that EU Member States still 
devote considerable  efforts  to  the  three  'traditional' policy 
levers of: 
• support for research  carried out by companies 
• schemes to stimulate adequate financing for innovation 
• special  help for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
to absorb new technologies and to manage innovation 
In addition, three areas of action are emerging as new priorities: 
• co-operation  between  research  centres,  universities  and 
companies 
•  clustering and  other forms of co-operation between inno-
vation actors 
• the creation of new technology-based firms (NTBFs) Business expenditure on R&D  as a percentage of GDP.  1998 
Source: Eurostot 
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Support for industrial research 
Private  sector  research  and  development  is  an  important 
indicator of national  innovation capacity  (Figure  1  .12),  and 
Member States employ a variety of approaches to boost per-
formance.  Those whose  private  R&D  is  weak tend to adopt 
more general programmes and tax incentives, while countries 
with relatively  strong  private  R&D  may implement selective 
measures,  targeting  specific  companies  - such  as  start-ups, 
SMEs or research-intensive firms- specific industrial sectors or 
strategically important technologies. 
In  several  Member States, tax measures have for some time 
been used  to stimulate private R&D. A successful  scheme in 
the Netherlands, for example, allows firms to make reduced 
income tax and social security payments for R&D employees. 
The  simplicity  of  the  scheme's  administrative  procedures 
makes  it  especially  attractive  to  SMEs,  which  in  1998 
received  60% of its  overall  budget. Use  of the scheme  has 
grown from 5,000 companies in 1994, the year it was intro-
duced,  to 14,600 in  1999. An  evaluation  in  1999 showed 
that participating companies spend more on R&D than those 
which do not. The number of R&D employees also increases 
among scheme users. 
Technology absorption 
Enhancing  the  capacity  of  SMEs  to  absorb  technology 
(Figure 1  .1 3) is another traditional pillar of innovation policy. 
This  is  a demand-led  approach, and focuses  on the transfer 
of 'tacit' know-how and on physical  proximity to sources of 
new technology. Science parks,  regional technology centres, 
industrial  liaison  offices  (ILOs)  and  demonstration  projects 
are the most widely employed vehicles. 
A large number of Member States operate programmes to 
stimulate  SME  demand for new technology by supporting 
assessments  of  firm-level  technology  needs.  Finland,  for 
instance,  successfully  applies  this  approach  through  the 
Technology  Clinic  Initiative  and  the  Technology  Strategy 
Consulting Services for SMEs scheme. Sweden has developed 
a  multifaceted  scheme  which  combines  the  creation  and 
funding of company networks,  support for technology bro-
kers,  and the application of advanced information and com-
munications technologies. Launched in june 1999, the TUFF 
programme  encourages  trade  in  technological  services 
between  public  R&D  technology  providers  and  groups  of 
SMEs.  It stimulates  SME  demand  by  supporting  feasibility 
studies, inter-firm networking, and co-operative projects. 
Industrial-academic interfaces 
National policy-makers are increasingly abandoning the false 
distinction  between  'upstream'  measures  to stimulate  R&D 
and  'downstream'  measures  to  aid  technology  absorption. 
There  is  a growing emphasis on the dual role of the private 
sector as  technology user and  as  translator of market needs 
into research  problems. This has led to the emergence of the 
science-industry interface as  a new focus of policy initiatives. 
Following  the  systemic  approach  to  innovation  policy, 
Member States are starting to address performance problems 
with  schemes  designed  to  bridge  the  cultural,  institutional 
and information gaps between the performers of research in 
the public sector and those who take  up the results  in  the 
private sector. 
This  need  not imply the introduction of totally new meas-
ures,  but rather a redefinition and better integration of exist-
ing instruments. In  the UK  this has  included, for example, a 
substantial increase in the budget allocated to the Teaching 
Company Scheme (TCS)- one of Europe's pioneering mobil-
ity programmes - as  well  as  the launch  of a series  of com-
plementary measures. 
TCS's  goal  is  to  increase  interactions  between  the  higher 
education sector and business and industry, enabling firms to 
take  advantage of the scientific,  engineering, technological 
and business  management skills  and  knowledge available in 
universities. It subsidises two-year placements of highly quali-
fied recent graduates to work on projects central to the host 
companies'  needs,  under the joint supervision  of university 
- - -
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and company staff.  SMEs  make up 90% of the participating 
companies, and generally pay only 30% of the direct costs-
approximately €1,600 per graduate per year. 
In several countries, mobility schemes are being reshaped as 
two-way instruments, and R&D subsidy schemes redesigned 
to intensify collaboration between research  centres,  universi-
ties,  groups  of  enterprises  and  individual  companies. 
Measures fall  into two categories - nation-wide technology-
specific  'competence  networks',  and  regional  'technology 
valley' schemes.  The  latter type in  particular is  gaining con-
siderable  momentum.  In  Flanders,  regional  authorities  are 
promoting  research-industry  collaboration  around  research 
and  training  institutions.  Other examples  include  the  Irish 
'Atlantic Universities Alliance' and the 'TechGate Vienna' ini-
tiative in Austria. The dangers of fragmenting public support 
and  of stimulating  inefficient competition  between  regions 
are,  however,  inherent in  this  increased  regional  emphasis, 
especially  in  countries  where  decentralisation  is  still  in  its 
early stages. 
Financing innovation 
Since  the early  1990s,  most Member States  have  increas-
ingly sought to complement direct funding for research  by 
in 1999 channelled €750 million of venture capital to young 
technology-based firms. 
In  the  Netherlands,  special  facilities  for  new technology-
based firms (NTBFs) were recently withdrawn - government 
guarantees designed to stimulate venture capital investment 
in  high-risk,  high-tech  firms  had  done  little to  reduce  the 
funds' aversion  to risk.  The scheme  has  now been  replaced 
by more targeted seed  and growth funds. 
Spain,  meanwhile,  has  extended  fiscal  incentives  for 
research  to cover innovation activities as  well.  For  the first 
time,  a  2000  law  includes  innovation  costs  among  the 
deductible R&D expenditures (renamed R&D&I). This new 
approach covers  innovation projects undertaken in  collab-
oration with universities and the technology centres of public 
research  institutes,  as  well  as  the  acquisition  of  advanced 
technology in  the form of patents,  licences,  know-how and 
designs. 
Creation of innovative firms 
In most Member States, innovation finance policy has paved 
the way for broader policies designed to support the creation 
of new high-tech companies. In parallel with the mobilisation 
of  risk  capital,  typical  measures  include  entrepreneurship 
Share of manufacturing SMEs that innovate in-house, 1996 
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promoting private innovation financing (Figure 1.14), main-
ly at the early stages of the innovation process. 
Available venture capital is  increasing in  Belgium, for exam-
ple,  especially in  Flanders  where the take-off funds,  Sogepa 
and  Brustart, focus on  seed  capital investments,  rather than 
on  specific  industrial  sectors.  Interestingly,  universities  play 
an  active role in providing risk  capital for new spin-off com-
panies  established  to  exploit  the  results  of  academic 
research.  In  Sweden,  new measures  include the seed  finan-
cing fund operated by Nutek which targets small  high-tech 
companies,  and  the Nutek Investment Forum  CapTec  - an 
annual investment forum for young technology-based firms. 
In  Germany, the central pillar is the BTU  programme, which 
training in public research and higher education institutions, 
assistance for technology transfer and licensing, and the cre-
ation of 'incubators' offering a favourable environment and 
tailored advisory services. Start-up policies increasingly adopt 
a 'systemic' approach, often oriented around technology val-
leys  and  aligned  with wider reforms  - notably,  the  French 
'Innovation Law' of 1999. 
The traditional culture of the French education and research 
system  strongly  discouraged  entrepreneurship  among 
researchers,  who  have  been  viewed  as  civil  servants. 
Innovation financing focused exclusively on the later 'down-
stream' stages of the innovation process, to the detriment of 
feasibility  studies,  incubation  and  start-up.  The  1999 Innovation Law tackles these problems with a range of inte-
grated policy measures. 
To facilitate the creation of companies by young researchers, 
it allows  universities  and  public research  institutes to con-
tinue to pay them a salary during the start-up phase,  and to 
offer certain risk guarantees. The founders are also allowed to 
become members of the board of the new company and to 
take up to 15% of its shares.  Universities and public research 
institutes are encouraged to create incubators and commer-
cial offices, and the law facilitates joint ventures between the 
public and private sectors. 
The German federal government's Exist programme aims to 
improve the climate for the creation of spin-offs from univer-
sities,  and supports several  regional networks of universities, 
research institutes, venture capitalists, private companies and 
consultants, chambers of trade and commerce, science parks 
and business centres.  Five  regions were selected for support 
from an  overall budget of around €15 million per year. The 
programme is  accompanied  by a 'virtual academy' for new 
entrepreneurs,  a  newsletter,  a  seed  capital  fund  and  an 
action  research  programme.  The  programme  has  already 
had  considerable  impact on  the  German  high-tech  scene, 
even in those regions not selected for direct support. 
Another widely used  approach  is  to organise  contests and 
award schemes for young entrepreneurs. In France, a nation-
al  competition  for  the  creation  of  new  technology-based 
firms was  organised for the first time in  1999. Austria  has  a 
long-standing  state  award  for  innovation,  which  has  now 
been  complemented  by  a  'Young  Innovator  Scheme'. 
Awards are also used in Finland, where the prestigious annual 
lnnosuomi prizes recognise exceptional creativity and entre-
preneurship. 
Protecting intellectual property 
With knowledge playing an ever more significant role in the 
economy,  the  ownership  and  commercial  exploitation  of 
new knowledge has  become a core issue  for enterprise and 
innovation policy. A variety of measures aims to strengthen 
the  management  and  protection  of  intellectual  property 
rights, and schemes to provide additional support to innova-
ting companies using  patents and the patent systems  have 
become quite common. 
In  Germany,  an  'Innovation Market' provides an  innovative 
web-based  platform linking investors to patent holders and 
young  technology-oriented  firms.  In  Belgium,  several 
schemes  offer financial  support for firms wishing to explore 
Venture capital investment in  technology firms as  a percentage of GDP,  1999 
Source: EVCA/PWC 
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An  innovation-friendly environment 
Adopting  a  more  systemic  approach,  policy-makers  are 
beginning to back practical targeted innovation support pro-
grammes and schemes with reforms of the larger legal  and 
administrative framework at the national level  - as  exempli-
fied by the French Innovation Law of 1  999, described above. 
Germany's federal government has taken a similar path, ini-
tiating  step-by-step  reform  of the  legal  and  administrative 
framework for public research. By bundling a number of legal 
and administrative reforms into 'package laws',  the govern-
ment hopes to increase both their political impact and, in the 
longer term, their influence on the attitudes and behaviour 
of practitioners - or,  in  other words, to effect a shift in  the 
national 'innovation culture'. 
patenting possibilities, to use patent databases, or to acquire 
IPR and advice, and a national awareness campaign has been 
launched. 
Poor awareness of intellectual property issues has prompted 
the Spanish  Patent  Office  (OEPM)  to promote and  fund a 
knowledge-diffusion campaign for intellectual property mat-
ters,  and  it also  offers  grants  for training  in  IPR  issues.  In 
Portugal,  where financial  support for patent registration  is 
available,  the national patent office (INPI) has  been  restruc-
tured  to  strengthen  its  links  with  the  technological  infra-
structure so  that it can  promote patenting more proactively. 
In Ireland, IPR measures are focused on the high-growth soft-
ware and  multimedia content sectors,  where the Copyright 
Bill will streamline the protection and licensing of IPR. 
- - -
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Clustering and co-operation 
The  establishment of networks and clusters,  and the inter-
action  and  knowledge flows  within  them,  are  being  given 
increasing  priority  in  most  Member  States  (Figure  1  .1  5). 
Some countries still tend to encourage more traditional bilat-
eral collaboration and consortia building, while others target 
broader,  less  formal  collaboration within and  between  sec-
tors. But the shift from support for individual companies to 
measures supporting consortia is  now a general trend. 
In the Netherlands, clustering is a key element of innovation 
policy. The public sector performs a dual function -first, as a 
broker  for  strategic  information  and  contacts  between 
actors, and second, as a sophisticated public customer, using 
procurement policy to stimulate collaboration between con-
tractors.  In  Sweden,  programmes  such  as  the  'Regional 
Technology  Programme',  'New  Liaison  Functions'  and 
'Technology Transfer for SMEs'  all  support cluster and  net-
work development. 
The  Irish  Inter-firm  Co-operation  Network,  which  was 
successfully piloted in  1996, is  now a major focus  in  the 
National  Development  Plan  2000-2006.  Designed  to 
increase  both  science-industry  linkages  and  inter-firm 
relationships,  it  is  modelled  on  the  Danish  Industrial 
Network Programme,  providing an  excellent example of 
European transferability. 
A society open to innovation 
Many  countries  have  created  'innovation  councils'  or 
extended the role of conventional science councils to address 
innovation.  Many  consider  high-level  co-ordination  struc-
tures to be crucial in cutting through 'territorial' competition 
between ministries, while Germany and Spain  have initiated 
major redefinitions of ministerial competencies. 
Mobilising economic and  social  dynamism  is  also  high on 
the policy agenda in all  Member States.  Italy has established 
an  'Information Society Forum' to co-ordinate the drafting of 
the National Information Society Action Plan,  with a special 
task force to co-ordinate the contributions of different min-
istries  and  the  role  of  the  various  public  administrations 
involved. It publishes a newsletter and operates a website as 
a  working  forum  for  public  institutions,  enterprises,  trade 
unions, universities, research  bodies, associations and private 
citizens. 
Mobilising the innovative capacity of any society requires a 
strategic  vision  shared  by  all  relevant  stakeholder  groups. 
Traditional  technology foresight exercises  have  increasingly 
been  opened  up from  the  'inner circles'  of  scientists  and 
industrialists  to  include contributions from  a wider public. 
National parliaments have often played a pioneering role by 
setting  up technology assessment  offices  to anticipate and 
influence the impact of new technologies. Politically neutral 
not-for-profit  organisations  and  'Innovation  Foundations' 
receive  public  support  in  countries  such  as  Belgium  and 
Spain. The processes by which the outputs of 
scientific  and  technological  research 
reach  developers  and  end-users  are 
varied  and  complex.  Large  public 
research  institutes  have  traditionally 
focused  on  fundamental  science,  but 
are  becoming more entrepreneurial  in 
seeking  applications  for  their  work. 
Meanwhile, specialised  high-tech start-
up firms are  increasingly collaborating 
with universities and research  institutes, 
with  larger  companies  and  with  one 
another, both as  users and as  suppliers 
of new technologies. 32 
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inherent incompatibility between basic research and technology transfer, but the relationship between the two 
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•  Mobility of staff between  LPRis  and  industry is  vital,  but new employment and human resource  management 
policies are needed to address the significant practical barriers to such  exchanges which persist. 
•  LPRis'  ability to deliver services that genuinely facilitate commercially successful transfers of knowledge demands 
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•  Spin-off  companies  can  offer  the  most  efficient  route  to  commercial  exploitation  of  a  new  technology, 
but researchers  need  support to secure  financial  and  marketing  competences  in  order to  build  an  effective 
management team. 
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arge  public research  institutes (LPRis)  vary very widely in 
respect  of the  resources  and  effort they devote to tech-
nology transfer.  Depending on  their specific  circumstances, 
and the balance struck in their missions between the needs 
of  government  authorities,  national  industries  and  other 
stakeholders,  their activities may be  primarily in the area  of 
basic or strategic research, or alternatively may focus on con-
tract research  and the development of applications. 
However,  whether or not technology transfer  is  among  an 
LPRI's primary tasks, it is at the very least a significant and valu-
able by-product of its work, and most LPRis  now have explicit 
technology transfer objectives. CERN<ll, which of all  European 
LPRis  has  perhaps  the  greatest  focus  on  'fundamental' 
research,  nevertheless  created  the  underlying  technology of 
the World Wide Web- perhaps the most far-reaching example 
of technology transfer ever seen. 
Getting more innovation  from  public research  acknowledges 
the diversity of LPRis,  but starts from the premise that there 
is  no  inherent incompatibility between  basic  research  and 
technology transfer. On the other hand, it contends that the 
relationship  between  the two activities  needs  to  be  made 
explicit  and  to  be  managed  (Figure  2.1 ).  Institutes  must 
develop a culture in which each  is  appropriately recognised, 
valued,  supported  and  rewarded,  and  where  neither  is 
undermined  by  ambivalence  or vacillation  on  the  part  of 
senior  management.  just  as  in  the  world  of  commercial 
research  and development, each  LPRI  must adopt a system-
atic 'portfolio' approach to its  research  strategy,  in  which a 
clear  balance  is  established  between  long-term  and  short-
term, and between low-risk and high-risk, research  goals. 
The  report makes  no attempt to define a single  model of 
technology transfer good  practice which  all  should  follow, 
but identifies six  areas  of good practice relevant to all  LPRis, 
in which benchmarking could improve performance (Figure 
2.2). It also describes a number of tools and approaches for 
technology transfer which all  (or almost all) will find useful. 
However,  it recognises  that the  balance  accorded  to each 
area  of good  practice,  and  the  use  made  of each  tool  or 
approach,  will  vary  from  case  to  case.  Finally,  the  report 
develops a series  of recommendations for policy-makers, for 
(7 )  The European Organisation for Nuclear Research 
LPRis  themselves,  for industrial  partners,  and  for educators 
and  other  transfer  partners  - and  in  particular  a  detailed 
proposal,  called  the European  LPRI  Benchmarking  Initiative 
2000, for the creation of a benchmarking group. 
LPRis  and innovation policy 
Whatever their original missions,  most LPRis  now recognise 
that their present function goes  beyond the traditional  role 
of advancing science and generating know-how in emerging 
technological areas.  Today,  it also  encompasses the promo-
tion  and  diffusion  of  new  knowledge,  and  support for  its 
successful conversion into competitive products and services. 
Indeed, the strength of a country's LPRis,  and their ability to 
interact efficiently with industrial research  and development 
efforts, is an important determinant of overall national innov-
ation capacity. 
LPRis contribute in three ways- first, by providing ideas and 
information as  the basis  for the development of new prod-
ucts,  processes  and  services;  second,  their pursuit of long-
term research goals advances the state of the art in new areas 
of  knowledge  and  serves  as  a  training  ground  for  highly 
qualified  staff;  third,  their  ability  to  forge  connections 
between  specific  research  fields  strengthens  the  broader 
national and EU  scientific and technological base. 
LPRis  can  act as  bridges betwee.n  universities and  industry, 
but to do so effectively they must learn about t~e real  needs 
of firms - and  of SMEs  in  particular. ihey may also  require 
funding  incentives,  since  small  firms  are  often  unable  to 
finance such  collaboration directly. Similarly,  LPRis can facili-
tate  network and  cluster  development and  provide  skilled 
support for the consultants who deliver some  of the most 
successful small company assistance schemes. In many cases, 
recent  reductions  in  government funding  for  nuclear  and 
defence research  has  led to the adoption of a more market-
oriented approach, facilitated by the relaxation of regulatory 
constraints. On the other hand, private research  centres are 
likely  to  resent  any  suggestion  of  unfair competition from 
'subsidised'  public research  bodies,  while researchers  them-
selves  are  wary of possible  dilution of LPRis'  basic  research 
capacity. 
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In  some  areas  of  their  m1ss1on,  it  is  more  appropriate  to 
consider the role  of an  LPRI  in  relation  to regional  industrial 
networks  and  clusters,  than  as  contributors  to  national 
innovation  systems.  Alongside  universities,  LPRis  appear 
well-equipped  to  support cluster  dynamics,  and  to  provide 
resources of knowledge and skills  on which clusters of nearby 
companies can  cost-effectively draw.  Mobility of professional 
staff between industry and the research base is clearly vital, but 
enlightened human resource  management and  more flexible 
employment  policies  are  needed  to  address  the  significant 
practical barriers to such exchanges which persist. 
European policy-making is  increasingly adopting a system-
based  approach to innovation, placing a greater emphasis 
on networking, on venture capital, and on support for the 
creation and growth of innovative firms- and according a 
correspondingly lower priority to the funding of high tech-
nology  research.  LPRis  must  adapt  to  these  changing 
circumstances,  but the  new environment  presents  them 
with opportunities as  well as  threats. 
nesses,  offering incubation services to help LPRI  researchers to 
commercialise research  results through a start-up firm. 
A wide range  of technology transfer instruments and  chan-
nels has been developed, as  a means for institutes to interact 
with regional and national innovation systems.  By employing 
less traditional communication channels such  as the technical 
and trade press,  and trade fairs and exhibitions, for example, 
LPRis are able to present their achievements to industry as well 
as to scientists, and at the same time to gather valuable intel-
ligence about industrial and commercial needs and trends. 
In  almost all  LPRis,  transfer departments have  been  set  up 
during the past decade. Some proactively market their institu-
tions' technologies and  technological capabilities,  while oth-
ers  still  perform  a  largely administrative function.  However, 
the challenge of delivering services  that will genuinely facili-
tate commercially successful transfers of knowledge demands 
the elimination of rigid and bureaucratic rules and procedures. 
Some  LPRis  have  found  it easier  to  develop  the  necessary 
entrepreneurial  spirit  and  dynamism  in  a  newly-established 
'arms-length' organisation than in an  internal department. 
The LPRI technology transfer 'value chain'  ..., 
Figure 2.3 
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The technology transfer 'value chain' (Figure 2.3)  does not 
represent a linear process,  but highlights the different com-
ponents  of  knowledge  transfer  from  LPRis.  Although  the 
emphasis which each  LPRI  places on individual components 
will differ,  most will  be  active to some  degree at all  points 
along the chain. 
Traditionally, knowledge transfer has primarily used publica-
tions,  conference  papers  and  other established  channels  of 
scientific  communication.  In  the  1990s,  staff  transfer  has 
grown  in  importance,  as  collaboration  with  industry  has 
increased, and as  LPRis  have employed more staff on a part-
time or temporary basis.  But knowledge transfer,  in  all  but 
the  narrowest  sense,  requires  subsequent  adjustment  and 
refinement of the technology transferred to meet the needs 
of the  end-user.  Many  LPRis  have  started  to  deliver  such 
development services- even though this work is  outside the 
realm  of  'pure'  science,  and  requires  new  management 
competences.  Most also  promote the creation of new busi-
•  venturing and  spin-outs 
Leading  research  institutions in  the United States  have had 
spectacular success in creating spin-off companies, which has 
in  some  cases  provided the catalyst for rapid  regional  eco-
nomic  development.  This  has  prompted  intensive  efforts 
throughout Europe to improve performance in  the creation 
and growth of such  high-tech start-ups.  Spin-off companies 
founded by researchers  can  offer a faster and  more efficient 
route to commercial exploitation of a new technology than 
transfer  to  an  established  larger  firm  - where  it  may  be 
delayed  or  abandoned  due  to  institutional  rigidities.  But 
researchers rarely possess all the necessary business skills, and 
support is  needed to secure financial and marketing compe-
tences in order to build an  effective management team. 
Contract research,  partnerships and joint ventures offer less 
widely  used  alternatives  to  the  creation  of  spin-offs  as  a 
means  for  LPRis  to  contribute  to  economic  development. 
Knowledge commercialisation strategies  may also  be  based 
on  the  exploitation  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR) 
through  patenting  and  licensing  - but  here,  supporting services  are  essential  to  ensure  effective  transfer  of  tacit 
knowledge  components  not  contained  in  patents  them-
selves. 
The selection of suitable technology transfer instruments is 
itself a key skill for LPRis. The correct choice in the case of any 
specific technology depends not just on the objectives of the 
partners,  but also  on the industry concerned and the phase 
of the technology's lifecycle. Spin-offs, for example, may be 
appropriate in  the development phase  and  in  an  emerging 
industry, where both risks  and  potential returns are high. In 
more mature industries,  by contrast, spin-offs are  much less 
likely to be  able to challenge the dominance of established 
market leaders. 
Six key areas 
Six areas of management focus, in each of which LPRis should 
seek  to  identify  and  implement  appropriate  best  practice, 
appear to be critical. 
The  first  of  these  is  market  focus.  Successful  technology 
transfer  requires  LPRis  to  identify  and  orient  their  activities 
towards  the  needs  of  their  customers,  and  to  adapt  their 
organisational structures so  as  to encourage and manage this 
A revitalised organisational culture needs to be  reflected and 
supported  by internal  management structures  and  proce-
dures. Effective knowledge management within the institution 
is essential, and communication blockages at all levels must be 
identified and  removed.  To  improve efficiency,  enhance cus-
tomer satisfaction and reduce internal resistance to technology 
transfer,  project management procedures  and  skills  must be 
strengthened (Figure 2.4). Training schemes and quality man-
agement  systems  must  be  introduced,  and  industrial  links 
strengthened  through  programmes  of  short-term  staff 
exchanges. 
Next,  active  IPR  management  is  necessary  to  maximise 
financial  revenues  and  ensure  customer satisfaction. A clearly 
stated  strategic IPR  policy,  supported  by appropriate training 
and information-sharing activities,  is essential. There must also 
be an  incentive system which adequately rewards  IPR activity. 
Lastly, the channelling of resources through a specific licensing 
or technology  transfer  is  a  basic  condition  for effective  IPR 
management. 
The fifth area of management focus is networking. Successful 
innovation  demands active  management of the  interactions 
between  LPRis  and  the  other  stakeholders  in  the  transfer 
Effective project management for LPRI technology transfer  -, 
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commercial orientation. Potential applications and customers 
must  be  proactively  identified  by  multi-disciplinary  teams 
combining  technical,  marketing  and  business  expertise. 
Depending on the needs of target customer groups, accom-
panying services  may need  to be  developed and delivered in 
parallel with the flow of technologies. 
The second area  is organisational culture. Changing the cul-
ture of an  LPRI traditionally rooted in basic scientific research  is 
a long and difficult process.  It cannot be effected without real 
commitment from senior management, articulated in  appro-
priate  managerial  methods and  style.  Suitable  organisational 
arrangements also need to be introduced in order to make the 
technology  transfer  mission  of  scientists,  researchers  and 
engineers clear and explicit, give them sufficient incentives to 
fulfil it, and remove obstacles to entrepreneurial creativity and 
initiative.  Active,  organisation-wide  communication  of  the 
technology transfer mission is absolutely essential. 
• performance 
of  agreed tasks 
• overv1ew 
of the project 
• assessment 
of  final  results 
+ 
+ 
+ 
• final meeting 
• internal review 
• project evaluation 
• ask for customer 
feedback 
• customer feedback 
• agreement between partners 
on follow-up 
• project evaluation 
• dissemination activities 
(e.g. seminar. press conference) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
• evaluation and review 
• project debriefing 
• map knowledge and experiences 
process - industrial firms, universities, investors, users and pub-
lic authorities. Efficient networking, both internal and external, 
requires  mutual  understanding  and  trust,  and  sufficient 
resources and time must be made available to ensure that this 
develops. 
The final area  on which LPRis  need to focus is entrepreneur-
ship and new business creation. In  recent years,  these  have 
emerged  as  highly efficient methods of bringing knowledge 
generated by research  to the market, while they also produce 
new wealth and jobs among other social benefits (Figure 2.5). 
The  most  promising  approaches  to  entrepreneurship  are 
based on networks which bring together complementary local 
experts to provide a comprehensive and affordable package of 
guidance  and  support  services  to  would-be  entrepreneurs. 
LPRis  themselves frequently act as  references for new spin-off 
companies,  and  in  some  cases  provide seed  or development 
capital, either directly or indirectly. 
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Model of LPRI  support for entrepreneurship  -, 
Figure  2.5 
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Benchmarking does  not appear to be  a widely used  man-
agement tool  among  European  LPRis.  Some  have  already 
initiated  a  process  of  performance  comparison  against 
organisations perceived as  'best in  class',  but this falls short 
of a benchmarking approach specifically designed for LPRis. 
Benchmarking  is  a  continuous  process.  It leads  to  better 
understanding  of the  organisation's  current  practices,  and 
makes  use  of systematic  comparison  of practices  and  per-
formance  with  those  of  others  to  develop  improvement 
actions which will bring performance levels up to or beyond 
those of the 'best in class'. 
In  assessing  the performance of the LPRI  technology trans-
fer process,  managers have conventionally employed a series_ 
of  predominantly  financial  indicators  - external  revenues, 
overhead  costs,  royalties  and  so  on.  Such  indicators  are, 
however,  both  narrowly focused  and  backward-looking.  A 
more useful,  and  more  balanced,  set  of indicators  may be 
developed in  relation to the twin dimensions of 'time focus' 
(from  the  impact  of  past  inventions  to  the  prediction  of 
future directions) and 'process phase' (from the input of new 
product ideas to the output of successful commercialisation). 
Such  indicators  should  inform  strategic  management  by 
revealing  the gap between current and desired  technology 
transfer  performance,  and  providing  a  yardstick  against 
which to measure progress. They should address both short-
and  long-term  time  horizons,  promote  transparency 
between functions, provide the basis for reviews of individual 
and team performance, and serve as a framework for project 
and programme evaluation. 
II 
Y2  Yx 
II ...  channels 
Benchmarking  references - the 'best in  class'  performance 
selected  as  the point of comparison for a particular function 
- may be  drawn from within the  LPRI,  or from  outside  it. 
Many LPRis  choose  internal  references for their first bench-
marking  exercise,  in  part  because  information  about  per-
formance has  not in  the past been widely shared.  However, 
it is  clear that no one institution is  likely to be 'best in  class' 
in  all  areas. 
Systematic benchmarking promotes process-oriented think-
ing, increasing focus on the way things are done, and on the 
value of each  step  to the ultimate customer.  It involves the 
whole institution in continuous problem-solving, embedding 
the process of change and  learning, and stimulates the cre-
ation  of  horizontal  networks  which  serve  to  integrate the 
organisation.  It  also  creates  responsive,  customer-driven 
technology delivery networks.  But effective implementation 
requires the full involvement of all  levels of the organisation. 
Senior  management  must  publicly  support  the  bench-
marking exercise,  and communicate its progress, while driv-
ing the LPRI  towards attitudes and performance which align 
research  activities  with  the  expectations  of  stakeholders. 
Functional departments must support research units in fulfill-
ing their technology transfer missions, and help to bridge the 
gap with industry.  Research  units,  in  turn,  must use  bench-
marking to focus  on  customer-oriented  research  by setting 
and achieving objectives. Finally,  the assessment of technol-
ogy transfer performance must be integrated with the meas-
urement and appraisal of other aspects of the organisation's 
mission, and in  particular its pursuit of scientific and techno-
logical excellence. .··  2.2 
; 
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Key Findings 
•  The  composition  and  strengths  of the founding  team  is  a  key  determinant of subsequent  success  for new 
technology-based firms (NTBFs). 
•  In nearly three-quarters of cases,  NTBFs' product development strategies address the known requirements of one 
or more specific customers. Very often, a first customer contributes to the costs of developing the product which 
it needs. 
•  NTBFs  attribute their success  more to the strength of their human resources than  to 'hard' factors  such  as 
the acquisition of technology or the ability to attract equity capital. 
•  Many  NTBFs  seek  to  avoid  the  dilution  of equity  and  loss  of  managerial  control  associated  with  venture 
capital funding for as  long as  possible. The most successful  maintain financial  independence through careful 
management of cash flows. 
• They value participation in European collaborative projects more as a way to extend their existing technical and 
commercial networks than as  a framework for research and development. 
•  Difficulties  in  obtaining  adequate  human  and  financial  resources,  and  inflexibilities  in  employment  law, 
tax  regulations,  and  intellectual  property rights (IPR)  and  standards approval  systems,  constitute the principal 
barriers to success. 
T
he  value  of  a  statistical  exercise  such  as  the 
Community Innovation Survey (see  Chapter 1  ),  which 
provides  an  overview of innovation  behaviour in  Europe 
based  on  comparable  firm-level  data,  is  beyond  doubt. 
Inevitably, however, the CIS  fails to capture the dynamics 
of innovation activity as  experienced by individual firms. 
European innovative enterprises: Lessons  from successful appli-
cations of research  results  to dynamic markets attempts to fill 
this gap,  providing a snapshot of the experience of 50 new 
technology-based  firms  (NTBFs)  which  have  successfully 
applied the results  of publicly funded research.  The  sample, 
drawn primarily from the emerging information technology 
and  biosciences  sectors,  was  composed  overwhelmingly of 
firms with fewer than 500 employees.  Nearly three-quarters 
had  been  established  for  less  than  ten  years.  The  report's 
conclusions  are  qualitative,  but  offer  a framework  for the 
statistically rigorous follow-up surveys  needed to inform the 
design of effective policy initiatives in support of NTBFs. 
In  summary,  on  the  evidence  of  these  50  companies 
European  NTBFs  are  highly focused,  address  European  and 
international  markets,  devote considerable  attention  to the 
acquisition  and  development  of  human  resources,  make 
extensive use of electronic communication technologies, and 
rely heavily on networking as  a source of both technical and 
commercial  advantage. They are  also  wary both of venture 
capital and of publicly funded research  programmes, though 
all  had  received  regional,  national  or  European  research 
and  development project funding, and 40% said  that their 
companies  would  not have  been  established  without this 
support.  They  identify as  the  principal  barriers  to success 
difficulties in  obtaining the human and  financial  resources 
they  need,  and  inflexibilities  in  employment  law,  tax 
regulations, and intellectual property rights (IPR) and stan-
dards approval systems. 
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A firm foundation 
The composition and strengths of the team which found the 
company  is  a  key  determinant  of  subsequent  success  -
indeed, the firms themselves ranked  this as  the single issue 
with  the  largest  impact  on  their  development.  The  most 
important specific factor was  the founders' in-depth know-
ledge both of the technology concerned  and  of the target 
market (Figure 2.6). However, at an  early stage complemen-
tary marketing, selling, financial and analytical, and planning 
skills  are  needed  to build a fully competent business  team, 
and  most of the companies hired specialists  in one of these 
areas  as  their first recruits. 
At the time  of company  launch,  awareness  of the target 
market  and  of  the  requirements  of  individual  customers, 
often gained during previous employment, tends to be very 
high. In  64% of the sample cases, the firms saw their target 
market as 'closed' - they defined it in terms of the highly spe-
cific technology which they planned to offer,  and  relied  on 
the uniqueness of this offer to gain entry to the market, and 
to defend  them  against  competition.  In  the  30% of cases 
uct  which  it  needed.  More  generally,  these  relationships 
seem  to be  a critical factor in  long-term company success, 
serving as a valuable reference for other customers, for exam-
ple. However, 70% of the sample had undertaken their initial 
product development as  a  platform  for  later  extension  or 
customisation which would expand the customer base  and 
avoid  long-term  reliance  on  a  single  'lead  customer'.  The 
firms  which  subsequently  achieved  the  greatest  financial 
success were those which had paid the greatest attention to 
establishing  and  maintaining a positive cash  flow from the 
outset,  thus  reducing  dependence  on  bank  overdrafts  or 
external equity finance. 
Only  36%  - predominantly  from  Italy  and  elsewhere  in 
southern  Europe  - confined  their  initial  attention  to their 
domestic national markets.  In  a number of cases,  breaking 
into the  United  States  market was  seen  as  a  critical  goal. 
These  internationally-oriented  start-ups  anticipated  much 
larger  sales  in  America  than  in  Europe,  and  saw  direct 
employment of specialist US  technical and sales  staff as  the 
most cost-effective means of gaining access  to that market. 
Relative impact of key success factors (importance x financial contribution; I 00 = vital) 
--, 
Figure  2.6 
-
Founding team qualities 
Employee selection and development 
-
Customer retention skills 
- I  I 
Pre-start planning 
-
Market development/exploitation 
I 
Own IP/know-how consolidation 
Private funding sources  I 
-
Compet1tive analyses 
-
30  40  50 
involving commodity products such,  as  internet services  or 
mass  market software,  the firms were acutely aware  of the 
competitive situation, and relied  on pricing, time-to-market 
and  superior  channel  management to  gain  a  foothold.  In 
two-thirds of cases,  the founders' desire to improve on  the 
product offering of a previous employer,  or to escape  from 
financial  constraints  or personal  frustration  experienced  in 
that employment, was  a central  motivating factor.  In  most 
cases,  financial reward was  not the primary driver. 
Product development 
These  companies'  product development strategies,  usually 
based  on  the  exploitation  of  existing  know-how,  were  in 
72%  of cases  driven by the opportunity to meet the known 
requirements of one or more specific customers.  In  66%  of 
cases,  the first customer provided early-stage financial  sup-
port, often contributing to the costs of developing the prod-
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I 
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They also  believed that activity in the US  would remove any 
perceived inferiority attached to purely European products or 
services. 
The  identity and  satisfaction  of early  customers  form  the 
basis  for the marketing 'pitch' of 70% of the firms,  and are 
given far more prominence than either ISO 9000 quality cer-
tification or industry awards. Indeed, retaining a core of sales 
to long-term customers by anticipating their needs appears 
to be  central  to the marketing strategy of many - after the 
strengths  of  the  founding  team,  this  was  ranked  as  the 
second  most important overall  factor for success.  When  it 
became necessary to differentiate themselves from competi-
tors as they sought to expand outside their early niche, most 
firms  sought to do so  on  the basis  of technical  superiority 
rather than pricing or other market factors. Human resources 
Overall,  these  NTBFs  attribute  their  success  more  to  the 
strength of their human resources than to 'hard' factors such 
as  the  acquisition  of  technology  or  the  ability  to  attract 
equity capital. High among these 'soft' issues is the quality of 
the staff recruited by the firm, their induction and their sub-
sequent training. There was broad consensus that recruiting, 
developing and appropriately rewarding the members of the 
team  was  one  of  the  most  critical  tasks  involved  in  the 
management of a small,  high-tech  enterprise.  Seventy  per 
cent had experienced difficulty in recruiting specialists of suf-
ficiently high quality. This was especially the case for market-
ing  and  sales  staff,  and  for  technical  staff  - software, 
electronic  and  biochemical  engineers  in  particular.  Many 
firms  reported  that, even  when they found applicants with 
the necessary skills, few were equipped for the flexible team-
working on which the culture of most high-tech start-ups is 
based.  Commonly, they blamed the educational system  for 
its failure to prepare students for an entrepreneurial industrial 
environment.  A  significant  number  of  firms  - notably  in 
France,  Belgium, Germany and Spain -felt frustrated by tax 
laws  which  limit the  percentages  of shares  which  can  be 
offered in stock options, and which treat options as a taxable 
benefit when they are  received,  rather than when they are 
exercised. 
Investors and partners 
Thirty per cent of the sample had attracted venture capital 
funding as  a first  step  towards stock market flotation, with 
1  0%  having  gone on  to achieve  an  initial  public  offering 
(IPO).  However,  venture capital  was  widely  perceived  as  a 
necessary evil. Many sought to avoid the consequent dilution 
of equity and loss of managerial control altogether, or for as 
long  as  possible.  Indeed,  the  most  successful  were  those 
which had maintained their financial independence through 
careful management of cash flows. 
Much more common sources  of growth finance were  rev-
enues from sales  made to first customers,  public funding (in 
40% of cases)  and private funds.  Sources of private funding 
varied  widely,  from  investments by founders  themselves  or 
by family trusts, to business angels, customers and suppliers, 
and in a very few cases local retail banks. In  30% of the firms, 
all  the original private investors still  retained their holdings, 
and in no case  had founders yet withdrawn their equity. 
The  surveyed  firms do not value  participation in  European 
collaborative projects very highly as a framework for research 
and  development.  However,  they do value  it as  a way to 
extend  their  existing  technical  and  commercial  networks, 
and to gain access  to new ones - 62% use  this  mechanism 
to supplement technical partnerships and to support market 
developments across  Europe.  More generally, for a majority 
networking is  an  essential  continuing activity, to which con-
siderable resources are devoted. Local and regional networks 
are  very important as  sources of technological collaborators 
and of specialist financial and legal assistance. 
Management style 
These companies place the emphasis firmly on vision, com-
mitment, energy and common sense,  rather than on innova-
tive  or fashionable  management  methods.  Typically,  they 
employ flat management structures and an  'open door' pol-
icy,  stressing tutoring and personal development and a good 
regular flow of internal communications. 
Twelve  in-depth  case  studies  reveal  further  features  of  a 
common  pragmatic  managerial  approach,  which  is  inde-
pendent both of technology and of country, and covers: 
• A clear focus, from the outset, on a particular market and 
a particular product or product range.  In  the early stage, 
the focus  is  on  options based  closely  on the knowledge 
and skills  of the founders,  which therefore offer the best 
chance of commercial success. 
• Collaboration with other companies.  Perhaps  as  a corol-
lary of their own specialisation, the success  of many firms 
depended on good relationships with third parties,  either 
for the exchange of research  results (especially in the field 
of biotechnology), or to gain access to established sales or 
distribution channels. Good  English  language skills  were 
considered  a prerequisite for successful  collaboration,  as 
was awareness of intellectual property law. 
•  Customer orientation. In  a number of cases,  the empha-
sis  on customer service had led firms to establish overseas 
subsidiaries at an  early stage, in order to be close to major 
markets and ensure conformity to local standards. In  oth-
ers,  the  focus  was  on  anticipating  and  meeting  the 
second-phase needs of the original customer base. 
• Careful  cash  management  from  the  beginning. 
Maximising cash flow was firmly entrenched in the corpo-
rate culture of a significant number of the case study com-
panies.  They saw  this  as  a  key  element in  their success, 
reducing dependence on bank debt financing and delay-
ing the dilution of equity by venture capital at least until 
the  company had  achieved  worldwide  product roll-out. 
The negotiation of phased  payments for development or 
serial  order contracts was a widely used  method. 
• An  emphasis  on  people.  These  high-growth,  high-tech 
companies  see  the  members  of their staff  teams  not as 
employees  but as  key  assets,  carefully  chosen  and  nur-
tured.  Their  approach  to  the  management  of  human 
resources  is  positive but flexible, and they demand a large 
degree  of  both  flexibility  and  commitment from  team 
members in  return. 
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Barriers and bottlenecks 
Perceived  barriers to success fall into three interrelating cat-
egories-first, lack of awareness about the dynamics of entre-
preneurship among officials,  graduate recruits and financial 
institutions; second, inflexibility in the national and European 
legal  and  regulatory  systems;  and  third,  broader  cultural 
attitudes (Figure 2.7). 
The surveyed firms felt that a wide gulf existed between the 
concerns of high-tech start-ups  like  their own and  those  of 
both  government  and  bank  officials.  Few  have  personal 
entrepreneurial  experience  of  any  kind,  and  are  therefore 
unused and  unwilling to deal with the risks  associated  with 
high-tech start-ups. At the same time, little effort is  made to 
foster entrepreneurial  awareness  or attitudes through train-
ing,  even  among  those  who  deal  directly with  small  and 
medium-sized enterprises.  Government policy and  schemes 
still appear to be oriented largely to the concerns and needs 
of large-scale industry, while the interests of high-tech start-
ups are poorly represented by industry associations- though 
it was  notable that only 4%  of the sample themselves took 
any part in trade lobbying. 
Skills  shortages constitute a real  barrier.  In  particular, these 
firms complain that too few graduates are trained to state-of-
the-art standards in  emerging technologies. Technical  grad-
uates  are  also  deficient  in  communication,  presentation, 
project management and even in basic business skills. On the 
other hand, commercial and  business courses are  too much 
oriented towards the requirements of large corporations, and 
graduates have little grasp of the realities of entrepreneurial 
start-ups.  'Corporate  attitudes'  are  also  a  problem  among 
lower-level  technical  or administrative staff,  who often  lack 
flexibility  and  commitment.  Both  risk-aversion  and  fear  of 
corporate failure were felt by the firms to be European char-
acteristics,  possibly reinforced  by punitive bankruptcy laws, 
which contrasted unfavourably with the 'can-do, can-fail' US 
environment. 
Both  personal and corporate tax regimes were also  seen  as 
failing to provide sufficient incentive for entrepreneurial risk-
taking. Among the tax breaks  requested  were a special  low 
rate  of personal  taxation  for the founders  of companies  in 
their first two years,  and exemption from corporation tax in 
the first five years. Employment law also presents obstacles -
in  particular,  limitations on working hours and the difficulty 
of  obtaining  work  permits  for  qualified  non-Europeans. 
Public  sector bureaucracy and the high cost of patent pro-
tection were also common complaints. Attitudes to investment in risky enterprises, 
especially  among  financial  institutions, 
constitute  one  of  the  major  cultural 
differences between the  United  States 
and Europe- where stability is preferred 
to  change,  and  security  to dynamism. 
To  improve  the  access  of  innovative 
European  firms  to  development  finance, 
the  ability  of  corporations,  venture 
capitalists and banks to assess the risks and 
the returns  of new technologies  needs  to 
be strengthened. 
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Key  Findings 
•  Corporate investments of €1 .2  billion  per year amount to 1 0% of total European  venture capital,  but 40% of 
early-stage investing. About three-quarters is  invested in Europe. 
•  Corporate venturing is spread evenly through the EU's  major economies, with the exception of Italy. 
•  Five  sectors - communications,  utilities,  'food,  drink and  tobacco',  metal  manufacturing and  air transport -
account for 44% of Europe's corporate venturers. 
•  Most corporations making a venture capital investment are primarily motivated by the strategic goal of forging 
a link with a new technology or market that might prove crucial to its future. 
•  Allowing entrepreneurial staff the scope to develop their ideas through spin-outs also  gives a corporation the 
opportunity to exploit in-house R&D quickly and cheaply. 
•  lnvestee  companies gain credibility from the endorsement of their investor,  as  well  as  forms of support that 
would otherwise be beyond their reach. 
• Taxation levels form the main obstacle to increased corporate venturing. 
Motivations 
The most important motivation for a corporation to make a 
venture capital  investment is  strategic - it wants to open a 
window on to a new technology or market that might prove 
crucial to its future. Strategic reasons were weighted at 62% 
by the survey respondents.  But it must be  remembered that 
the financial motive of ensuring future profits underlies this. 
Investing in  a new venture gives a corporation the opportu-
nity to buy a new technology cheaply,  develop it in  partner-
ship,  or simply to stay  informed of developments. eve can 
also  be  a form of insurance - about half the money comes 
from companies with a degree of monopoly power, such  as 
major pharmaceutical  and  privatised  companies,  which are 
also  those  most threatened  by  technological  change. eve 
can  also  be a means of spinning a non-core project out of a 
company. 
Direct financial  profit is  a secondary objective of corporate 
venturers,  with  a  weighting  of  27%.  Corporate  venturers 
tend  to invest  at a premium,  and  opinion  is  divided  as  to 
how profitable eve  is,  with  some  sources  calculating  the 
median rate of return to be  as  low as  7%. Others claim that 
it is as  profitable as  independent venture capitalism -that is, 
over 20%. 
There  are  also  human  resource  reasons,  since  allowing 
entrepreneurial  staff  the  scope  to  develop  their  ideas 
improves job satisfaction,  while also  giving the corporation 
the opportunity to exploit in-house R&D quickly and cheap-
ly.  The exercise of social  responsibility can  also  be a motiva-
tion  for corporate  venturing  (6% weighting),  for example 
through schemes  to  help employees  facing  redundancy to 
found their own businesses,  whether these are related to the 
parent company or not. 
The  firms  in  which  investments  are  made also  show  both 
financial  and  strategic  motivations,  although  here  the 
weightings are reversed- the cash  (debt as well as  equity) is 
most  important,  followed  by technical  assistance  (in  R&D 
and  in  manufacturing  technology),  help with  distribution, 
and credibility (with financiers and suppliers). As for individ-
ual  entrepreneurs,  they  are  nowadays  in  a  position  to 
demand more control over their lives,  and so prefer to man-
age their own small company than to work for a corporation. ~ 
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Figure  3. 1 
Matrix of investment area vs  NACE description of investor's sector 
Benefits 
The  corporate  investor benefits  by gaining  access  to new 
technologies,  and  maybe  even  a  leading  position  in  their 
development,  more  quickly and  cheaply  than  if it tried  to 
develop them in-house. By  buying in  early,  it avoids paying 
inflated prices for quoted company shares.  As  a by-product, 
eve opens up the company's culture. 
The  investee  company gains  credibility from the endorse-
ment  of its  investor,  as  well  as  other  support  that would 
otherwise be  beyond its  reach. This might include access  to 
worldwide distribution channels,  research  results,  manufac-
turing  technology  or  legal  expertise  as  regards  patent 
infringement. But it must avoid  losing  its  independence or 
being swamped by bureaucracy. 
Investment mechanisms 
Corporations venture either directly, by finding and making 
their  own  investments  (as  did  61 o/o  of the  study  sample), 
indirectly through a venture fund (25% of the sample),  or 
both (14%). Sometimes they even  invest in  the same  com-
pany via  both routes ('parallel investment'). 
They  usually  identify  possible  investments  themselves, 
through active  search  procedures  (for instance,  by visiting 
universities and trade fairs),  although a quarter use  external 
advisers.  But  many  referrals  arise  spontaneously  through 
existing business contacts. 
They manage their holdings in-house (40%), via a subsidiary 
company (15%)  or informally (45%). eve  teams  typically 
number six to eight, with investments being approved by the 
main board of directors. Corporations look for a high return 
- 25% or if possible 40% per annum - in  addition to non-
financial strategic benefits. 
Which  investments  are  held  is  commonly kept  secret,  for 
fear that it will reveal  too much about the company's stra-
tegic plans or encourage unwanted applications for funding. 
But some companies make a virtue of inviting entrepreneurs 
with mutually beneficial ideas to contact them. 
Investment characteristics 
The sample made an  average of 1  .4 direct investments per 
year  (with the largest  social  responsibility  investors  exclud-
ed). The annual spent varies from year to year,  but averages 
€14 million per company.  Sixteen  companies had  invested 
over €1 00 million per year for the last five years. 
The  largest  single  investment  was  €900  million,  and  14 
companies had invested lump sums in excess of €20 million. 
At the other end of the scale,  over half the sample had never 
invested a sum larger than €5 million, and many investments 
were  under  €1  million.  Start-ups  accounted  for  41 o/o  of 
investments. 
Geographically,  corporate venturing  is  spread  fairly evenly 
through  the  EU's  major economies,  with the exception  of 
Italy. Most investments are  domestic, but some are  in other 
parts of Europe or in North America and Asia, with a few else-
where.  Corporate  venturers  come  from  a  wide  range  of 
industrial sectors,  but 44% of them are  in  just five sectors -
communications,  utilities,  'food,  drink and  tobacco',  metal 
manufacturing and air transport. 
The  destination of investments  is  also  quite widely spread, 
but over half are in six sectors- services (financial, consumer 
and other), transport and communications, energy,  biotech-
nology, pharmaceuticals and information technology, in that 
order (Figure 3.1  ). 
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Investments  are  generally  held  for  more  than  five  years. 
Some investors have an 'all or nothing' policy, whereby they 
attempt to acquire 100% of successful start-ups, and dispose 
entirely of their interests in  unsuccessful ones. 
The  fact  that  corporate  venturing  is  not  primarily  about 
profit  is  borne  out  by  the  finding  that about  half  of the 
sample provide non-equity finance (mezzanine debt or loan 
guarantees) as  well  as  equity, and  77%  also  give non-finan-
cial  support. 
Scale  and impact 
The funds raised for direct corporate venturing investment 
in  Europe  are  significant.  At around  €1.2 billion  per year, 
they  make  up  about  1  0% of total  venture  capital  (Figure 
3.2).  About  three-quarters  of  this  is  invested  in  Europe. 
However, they are even more significant in early-stage invest-
ing,  where they make  up 40%  of the total.  In  addition to 
direct eve,  over €2 billion per year is  being invested  indi-
rectly, that is via independent venture capital funds. By com-
parison,  in  the us  direct eve  is  estimated to be  about five 
times as  big as  in Europe, with investment of around €5 bil-
lion per year. 
The  whole  group  of  84  direct  corporate  venturers  had 
invested in  500 companies over the last five years,  support-
ing the  creation  of at  least  55,000 jobs.  The cost to these 
minority shareholders alone is  €120,000 per job, which is  a 
high figure, although it will be offset by future jobs created 
in fast-growing start-ups. The results  show with 90% confi-
dence that companies that engage  in  corporate venturing 
also generate higher returns to shareholders. If there is a pos-
sible  downside to eve,  it is  that the early  absorption of a 
challenger by a corporation may stifle competition. 
Barriers 
The most common reason  for a corporation not to engage 
in eve is an  unwillingness to divert management time from 
core activities,  linked with the feeling that it is  irrelevant or 
not strategically useful. 
The  main  obstacles  to  increased  corporate  venturing  are 
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levels of taxation. In  particular, the rates of capital gains tax, 
and the complicated regimes, discourage equity investment. 
In  some  cases  capital  losses  cannot  be  carried  forward. 
Similarly, tax on share options adds to the cost of employing 
corporate venture executives. Other provisions,  such  as  the 
taxation of hidden reserves on acquisition in some countries, 
inhibit cross-border activity. 
The predominant opinion among those surveyed is that the 
best  way  in  which  governments can  encourage  corporate 
venturing is  not to institute new public programmes, but to 
improve the overall  business  environment by reducing  tax 
and regulatory barriers, and stepping up European  harmon-
isation. There are also some indications that a clearing house 
would be useful in improving information flow. 
Good practice 
The interviews conducted in the course of the study provide 
additional  lessons. For the best results,  corporations should 
enter corporate venturing with clear  objectives  and  a firm 
five- to  seven-year  commitment.  They  should  work  with 
independent  venture  capitalists,  to  gain  expertise  and  to 
insulate venturing activities from day-to-day pressures. They 
should  in fact treat the corporate  ventur~ unit as  an  entre-
preneurial  business  within a business,  appointing staff with 
entrepreneurial  qualities  rather than  corporate conformists, 
and  sharing  gains with them, to deter them from leaving  if 
they are successful. 
They must recognise that large and small  companies have 
different cultures, and must try to add value to the investee 
business without swamping it. In  particular, they should not 
be  excessively  controlling, and  should avoid favouritism  by 
keeping  post-investment commercial  relationships  at arm's 
length. 
They should recognise that large corporations can no longer 
rely on organic growth alone,  and that corporate venturing 
is  one way of opening up their culture and helping them to 
change - and survive. Funding of new 
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Key Findings 
•  Almost all  banks  use  the same  assessment criteria for new technology-based firms (NTBFs)  as  for other SMEs. 
Specific approaches to NTBFs are more common among British banks, patchy in other parts of northern Europe, 
and rare in southern Europe. 
•  Overall,  only 15% have special  packages for start-up companies,  and only 27% recognise the existence of an 
identifiable category of NTBFs. 
•  No bank accepts intangible assets  such  as  intellectual property as  security for a loan. 
• The  major barriers to increased  bank lending to NTBFs  are  the limited flow of applications,  high  risk,  under-
capitalisation of applicants, and lack of bank expertise. 
•  US  banks with specialist knowledge of technology markets work with venture capitalists and business angels to 
provide loan finance to NTBFs,  even those not yet generating revenues. 
I
deas  are the products of individual minds,  not of smooth-
running corporate  machines.  By  retaining  control  of their 
new  technologies,  inventors  in  the  booming  knowledge-
intensive industries have a chance to prove the value of these 
innovations before a possible flotation or sale of the business. 
But  to  do this  they  need  finance - and  it is  smaller  com-
panies, and especially those involved with unproven techno-
logies,  which  face  the  most  serious  difficulties  in  raising 
finance. 
Mainstream  venture  capitalists  prefer  to  make  substantial 
investments which can  more easily repay their management 
costs,  and  business  angels  cannot meet every  demand,  so 
small  firms find  it difficult to  raise  small  sums.  There  is,  in 
short,  an  'equity gap', which European  Union  programmes 
such  as  1-TEC  (see  page 48) are attempting to fill.  However, 
there may be other sources of funds that can  be  tapped. 
This  study looks not at equity but at loan finance and asso-
ciated  services  offered  by commercial  banks  to a particular 
subset of small firms- new technology-based firms or NTBFs. 
The classic definition of an  NTBF  is a firm that is  less than 25 
years  old,  is  independent of larger companies,  and  is  estab-
lished to exploit inventions or innovations. 
The  study  attempts  to  understand  the  situation  from  the 
supply side,  and to codify good practice.  Data were collect-
ed  by interviews with 49 bank branches across  Europe,  and 
in  the United States and Israel,  chosen for their proximity to 
science  parks,  where  one  would  expect  to find  clusters  of 
potential NTBF  customers.  Expert interviews and a literature 
search  were also conducted. 
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The sample of  banks  represents around  30o/o  of the total 
assets of  Europe's  banks (Figure  3.3).  However,  as  it  neces-
sarily includes both large and small banks, the percentage of 
capacity covered for a  given country varies  between 1  OOo/o 
and 2o/o.  As  regards ownership structure, the sample includes 
67o/o  public  companies,  23o/o  co-operative  and  savings 
banks, 6o/o  public-sector banks and 4o/o  small private banks. 
Pattern of support 
The survey found a very low level of lending, and only 30o/o 
of the sample had plans to develop lending to NTBFs  in  the 
future.  In  general,  banks  liked  to  be  seen  to  be  serving 
NTBFs,  but in  practice treated them no differently from other 
SMEs  - 96o/o  use the same assessment criteria for all  SMEs. 
Quantitative figures are impossible to compile, as most banks 
keep  no statistics  on their business with  NTBFs,  and those 
that do will  not release them. 
Some  geographical  trends  can  be  discerned.  Specific 
approaches  to  NTBFs  are  more  common  among  British 
banks, patchy in  other parts of northern Europe, and rare in 
southern  Europe.  As  regards  industrial  sector,  software  is 
looked on relatively favourably  because of its  low financing 
requirements, and biotechnology is  seen as difficult because 
of the long lag  in  revenue streams. 
Bank recognition of NTBFs 
The first line of enquiry concerned whether banks recognise 
NTBFs  as  a  specific type of client.  All  the banks claimed to 
have products that were especially suitable for  small  firms, 
and 60o/o claimed these were tailored to the individual com-
pany's needs, rather than being a standard product. But only 
15o/o  had packages especially for start-up companies. These 
might include cheaper loans, advice and coaching, advice on 
grants,  use  of guarantees,  or  performance-related  interest 
rates. 
Furthermore, only 27% of the sample recognised the exist-
ence of an identifiable category of NTBFs. This appears to be 
a function of national policy rather than of the bank's own-
ership structure - three-quarters of those recognising NTBFs 
were from Sweden or Britain. 
The level of customised service provision varies from zero up 
to having a specialist technology unit.  Half  of the banks use 
specialist assessment staff,  who might be from  universities, 
national laboratories, consultants or other investors such as 
business angels or public agencies. A further third use inter-
nal  specialist  expertise  - experienced  branch  staff,  head 
office experts, IT  staff or start-up advisers. 
A positive  sign  was that three  banks (6o/o)  had  organised 
training  seminars  for  branch  managers  on  the  subject  of 
technology-based firms or young start-ups. 
Products and assessment procedures 
Most banks which did recognise NTBFs  claimed to respond 
to their needs  by  offering  a  more flexible  approach to se-
curity  and  guarantees,  granting  more  credit  (though  still 
depending on the owner's equity),  deferral  of  interest pay-
ments and special assessment procedures or specialist staff. 
On the other hand, one bank applied more stringent condi-
tions to customers it classified as NTBFs. 
The survey then looked at how banks assessed loan applica-
tions. It is  interesting that some banks claimed to treat NTBFs 
like  other clients, but nevertheless employed specific assess-
ment procedures. Banks used five main criteria to assess loan 
applications: 
•  business plan, including cash flow 
• quality and record of key personnel and management 
•  company track record 
• security 
•  equity 
The two pairs of criteria most commonly taken into account 
are  business  plan  and  personnel (  45%),  and  business  plan 
and security (24%).  Less  commonly used are business plan 
and track record (13%), personnel and equity (8o/o) and per-
sonnel  and  security  (5o/o).  Overriding  weight  is  therefore 
placed on the quality of the business proposal (41 o/o)  and of 
personnel and management (29o/o)  (Figure 3.4). 
Security remains a major issue, however, and the banks sur-
veyed break into two clusters. Nordic banks (a quarter of the 
sample, 12 banks) differ from the rest in that they play down 
formal  security,  and  invest  if  they  have  confidence  in  the 
strength of the business  idea,  the people implementing  it, 
and the amount of money they themselves are risking. 
A further important issue is that no bank accepts as security 
for a loan intangible assets such as intellectual property. This 
is  perhaps understandable, as intellectual property, if  it  is  to 
retain  its  value,  must be understood  by its  acquirer.  In  the 
event that the bank had to call  in  the security, it would not 
have the skills to use it. This is  not to say that the importance Relative priority of pairs of key investment assessment criteria  .., 
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of intellectual property is not recognised; as  part of the over-
all assessment the banks insist that it be properly protected. 
Barriers 
The  banks  surveyed  identified  eight principal  obstacles  to 
expansion of their business  with NTBFs. Four of them were 
major barriers,  being cited between six and 1 3 times: 
•  limited supply of NTBFs applying (1 3) 
•  high risk  level (9) 
• limited supply of equity capital within the applicant firms (8) 
•  lack of expertise within the bank (6) 
These barriers interact and amplify each other- so few new 
technology  entrepreneurs  come  forward,  in  part,  because 
there is  so  little risk  capital  available to back their ventures. 
The 'equity gap' thus leads  to a debt gap.  Similarly,  banks' 
inexperience  with  NTBFs  increases  the  risk  they  run.  The 
presence of other investors would also reduce the bank's risk 
and increase the quality of expert appraisal. 
The other four barriers were cited between one and three times: 
•  poor quality applications which do not give the informa-
tion needed to assess  risk 
•  lack of tangible assets to pledge as  loan security 
•  lack of expert due-diligence services which are cost effective 
for these applications 
•  lack of publicly supported loan guarantees 
It is  noteworthy that cultural  and  regulatory barriers  were 
not mentioned, despite prompting. 
USA and Israel 
Studies  in  the USA,  where economies of scale  are  greater, 
show that a class of banks with specialist knowledge of tech-
nology  markets  works  closely  with  venture  capitalists  and 
business angels to provide loan finance to NTBFs, even those 
not yet generating revenues.  In  fact, the presence of such  a 
specialist  is  linked  to  the  strength  of  regional  technology 
clusters,  although in  the early stages  they too insist on  the 
protection of high equity cover for their loans. 
Successful  specialist  lenders  in  the  US  tend  to  'chase  the 
smart money', that is  collaborate with the best-performing 
venture capitalists to pick out those NTBFs with the strongest 
equity cover for their loans.  These  cash-rich firms will often, 
in fact,  leave large amounts on deposit with the banks,  only 
using their credit facilities during growth spurts. 
Banks  tend to provide loans for the purchase of equipment 
30%  40%  50% 
(typically above $300,000), to finance stocks,  and to bolster 
working capital prior to an  equity injection. 
Although  US  banks  do take  a charge  on  all  the  business' 
assets, an interesting NTBF-friendly difference is that they will 
attach  a value to intellectual  property as  part of securing  a 
loan,  as  it is  more easily  realisable given the density of simi-
lar businesses in the locality. A further difference is  that spe-
cialist banks have now started to blur the boundary between 
debt and  equity  by  including  a  small  proportion  of  share 
options in the package. 
Israeli banks are also more willing than their European coun-
terparts  to lend  to NTBFs,  and  their national  headquarters 
typically house a small specialist team that will lend to Israeli 
companies floating on Nasdaq. 
Good practice 
A significant strand of opinion within the banks is that good 
practice for commercial  banks  is  simply to avoid  lending to 
NTBFs. This  is  because  banks  are  by definition slower than 
their clients to understand new technologies, and are there-
fore  in  no  position  to  assess  risks  accurately.  Loan  finance 
earns  a  relatively  low  return,  which  must  be  protected. 
Therefore,  early-stage  high-risk  investment,  such  as  that 
required  for  research  and  development  or  marketing  ex-
penses,  should be on an  equity basis. 
The  most  appropriate  time for  debt finance  comes  later, 
when the company has grown to have regular revenues, tan-
gible assets  that can  be  given  as  security,  and  a  need  for 
working capital. 
However,  there  may  be  advantages  for  banks  in  building 
bridges with the fast-growing high-tech sector.  They might 
offer  NTBF  packages  comprising  cheap  loans  aligned  with 
public grants. Adopting some characteristics of equity,  they 
might  link  interest  rates  to  company  performance,  defer 
interest payments, and/or take share options. 
Banks  can  establish  uniform assessment  criteria  which will 
reduce the cost of due diligence. They can  tap into existing 
knowledge of technology markets  by sponsoring  university 
posts  or consultancy  services.  They  can  train  up specialist 
staff, and use outside experts to assess  potential borrowers. 
The  public sector,  or mutual organisations,  can  encourage 
banks to lend by offering NTBFs  loan guarantees. 
- - -
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Key Findings 
•  1-TEC  concentrated on building the capacity of venture capital firms to invest in early-stage technology. 
•  1-TEC  complements other schemes,  uniquely  supporting  the  cost  of managing  venture  capital,  rather  than 
investing directly in equity or providing guarantees. 
•  By  February  2000,  1-TEC  participants  had  committed  some  €494  million  to  133  eligible  companies, 
representing about 9% of the entire European high-tech early-stage market. 
• A very high proportion of 1-TEC deals were syndicated, indicating a trend for venture capitalists to seek reciprocal 
transnational syndication of investments as  a way of spreading risk. 
•  1-TEC  participants make more cross-border investments than venture capitalists generally. 
• The  industry as  a whole has  benefited from a long-term increase in capacity resulting from the engagement 
and training of new staff. 
The  1-TEC  (Innovation and Technology Equity Capital) pilot 
project started  in  june 1997.  Its  objective  is  to encourage 
economically viable,  high-quality early-stage  investments in 
technologically  innovative  European  SMEs.  As  a  means  to 
this  end,  it aimed  to build  lasting  capacity within  venture 
capital operators to appraise and manage such  investments. 
€11  million  was  set  aside  for 28  venture  capital  firms  ~ 
€7.5 million in  1-TEC 1 and €3.5 million in  1-TEC 2. An  inter-
im  assessment  of  the  pilot  programme  was  carried  out 
between May 1999 and  March 2000. 
Intervention logic 
1-TEC  learnt  the  lessons  of the  Seed  Capital  pilot action, 
which ran from 1989 to 1995, by concentrating on building 
the capacity of established  venture capital firms rather than 
trying to encourage new ones to start up. It adopted the rel-
atively simple method of paying half the costs of employing 
new investment managers,  of travelling  to investigate and 
appraise investments, and of employing outside consultants 
to appraise investments. 
Two safeguard  conditions were laid down. Reimbursement 
was  limited to 5% of eligible investments made, and at least 
a quarter of the new fund had to be invested in eligible firms 
within three years.  Funds that were already doing early-stage 
financing also had to invest at least 50% more than the total 
they  had  invested  over  the  last  ten  years.  So  as  to  reach 
newly established enterprises, the SMEs  benefiting from the 
investments had  to be  incorporated  within the three years 
prior to the investment, or within the following year. 
The launch of 1-TEC was widely promoted, and the budget 
was  oversubscribed.  The  first  tranche  of funding  was  allo-
cated  predominantly to existing  venture capitalists  gearing 
up  new  investment  activities,  and  the  second  tranche  in 
somewhat smaller amounts to younger firms,  attempting to 
achieve a geographical balance across the EU. 
Measures and take-up 
The  main  measure  used  was  a 50% contribution for three 
types  of cost.  The first of these  is  the employment of addi-
tional  investment managers.  At the time of the evaluation, 16 of the 28 participants had made use of this facility, and it 
accounted for 54% of all  the costs claimed. 
1-TEC also supported travel costs, particularly helpful in the 
early  part of the cycle,  as  it permits staff to attend confer-
ences and visit potential clients. It is especially useful for firms 
which have a proactive policy of 'making their own deals' -
that is,  approaching  the  companies they want to invest in 
rather than  waiting to be  approached.  Half the companies 
used  the  travel  grants,  several  of  them  (particularly  new 
ones) found them useful. They made up 9% of costs claimed. 
The third 1-TEC financial  measure was to support the short-
term  engagement  of  consultants,  sometimes  during  the 
construction  of the  case  for investment ('positive  due dili-
gence') but more often during the final checking ('negative 
due diligence'). Around half the firms made use of this meas-
ure, which formed 37% of the costs claimed. 
antees, supports the cost of managing venture capital. 
1-TEC was  operating in  an  increasingly healthy environment. 
Over its life, investment in European high-technology start-ups 
exploded (Figure 3.5). At its start, returns were already improv-
ing - EVCA figures show that the benchmark return of early-
stage funds between 1994 and 1997 was 24.4% p.a. Demand 
was  also  high, and consequently high-tech investment tripled 
from €1.3 to €4 billion per annum between 1996 and 1998. 
About half of this was early stage. Yet at the same time the cost 
of launching a viable high technology business  on the global 
market also rose,  to at least €1 0 million. High-tech early-stage 
investment in  Europe is  booming accordingly. 
•  Funds invested- The main immediate impact on the ven-
ture capitalists is that they could process many more deals -
their 'deal flow' typically doubled, and thus they could invest 
money  more  quickly.  During  the  three  years  of the  1-TEC 
Venture capital executives in  Europe, 1995-99  -, 
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In  addition to financial  aid,  1-TEC  also  offered participating 
firms access to the Eurotech Data information service, which 
on demand prepares, within two weeks,  a dossier on a tech-
nology, market sector or product. Around half of the partici-
pating funds used the service,  each  requesting between one 
and nine dossiers,  and they rated it very highly. 
Finally,  1-TEC participants were invited to a series of half-day 
meetings to build up a network of contacts, with a view for 
example  to  syndicating  investments  among  them  or 
exchanging experience and good practice by discussing top-
ical subjects such as the current exit climate or valuation pro-
cedures. 
Additionality and impact 
1-TEC  was  broadly  complementary  to  other  European  and 
Member State schemes,  such  as the ETF  Startup Facilityc
1
> and 
LIFT(2). Of the 182 national schemes  in  support of innovation 
listed in the database of the European Trend Chart on Innovation 
(see  page 26), 43 (23%) concern  finance.  1-TEC  differs from 
most of these in  that it targets entrepreneurs not directly but 
through venture  capitalists.  It is  the only scheme  in  Europe 
that instead  of investing directly in  equity or providing guar-
project,  participants  committed  some  €494  million  to eli-
gible companies,  which  represents  about 9% of the entire 
high-tech early-stage market. The average size  of the invest-
ments is €61 0,000- slightly smaller than European seed and 
start-up investments in general. 
•  Transnationality  - 1-TEC  participants  are  more  trans-
nationally  minded  than  venture  capitalists  in  general,  and 
one-sixth of the eligible investments are  cross-border. 
•  Syndication- Half the 1-TEC deals were syndicated, which 
is twice as many as the norm. This appears to indicate a trend 
whereby venture capitalists are strengthening their European 
links  and  seeking  reciprocal  syndication of investments as  a 
way of spreading their risk. 
•  Staff-The industry as a whole has benefited from a long-
term increase in capacity resulting from the engagement and 
training of new staff. 1-TEC has supported the engagement of 
some  30  new investment managers directly,  predominantly 
below 35  years  old, who constitute new talent coming into 
the venture capital industry. 
•  lnvestee companies- As  at February 2000, 1-TEC  partici-
pants had  reported  1 33  eligible investments. Two-thirds of 
them are in the internet, telecom and IT sectors and a further 
(1) The  European  Technology Facility Startup Facility (ETF Startup Facility)  is  part of the European  Commission's Growth & Employment Initiative. 
(2) LIFT (Linking Innovation Finance and Technology)  is  an action of the Innovation and SMEs programme of the EU 's  Fifth  Research  Framework 
Programme.  It is  available at http://www.lift.lu/ 
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quarter in  pharmaceuticals, medical and biotech. Two-thirds 
of them are  small companies with less  than ten employees. 
There is a broad geographical distribution. 
•  Employment - Working from  investee  companies'  own 
projections, it can  be estimated that by the end of 2001, the 
number of people employed in the average 1-TEC-supported 
company will  have  risen  from  21  to 59.  It is  reasonable  to 
assume  an  average investment of €45,000 per job over the 
life  of the investment,  implying creation  of around  11,000 
jobs associated with the total investment of €494 million. It 
is  important to  remember  that  some  companies  will  not 
grow as  predicted,  that not all  these  jobs will  be  new,  and 
that  there  will  be  incalculable  displacement  effects. 
Employment is  expected to grow fastest in the telecommu-
nications and  internet sectors,  and  most slowly in  medicine 
and biotech (Figure 3.6). 
Barriers and prospects 
Some design factors reduced the efficiency of the pilot proj-
ect. First, the rigid administrative requirements of the Fourth 
Research  Framework Programme made for high compliance 
costs. Secondly, there was uncertainty ov~r what costs would 
be  reimbursed.  A further  brake  on  an  effective  use  of the 
budget was  that amounts granted to but not claimable by 
one company could not be  redirected. But the greatest bar-
rier  was  the three-year  age  limit on  beneficiary  SMEs  - in 
biotechnology in  particular,  new products may take  longer 
than three years to gestate. 
1-TEC appears to have nursed into existence a pattern of col-
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laborative cross-border investment in small  innovative com-
panies.  Meanwhile, the demand for early  stage  investment 
continues to outstrip the supply of skilled labour available to 
manage it. 
There is a good case for a successor programme of grant aid 
to be  launched, but with a redesigned  selection  procedure, 
and with amended eligibility conditions to improve targeting 
and  additionality.  A simpler system  of a flat-rate grant per 
new  staff  member  employed  might  prove  considerably 
cheaper to operate. 
The information, networking and professional development 
aspects  of 1-TEC  are  worthwhile and  could  continue  on  a 
stand-alone basis. chapter 4  Innovation Management 
Small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs)  are widely viewed as  key sources 
of future European competitiveness and 
employment. In  high-tech sectors,  rapid 
growth  can  transform  today's  start-up 
into  tomorrow's  global  market  leader, 
and  even  traditional  manufacturing 
firms  have  the  potential  to  grow  by 
absorbing  new technologies  developed 
by  others.  However,  Europe's  SMEs 
remain  poorly  equipped  to  fulfil  this 
potential, with limited capacity to man-
age  innovation  and  change,  and  to 
defend their intellectual property. 52 
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Key Findings 
•  Innovation is less a question of technology than a way of thinking and of viewing the enterprise and its surroundings. 
•  SMEs have been slow to adopt the innovation management techniques (IMTs) now widely used  by their larger 
competitors to support the innovation process. 
• This report identifies ten types of IMT which are particularly suitable for use by SMEs,  have a proven track record, 
focus on improving competitiveness, and require no more than ten days of consultancy time. 
•  The benefits of IMTs are greatest when they are seen as  serving the strategic goals of the company, rather than 
as  one-off fixes for specific problems. 
W
hy do small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) need 
to innovate? The answers  are  familiar by now - tech-
nical  progress  makes  their  products  obsolete,  globalisation 
exposes  them to new competitors from distant parts of the 
world,  rapidly  changing  markets  require  more  responsive 
production processes,  and  more demanding customers  call 
for  higher quality and  better  services.  Standing  still  is  no 
longer an option. As the European Commission's 1995 Green 
Paper on  Innovation said:  "Innovation is  at the heart of the 
spirit  of  enterprise  and  thus  companies  must  constantly 
innovate, even  if only gradually." 
Being aware of the need to innovate is one thing, but know-
ing how to do it is something else. What do you actually do? 
How do you start? Who can  help? 
Innovation Management: Building competitive skills in SMEs  is 
based  on  experience  gained  from  the  Innovation  pro-
gramme  of  the  European  Union's  Fourth  Research 
Framework Programme (FP4).  It offers a practical guide not 
just for SMEs,  but for innovation agencies,  technology insti-
tutes,  Innovation Relay  Centres,  consultants and  other bod-
ies  concerned with innovation. 
The  first  point to  understand  is  that innovation  does  not 
always mean employing the very iatest in  unfamiliar, expen-
sive,  cutting-edge technology. On the contrary, innovation is 
less  a question of technology than a way of thinking and of 
viewing the enterprise and  its  surroundings. While techno-
logical advances may be  the result of such  thinking they are 
not themselves  enough  to secure  a company's future.  The 
many  cases  of successful  innovation  in  traditional,  mature 
industries  tend  not to  make  headlines,  but all  companies 
need to innovate because they all  need to survive. 
Indeed,  too much focus  on technology can  distract atten-
tion.  It has  been  estimated  that 90-95% of all  attempts to 
launch  technologically  innovative  products  end  in  failure. 
One  reason  is  that companies  think they are  developing a 
product when in  reality they are  making a 'technical object' 
- a bright idea - which may be excellent in  its own way but 
does  not  necessarily  meet  the  needs  of  the  market. 
Innovation does not just mean new ideas, it means new ideas 
that sell. 
Large  companies  have  long been  aware  of the changes  in 
their markets and many have responded to the need to man-
age  innovation.  They  have  examined  themselves  and  in 
doing  so  have  created  a range  of tools  and  techniques  to 
help them adapt to changed  circumstances  and  meet new 
market challenges. They learned the hard way - those that 
did not are no longer with us.  SMEs,  on the other hand, have 
been  rather slow to adopt the measures now widely used  by Ten  selected Innovation Management Techniques  I 
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their larger competitors to support the innovation process. 
This is  both paradoxical and worrying, since it is widely held 
that their flexibility  and  nimbleness  give  SMEs  far  greater 
potential  for  rapid  innovation.  Much  of  EU  and  regional 
innovation  policy  is  now focused  on  nurturing  SMEs,  and 
great expectations are  riding upon them. 
So  what is  the  problem?  It is  certainly  not that SMEs  are 
unaware of the need for innovation. But for a small company, 
planning what to do and how to do it can  be daunting. Big 
companies  may have  the resources  to set  up whole teams 
devoted to innovation  but SMEs  do not. They  depend  on 
others to help them.  But what kind  of help do they need? 
How do they  become  more  innovative?  How much  will  it 
cost? Who can  they turn to and who can  they trust? 
Innovation management techniques 
Over the years,  large  companies  have  created  a  series  of 
methodologies  called  innovation  management  techniques 
(IMTs) to address the problems of innovation in a systematic 
way. For  the most part,  however,  SMEs  know little of these 
techniques,  yet many  IMTs  represent  a  distillation  of cor-
porate experience and wisdom which is  readily adaptable to 
the  circumstances  of  small  companies.  One  aim  of  FP4's 
Innovation programme was to support the pilot application 
• QuJiity management 
• Creativity tools 
of selected techniques by SMEs themselves. 
This  report  identifies  ten  types  of  IMT which  have  been 
judged  particularly  suitable  for  use  by  SMEs  (Figure  4.1 ). 
They  all  have  a  proven  track  record,  focus  on  improving 
competitiveness,  require  no more than ten days  of consult-
ancy time and  have been  widely used  in  24 projects in  the 
Innovation  programme's  'Promotion  of  Innovation 
Management Techniques' action line. 
Every  company  is  advised  to  begin  with  a  diagnostic  of 
innovation  profile,  which  helps  identify  its  innovation 
strengths and weaknesses.  It may take from five to 20 days, 
including visits,  interviews and analysis - and  usually exam-
ines  12  aspects  of the company's work.  The  object is  to a 
draw up an action plan which may involve using one or more 
of the other IMTs. 
Four  IMTs  are  grouped as  'inward looking' since  they help 
the  company  examine  its  'metabolism'  with  the  aim  of 
improving its internal functioning. The first, value analysis,  is 
a  technique for finding  out how to obtain  the  maximum 
value from a product, process  or service.  In  this case  'value' 
is  the customer's  perceived  value  of the product or service 
judged by how useful  it is  and  how much the customer is 
prepared to pay. The analysis can  lead  directly to the identi-
fication of new products and services. 
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More  radical  is  business  process  re-engineering,  which 
essentially rebuilds the company from scratch to achieve rad-
ical improvements in time, costs and quality. The fundamen-
tal  concept behind re-engineering is  not merely to reorgan-
ise the company's structure into a new one of greater or less-
er complexity, but to transform its processes.  Project devel-
opment and management is a set of tools intended to help 
the company to organise  itself  better to carry out specific 
projects. It includes such well-known methods as critical path 
analysis  and  programme  evaluation  and  review  technique 
(PERT). This is related to product design and development, 
a  broad  set  of techniques  to assist  the  actual  design  and 
manufacture of a  new product.  Many  possibilities  are  dis-
cussed  here, including several to aid product design (such as 
concurrent engineering and failure mode and effects analy-
sis)  and  others  to  assist  with  computation  (finite  element 
analysis, rapid prototyping, and so on). 
A further group of three IMTs is described as  'outward look-
ing' since they seek to examine the company's relationships 
with its competitors and with the market. Perhaps the most 
familiar is  benchmarking, which is  the process of comparing 
aspects of the company's performance with the best in  the 
sector.  The  areas  most  commonly  benchmarked  include 
costs,  products,  customer  service,  productivity,  innovation 
and  use  of resources.  The  idea  is  to understand why differ-
ences  exist and to plan how to reduce them. Marketing of 
innovation is  a relatively new tool to ensure that a product 
is  not just a 'technical object' but really is a marketable prod-
uct meeting customers' needs. This technique is most effect-
ive when the product is  still  in  the design  phase and  is  par-
ticularly valuable for radical  innovations. Technology watch 
is  a way of systematically keeping  track of developments in 
the market to ensure that the company can  move swiftly to 
exploit new opportunities.  An  important element of this  is 
being aware of the patents filed in the firm's field of interest, 
both to avoid  potential  conflicts  with existing  patents and 
also  as a source of information for benchmarking. 
Finally,  there are two 'forward-looking' IMTs which deal with 
the  company's  capacity  to  manage  change.  Total  quality 
management, one of several techniques originating in japan, 
ensures that product quality is built in from the start and is well 
known for requiring the commitment of all  the employees in 
a company.  All  these  IMTs  require  new thinking and  several 
creativity  tools,  from  brainstorming  to  lateral  thinking,  are 
presented to get employees thinking in new directions. 
There  is  a full  list of references  for further reading  and  an 
appendix of descriptions of each  of the  24  projects  in  the 
Innovation  programme  in  which  these  ten  IMTs  were 
applied. 
It would be misleading to think of these IMTs as a medicine-
chest  of  remedies  which  can  be  dispensed  according  to 
whatever corporate ailment has been diagnosed. There is  no 
simple  one-to-one  correspondence  between  the  problem 
and the solution.  Every  company is  unique, more than one 
IMT is  usually required, and the techniques themselves must 
be  tailored  to  the  needs  of the  individual  company.  Even 
more important, the benefits of applying  IMTs  are  greatest 
when they are seen  as serving the strategic goals of the com-
pany,  rather than as  one-off fixes for specific problems. 
A supportive environment 
Although the report is  presented somewhat like  a cookery 
book, SMEs  are  not expected simply to pick out the recipes 
that appeal to them and start cooking. Success in innovation 
depends critically on the environment in which the company 
operates  - the  'climate  of  innovation'  - and  this  varies 
greatly from  region to region.  Few  SMEs  have access  to a 
ready-made  'innovation  network'  linking  companies  with 
universities, technology centres,  innovation agencies,  local 
and  national government, trade associations,  foundations, 
consultants and financial institutions. 
A second crucial success factor is  the number and diversity 
of consulting  firms  that can  support  SMEs  and  act  as  the 
interface to the support network. Indeed, while a few SMEs 
may be able to use one or more of the IMTs without external 
assistance,  it is  much better for them to employ an  experi-
enced  consultant to guide them through the process.  This 
does not mean that the consultant should do all  the work -
active engagement by the company is  essential  in  all  these 
techniques.  But a consultant is  not blinkered  by the estab-
lished  wisdom of a company's management team, and  can 
take a more objective view of its  problems. This  appears to 
help the company to learn from the experience and to take 
action.  National and  regional  innovation agencies,  in  turn, 
have  an  important role  in  supervising  the  consultants  and 
creating an  atmosphere of optimism and trust. 
The  real  challenge is  to equip SMEs  to 'feel' the innovative 
environment- to sense change and to believe that they can 
be part of it. Key Findings 
Promoting innovation 
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• Twenty-three projects, involving 800 SMEs in the European Union, enabled 90 business support organisations to 
improve their expertise in  designing and  managing Innovation  Management Technique (IMT) promotions, to 
train consultants and to test the methodologies with SMEs. 
•  Most projects were national or regional in scope. 
• Two-thirds of the participating business support organisations are continuing to use the IMTs developed in the projects. 
•  The projects had difficulty in targeting SMEs  whose needs were well matched to the IMTs on offer.  IMTs are 
ineffective in SMEs which lack a strong existing management culture. 
T
he first report featured  in  this chapter describes ten  types 
of  Innovation  Management  Techniques  (IMTs)  applied 
within SMEs as part of the Innovation programme. By contrast, 
this report assesses the success of that action line,  'Promotion 
of Innovation Management Techniques', which ran from 1997 
to 1999. It involved 23 specific projects and six accompanying 
measures (Figure 4.2). A total of 90 organisations took part in 
the 15 EU  Member States and Norway, Iceland and  Israel. The 
aim was  to sensitise  SMEs,  consultants and  business develop-
ment organisations to the potential of IMTs. 
Estimated overall results in  I 5 EU  countries 
..., 
Figure 4.2 
business consultants trained in the 
promotion and use of IMT  s 
innovatron consultancy assrgnments 
conducted in  SMEs 
business consultants sensitised to the benefits 
of IMTs  for rnnovation projects 
development organisations working at regional 
or national level sensitised to the benefits 
of IMT  s for rnnovatron pr-oJects 
other SMEs  sensitised 
c:::=J:l 
I 
i:. 
:··  ··"· 
.····-'.'·.  "  .....  ~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
:' 
I 
"<.!'.  :·:;--'{  _,;  --~  >.-. 
specrfic  projects (20) 
I  '- accompanying measures  (6) 
0  1.000  2,000  3,000  4.000  5,000  6,000 
55 - - -
56 
Using  IMTs with SMEs 
The first part of the action line consisted of a series of specific 
projects designed to strengthen the know-how of the nation-
al  and regional organisations that promote IMTs for SMEs. The 
23 projects (including one double project) were chosen so that 
the  partner  organisations  could  improve  their  expertise  in 
designing and managing IMT promotions, to train consultants 
and to test the methodologies with SMEs.  Most projects were 
national or regional in scope. At the heart of each were a num-
ber of consultancy assignments with individual SMEs,  in which 
the IMTs  could  be  evaluated  in  a real  business  setting.  Four 
hundred consultants were trained to ensure  that they would 
use the IMTs being promoted in the project. 
The SMEs  themselves, some  760 in the EU  countries alone, 
were mainly well-established firms already interested in intro-
ducing new products or ways of working. Fifteen per cent of 
them employed one to ten people, 53% 11  to 50 and 32% 
51  to 500 people.  Most were already known to the partici-
pants  in  the  projects,  and  while this  helped  ensure  a suc-
cessful  outcome it did limit the potential of each  project to 
spread awareness among the local SME community. 
Each  assignment took the form of an  initial  diagnosis  and 
recommendations, followed by a specific analysis using IMTs 
and leading to an action plan. The assignment concluded by 
monitoring and  supporting the implementation of the plan 
over a six-month period.  EC  funding allowed for up to ten 
days' consultancy time, though a few contractors were able 
to obtain regional or national funding to extend the assign-
ments.  All  the  contractors  organised  promotional  events 
including  workshops  with  representatives  from  businesses, 
institutions and consultants, training seminars with company 
managers  and  contributions  to  conferences  on  innovation 
and technology transfer. 
So  what were  the  benefits  to  the  various  parties  (Figure 
4.3)?  There  was  a  broad  consensus  among  all  the  partici-
pants that promoting the use of IMTs among SMEs was use-
ful,  especially  for  those  which  already  have  a  technology 
development strategy  as  well  as  the  human  and  financial 
capacities to carry out innovative projects.  Due to the sheer 
number of SMEs  in  Europe,  such  promotion  is  best carried 
out at a regional level. 
The  IMT  contractors,  the  agencies  and  institutions  who were 
direct participants in the projects gained experience in co-ordinat-
ing  the  work of consultants  in  several  IMTs  and  in  setting  up 
schemes for their skills  to be made available to SMEs.  Eighty per 
cent of them said they could not have undertaken such work with-
out EC  support, and wished to continue to develop the schemes 
with regional or national funding. On the other hand, similar bod-
ies who were not involved in the projects expressed little interest. 
The  EC's  practice  of supporting  projects  on  a  shared-cost 
basis seems to have deterred many private organisations from 
taking part in this action line. While the principle is  appropri-
ate for conventional  research  projects  promising a return  in 
exploitable  know-how for  the  participants,  it  promises  no 
Means  of  promotion 
IMT training seminars 
Application case  study publication 
Meetings  including  IMT-user testimony 
Technical assistance  in  implementing IMT 
Consultant  diagnosis of enterprise IMT needs 
Ente1·p1 ·ise  sensit1sation by specialist visits 
Drafting of promotional fiyers  and pamphlets 
Publication of practical  IMT-use guides 
Press  articles (newspapers and  magazines) 
Internet web site development 
Production of CD-ROM descnbing IMT use 
Radio  and television programmes  '1 
Impact 
on  SMEs 
such  return for organisations engaged in  promotional activi-
ties. The few private contractors who did take part (4%) were 
already accustomed to working for the public sector. 
Four-fifths of the consultants found the intervention meth-
ods interesting and useful.  But while 65% are continuing to 
use  the  IMTs  developed  in  the  projects,  only half felt that 
they  had  been  kept  sufficiently  informed  about the  other 
projects in  the action  line. They would like to have  learned 
more about a wider range of techniques. 
The response  of SMEs  to the authors' survey was  very poor 
but those who replied were satisfied  with the progress  made 
while working with the consultants,  though it seems  that in 
only half the cases  were the benefits directly linked to innov-
ation. This suggests that the projects had difficulty in targeting 
SMEs  whose  needs  were well  matched to the IMTs  on  offer. 
One contractor pointed out that IMTs  cannot be  effective  in 
SMEs that do not already have a good management culture. 
Spreading know-how 
The  second  part of the action  line was  rather different.  It 
consisted of six accompanying measures designed to support 
the  exchange  of  know-how  and  good  practice  between 
innovation agencies in different countries - up to ten coun-
tries in each case. Three of these projects looked at industrial 
design,  one studied  technology watch, and another exam-
ined management techniques applicable to innovation. The 
sixth made a comparison of IMT promotion practices. 
Although these  projects allowed the participants to master 
the IMTs and learn how to use them, the impact of the pro-
motional activities was  limited to those organisations which 
played a direct part in the projects. The impact on the wider 
innovation community was only slight, and little impact was 
made on the specific projects themselves. 
There  were  a  number of reasons  for this  limited  success. 
First, the specific projects were constrained by their contracts 
with the European Commission, which allowed little room to 
revise  their  workplans  in  the  light  of  new  experience. 
Second,  the  results  of the  specific  projects  became  known 
only when they had finished, at a time when the accompa-
nying measures themselves were also coming to an  end. It is 
likely  that the true  benefit of the  exchange  of experience 
would only have been realised  in future projects. 
The authors also point out that the organisations involved in 
the evaluation projects were led by practitioners whose inter-
ests  lay  in  meeting  the  concrete  needs  of  business  rather 
than in  engaging  in  academic comparisons of promotional 
methods.  Seminars  focused  on  descriptions of the projects 
themselves rather than on methodological comparisons, and 
a website set up to allow participants to compare their work-
ing methods was  hardly used. 
Nevertheless,  nearly all  the organisations that took part in 
the action  line said  they were satisfied  with what they had 
achieved, especially the tools and training programmes that 
they had developed. 
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Key Findings 
• Two-thirds of the sample firms had experienced attempts to copy their patented inventions, but only one in five 
actually used the courts to defend their patents. 
•  For 49%, fear of the cost of patent-defence litigation had a 'very big' or a 'significant' impact on their investment 
in invention. 
• The current patent system works poorly for SMEs.  Especially in the US,  large firms use  the resources which they 
have available for litigation to intimidate SMEs. 
•  For SMEs,  patenting is  currently not cost-effective as  a means of protecting intellectual property. 
•  Only in very rare cases  are penalties for infringement awarded in practice. 
•  Compulsory expert arbitration should be investigated as  a solution to the excessive costs of patent litigation. 
F
or  many years  there  has  been  concern  that patents  are 
under-used  by  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs),  which  therefore  rely  disproportionately on secrecy 
and speed to market, rather than on patents, to protect their 
inventions. Also,  they do not fully exploit patent information 
as  a source  of technological and  market intelligence. Efforts 
to improve SMEs'  access  to patent protection have focused 
on  reducing  the costs  of obtaining and  maintaining patent 
grants.  But since  a patent is  no more than  'a  licence to liti-
gate,' the real  issue  is the cost of enforcing the rights it pur-
ports to grant, which can  be far too high for SMEs  in  terms 
of both time and money. Anecdotal evidence has suggested 
that even those SMEs which owned patent rights were often 
failing  to  defend  them.  Two  causes  of  this  failure  were 
assumed to be the difficulty of monitoring whether infringe-
ment was  taking  place,  and  fear  of the cost  of litigation to 
assert patent rights if it was. 
Enforcing small firms' patent rights sets out to measure empir-
ically SMEs'  ability to monitor infringement of their patents, 
and their experiences of litigation. Its conclusions are  based 
on questionnaires completed by over 600 SMEs,  drawn from 
every  EU  Member State,  which had  obtained a European or 
United States patent between 1994 and 1997, and on inter-
views with the majority of these respondents. 
Survey findings 
•  Almost every firm had made and tested a prototype of at 
least  one  of its  patented  inventions.  In  63% of cases,  the 
product  was  subsequently  manufactured  and  put  on  the 
market by the firm itself, in 22% by the firm and one or more 
licencees,  and in  6% through licensing alone. 
..  Sixty-seven  per cent of the firms reported that there had 
been  attempts to copy their patented  inventions,  but only 
24% had experienced difficulty in learning about this. 
In  26% of cases  of infringement, the copying was done by 
firms larger than the patent holder, and  in  34% by a company 
of approximately the  same  size  as  itself - 11% reported  that 
their invention had been copied by firms in both size categories. 
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The financial impact of infringement was considered to be 
'unimportant' or 'bearable' by 46% of the firms, but for 21% 
it was  'very serious'. 
Only one  in  five  SME  patent holders  actually  used  the 
courts to defend their patents - 1  5% began  legal  proceed-
ings but abandoned them, presumably without any conces-
sion from the infringer,  23% got a settlement of their case 
before it reached the court, 21% went as far as trial and half 
of these  (1 1  %) to appeal. Technical arbitration was  used  to 
settle the dispute in only 9% of cases. 
·1  Fourteen per cent of the responding firms had taken out 
insurance against the cost of patent litigation, but only 2% 
had  made  a  successful  claim.  Over  half  doubted  whether 
such insurance would deter potential infringers, and only 5% 
were sure that it would. 
;,  In 40% of cases, fear of the cost of patent-defence litigation 
had no impact on investment in  invention. However, for 1  3% 
the impact was 'very big', and for 36% it was 'significant'. 
Conclusions 
The study amply confirms fears  that the current patent sys-
tem works poorly for SMEs.  It provides strong evidence that 
large firms use the resources which they have available for lit-
igation to intimidate SMEs.  This pattern is  most pronounced 
in the United States, where it is reinforced by the built-in bias 
against foreign and other non-local patentees of the District 
Court jury system for patent cases - and amounts to serious 
protectionism against non-US high-tech firms, even  if this is 
inadvertent on the part of the authorities. 
Although a few firms do obtain some  compensation from 
infringers,  in  general  it appears  that for SMEs  patenting  is 
currently not a cost-effective means of protecting intellectual 
property.  Infringers are  unlikely to be  deterred by efforts to 
highlight the  penalties for infringement,  since  it is  only  in 
very rare  cases  that such  penalties are  awarded in  practice. 
On the other hand, however, publicity of this kind would be 
an  important element of co-operative  protection  arrange-
ments proposed on the basis of the study's research. 
The EU's 1  999 ETAN(ll expert report on Strategic Dimensions 
of Intellectual  Property  Rights  recommended  that compul-
sory expert arbitration should be investigated as a solution to 
the  excessive  costs  of  patent  litigation.  More  recently,  a 
Working Group of the European Patent Organisation recom-
mended that EU  governments should follow the US  lead and 
introduce legislation  to make  the arbitration  of patent dis-
putes easier. 
The study presents empirical evidence supporting these rec-
ommendations. Secondly, until the necessary legislation is  in 
place,  it recommends the establishment of an  EU-wide vol-
untary  grouping  of  SME  patentees  - a  so-called  'Patent 
Defence Union' (PDU)- to defend their patents. Members of 
the PDU  would agree to technical arbitration of any dispute 
with another member, which the data collected by the study 
suggests could deal with around a third of all  cases.  Of the 
firms  approached,  52% said  that they would join the pro-
posed monitoring organisation if it existed now, and an addi-
tional 9% said that they might. 
The PDU would not be an insurance scheme, since it would 
offer no guarantee to any individual patentee that his  litiga-
tion costs would be met. But it would fight as  many cases  as 
its resources allowed, with the aim of ending the intimidation 
which makes so  many SMEs'  patents effectively worthless. 
The study suggests that to achieve viability the PDU  would 
need  a  subscription  base  of approximately €1  million  per 
year,  paid  in  respect  of  10% of the  18,000  SME  patents 
requiring  protection.  To  launch  the  PDU,  one-off funding 
could most appropriately be provided by diverting a tiny part 
of the annual subsidy of €1 70  million currently received  by 
the National  Patent Offices from  renewal fees  on  European 
patents. Some of this subsidy is  already used to promote the 
use of patents by smaller firms. However, diverting less than 
1%  of  the  National  Patent  Offices'  subsidy  to  the  PDU, 
enabling it to operate at its break-even level from the start, 
would  do much  to  strengthen  the ability of these  smaller 
firms to enforce the patents which they obtain. 
The Patent Defence Union might be governed by a Council 
composed of representatives  of the many groupings which 
promote  the  interests  of  smaller  businesses  and  inventors 
throughout the Member States.  The strongest candidate for 
its  location is  Denmark, since the authorities in that country 
have for many years been  most active in  pursuing the cause 
of the defence of SME patents. 
(1)  The  European  Technology Assessment Network, at http://www.cordis.lu/etan/home.html chapter 5  Regional Issues and Approaches 
The  pace  and  mechanisms of economic 
development vary widely across  the  EU 
and  within  Member States.  As  a  result, 
there is  wide consensus that innovation 
policy should be framed at the regional 
level - not only to take account of local 
economic circumstances,  but also to be 
closer  to  SMEs,  which  are  regarded  as 
the  primary engines  of innovation  and 
growth, and therefore as  key  'clients' of 
the economic development process. 
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5.1 
Assessment of the 
Community regional 
innovation and 
technology 
transfer strategies  English - NB-NA-1 7-028-EN-C, ISBN  92-894-0629-1 
Free, from the Innovation Helpdesk (see back cover) 
Study team led by: University of Newcastle (United Kingdom) 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on its  behalf is  responsible for the use 
which might be made of the following information.  The  views in the study are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the European Commission. 
Key Findings 
• The RITTS  process supported the development of politically endorsed regional technology transfer and 
innovation strategies, based on dialogue between all stakeholder groups. 
•  RITTS  projects led to adaptation and improvement of existing regional innovation support infrastructures 
and the design of new measures in response to demand. 
• The benchmarking of regions' policy and support instruments stimulated inter-regional learning. 
•  Steering committees of representatives from major public sector agencies and universities provided over-
sight of strategy development and implementation, and secured political support and legitimacy. 
•  Business  was  found  to  be  most effectively  represented  by bodies  such  as  chambers of commerce and 
industry associations. 
•  In regions where a strong innovation network does not already exist, the steering committee may need to 
be reborn as  a permanent 'innovation forum'. 
T
he  Regional  Innovation  and  Technology  Transfer 
Strategies  and  Infrastructures  (RITIS)  programme  was 
launched  in  1994  under the  Innovation  programme,  now 
managed  by the  Directorate-General for Enterprise. Its  aim 
was to help policy-makers and regional development organ-
isations  assess  the technology transfer support structures  in 
their  regions,  and  to  develop  strategies  and  implement 
actions  to  improve the  quality  of the  match  between  the 
services  supported  by  regional  funding  agencies  and  the 
needs of the region's firms, especially SMEs (Figure 5.1  ). 
The  way  in  which  this  assistance  was  supplied  added  a 
transnational  European  dimension. RITIS  provided funding 
for  regions  to  engage  consultants  drawn  from  an  inter-
national team of experts approved by the Commission. The 
idea was  to encourage best practice by taking advantage of 
experience gained in other European regions. Regions would 
therefore  have  access  to  high-level  international  expertise 
and  be  able  to  evaluate  their  performance  against  inter-
national  benchmarking  standards.  An  EU-funded  network 
would  provide  information,  facilitate  personal  contacts, 
organise conferences and workshops, and collect and diffuse 
practical experience. 
Three  principles  guided the  projects.  First,  they should  be 
'demand-led', providing innovation support of kinds actually 
needed by SMEs.  Second, the exercise placed stress on build-
ing  a consensus  within  the  region  for the  priorities  to  be 
addressed.  This  required  as  many  regional  stakeholders  as 
possible to be  brought in  at an  early stage. Third, although 
the analysis and  planning was  important, RITIS  was  mainly 
about taking practical action to bridge the gap between the 
supply  of  innovation  services  and  the  demand  for  them 
among SMEs. 
Each  project had three phases- examination of the existing 
infrastructure,  proposals  for  improving  the  infrastructure, 
and  implementation and  monitoring of the priority actions. 
A fourth was  added  later to ensure that adequate organisa-
tion, funding and planning was  in  place from the outset. 
The  RITIS  scheme was  open to all  EU  regions,  plus Iceland 
and  Norway.  Unlike  many  EU  programmes,  proposals were 
not restricted to areas already receiving other regional assis-Types of achievements of the RITTS  programme  Figure  5.1 
RITIS 
tance. The 42 regions chosen in the first two calls for propos-
als,  in  1994 and  1996, were  highly diverse,  including some 
with booming economies and others which were in indus-
trial decline. Geographically, they ranged from North Sweden 
and  Iceland  to the Canaries  and  Crete.  Some  regions  were 
well-established administrative divisions (including two nation 
states)  and others were  ad  hoc regions  put together for the 
RITTS  proposals. What they all  had  in  common was  a desire 
to improve their support for industrial innovation, whether in 
high-technology firms or in the more traditional sectors. 
Good project management 
Clear and realistic aims and objectives turned out to be crit-
ical to the success of the projects. Only a few regions started 
out with  a clear  rationale  but others  developed  it as  their 
project  unfolded.  Some  found  that  their  plans  were  too 
ambitious.  Those  without  clear  aims  seemed  to  view  the 
project as  little more than a study and  hoped that the con-
sultants would offer ideas for them to follow. 
Those  with clear objectives  had  considered  such  questions 
as: Why are we bidding for this project? What do we want to 
achieve? What do we already know about innovation in  the 
region? What do we need to find out? How will we achieve 
our goals and what will it cost? What can  we do ourselves? 
What help do we need from the consultants and from other 
regions?  Advice  on  project management was  provided  by 
the  Commission.  Each  region  had  a  project  co-ordinator 
working with  a  small  team  to  manage  the  day-to-day co-
ordination  of  the  project,  while  a  broadly-based  steering 
committee oversaw its strategic direction. 
The  steering  committee  typically  included  representatives 
from the major public sector agencies and universities in the 
region.  As  well  as  providing  oversight of strategy develop-
ment and implementation, this ensured that the project had 
political  support  and  legitimacy.  A  survey  of  participants 
showed that the committees' most important roles  were to 
build consensus  around the diagnosis of the problems and 
the  strategic  response  to  be  followed.  "It  becomes  clear, 
then, that members of the steering committees primarily see 
their roles  as  focused  on debate, advice and  political legiti-
planned RITIS achievements 
planned RITIS steps 
addit1onal  RITIS achievements 
• - -+  achieved RITIS steps (dotted= weaker) 
macy rather than a more action-oriented approach in  fund-
raising,  identifying  projects,  implementation  or  providing 
expertise."  Some regions found it difficult to retain the inter-
est of private sector partners, and business was found to be 
more effectively represented by bodies such  as  chambers of 
commerce and industry associations. 
Most regions also  set  up working groups to assist  consult-
ants  in  the development of strategies.  Once again,  having 
respected  people from  key  agencies  in  the working groups 
helped to build consensus and to secure acceptance of their 
proposals. 
It is  also  important to plan for the future and consider what 
will happen to the RITTS  structures when the project comes 
to an end. Where a strong innovation network already exists, 
the functions  of the  RITTS  project  may  pass  seamlessly  to 
existing bodies, but in other regions the steering committee 
may need to be  reborn as  a permanent 'innovation forum', 
for example. 
International consultants, local expertise 
International consultants played an  important role in  RITTS 
projects. They studied the supply and demand for innovation 
support services in the region and provided expertise on for-
mulating strategies. Most of the time their work was seen  as 
positive and of central importance to the success of the proj-
ects.  They  were  valued  for  their  independence,  specialist 
knowledge,  external  perspective,  benchmarking  skills  and 
new ideas brought from other regions. 
The benefits brought by the consultants included examples 
of  good  practice,  models  of  innovation,  skills  in  running 
RITTS-type  projects, independence and an  external perspec-
tive strong enough to confront local bodies with sometimes 
unwelcome  truths.  A  key  benefit was  the  set  of analytical 
tools and techniques which could be applied to the problems 
of the region. Where the contribution of consultants was dis-
appointing, this was  attributable to problems such  as  poor 
data  collection,  inappropriate  methodologies,  limited 
engagement,  poor  local  knowledge,  language  difficulties, 
arrogance,  inadequate briefing and management, or simply 
having too many consultants. 
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On the whole, the more successful regions used consultants 
to guide and facilitate,  rather than handing over their proj-
ects  to them. The  most successful  RITIS  projects combined 
careful  use  of external consultants with the knowledge and 
research  capacities  of  local  consultants  and  organisations 
such  as  universities  and  employers'  bodies.  Regions  were 
able  to do this  because  they  knew what they wanted  the 
project to  achieve  and  had  effective  managers  in  place  to 
steer and support the consultants. 
Methodological development 
Perhaps the weakest part of the projects was the assessment 
of demand for innovation services among SMEs. The obvious 
method of gauging this demand - sending questionnaires to 
SMEs  - was  used  widely but with a disappointing response 
rate.  Very  small  firms  are  renowned  for not taking  part  in 
postal  surveys.  In  some cases  the questionnaires were  aug-
mented by telephone surveys,  but in many cases  the sample 
sizes  were still too small to be meaningful. 
Interviews and focus groups were more productive, though 
there  was  a  problem  choosing  a  representative  sample  of 
firms to approach.  The  most common  problems  identified 
were lack  of finance for innovation and  lack  of skilled  staff 
(Figure 5.2). 
There was  a clear weakness in the absence of formal meth-
ods of demand analysis - often consultants were expected 
to supply the results rather than putting systems in  place for 
the  regions  to monitor and  understand  demand for them-
selves. Few regions were left with detailed methodologies for 
demand analysis. 
Analysis  of supply was  more straightforward, with consult-
ants interviewing support organisations. The two most com-
mon  problems identified were  firms'  limited  knowledge  of 
the available  support services  and  consequent underuse of 
them,  and  fragmentation and  overlaps  on  the supply side. 
Other concerns  included the targeting of schemes  towards 
large,  high-tech firms, cultural gaps  between support agen-
cies  and  SMEs,  insufficiently high priority given to technol-
ogy transfer, and burdensome and inflexible bureaucracy. 
Exchange  between  regions  served  mainly to provide the 
regions  involved  with  tools  and  lessons  to  better manage 
their own  projects.  Focus  on  key  ideas,  and  learning  from 
comparison  regarding  the  management of  RITIS  projects, 
were  the  main  benefits  of  transnational  collaboration 
expressed  by  the  regions.  In  most  cases,  an  international 
dimension was supplied by the consultants, but the interre-
gional  dimension  remained  weak.  The  barriers  to  effective 
exchanges included language and cultural differences, travel 
costs,  and  an  undue  emphasis  on  promotional  activities 
rather than learning. 
Most commonly identified unsatisfied needs 
lack of innovation financing and  risk capital 
lack of staff in  skilled in  dealing with innovation 
lack of marketing skills 
lack of managerial skills 
too few innovative start-ups 
low level of innovation in firms, especially sub-contractors 
weak co-operation between firms 
negative attitude in firms towards change and  innovation 
need for technological information/intelligence 
lack of openness and low level of internationalisation in firms 
firms' difficulties in  expressing their innovation needs 
need to review intellectual property rights 
weak contribution of SMEs to the.  design of R&D programmes and  polic t~s 
lack of relevant technical support in specific sectors 
Figure  5.2 Underlying factors behind RITTS 'successes' and 'failures'  Figure 5.3 
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Impact of the RITTS  projects 
RITIS achieved its objective to support regional policy-mak-
ers  in  upgrading  their technology transfer  and  innovation 
infrastructure. In  addition, it contributed rather more to the 
development of policy than was expected. But it is  also clear 
that the programme as  a whole was too ambitious for most 
regions,  which selected  and adapted objectives to suit their 
own circumstances. 
In  evaluating the success  of the projects,  it is  important to 
realise that the regions did not all  start from the same  point. 
The  mark  of  success  should  not  be  "how  much  did  this 
region  achieve?",  but "how far  did the region  improve its 
position  compared  with  its  starting  situation?"  In  many 
cases,  the RITIS  project seems  to have  been  an  important 
stage in a long-term process  of building an  effective innov-
ation policy. 
Three main factors contributed to the success  of individual 
projects (Figure 5.3). First, the presence of an  existing innov-
ation  policy  helped  give  direction  to  the  RITIS  project. 
Second,  regions  with  a  strong  identity  backed  up  by  a 
regional government tended to do better than regions which 
existed only on a map. A third factor, which became appar-
ent during the projects, was the crucial importance of good 
legitimacy and compe-
tence  of project leader 
inclusiveness of process 
project  management.  This  meant strong  political  backing, 
sound  management of consultants,  project  leaders  with  a 
high legitimacy and capacity, and intense involvement of all 
regional stakeholders. 
To  sum  up,  the RITIS  programme had  positive  impacts in 
four areas: 
It  encouraged  a  much-needed  move  towards  strategic 
thinking for innovation-oriented regional development. 
It offered  mechanisms and  incentives to create  regional 
dialogue in  geographically,  institutionally or culturally frag-
mented regions. 
It promoted the development of a concept of innovation 
broader than linear technology transfer,  and helped to raise 
this higher on the policy agenda. 
It assisted many regions to clarify the components of their 
innovation support infrastructures, and to develop actions to 
rationalise them and augment their visibility. 
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Forthcoming Studies 
The  12  Innovation Policy Studies summarised  in  this volume form part of an 
ongoing  series. The  following  studies  are  currently  in  progress,  and  their 
reports will be  made available by December 200 I: 
•  Corporation tax and  innovation: issues  at stake  and  review 
of experience in  the  1990s  in  the European Union and  the 
United States 
A  comprehensive comparative analysis  of tax incentive schemes  designed to 
promote innovation investments in  firms will identify their rationale, charac-
teristics, similarities and differences, analysing their influence on the innovation 
performance of European businesses and identifying good practice.  The impact 
of corporate taxation on intangible investments will also be assessed.The con-
clusions  of the  study  are  expected  to contribute to the  debate  regarding 
reforms of legislation and  practice in  this field. 
•  Innovation  policy  issues  in  s1x  applicant  countries:  the 
challenges 
Focusing on Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus, this 
study will examine the current framework conditions for selected  innovation 
issues, analysing the views and  policies of public authorities in  these countries 
responsible for promoting innovation among enterprises, especially SMEs.lt will 
also gather opinions from a representative group of private market operators 
on the innovation framework and  innovation investment trends. 
•  Innovative SMEs  and  employment creation 
Building on previous research  in  this field, this study will further explore the 
complex relationships between innovative SMEs  and  the creation of employ-
ment, in  order to shed  light on what can  and  what cannot be expected from 
innovative SMEs  in  terms of employment creation. 
•  Industrial relations and  innovation 
This  study  aims  to provide  policy-makers  with  practical  means  to analyse, 
benchmark  and  improve  the  framework  conditions  which  determine  the 
'innovation-friendliness'  of industrial  relations  in  a  given  sector,  region  or 
country, in  order to foster change  and  European  competitiveness. It will also 
be of interest to managers, employee representatives and trade union officials. BUILDING  AN  INNOVATIVE  ECONOMY  IN  EUROPE 
•  Patent protection of computer programs: impact assessment 
on innovative SMEs of future patent reform relating to com-
puter program inventions 
This study will  draw up a clear and reliable picture of the intellectual property 
rights  (IPR)  awareness of small  and  medium  sized  enterprises active  in  the 
software sector, formulating options on intellectual property rights awareness 
actions to accompany forthcoming legal  changes. 
•  Free patent information on the internet impact assessment 
This study will  develop an  accurate assessment of the present status of freely 
available  online  patent  information  originating  from  Europe, Japan  and  the 
United States, and of users' ease of access to this information. It will  also study 
the use made of these databases and their impact, both on commercial patent 
databases and on patent awareness in general, formulating options for improv-
ing the use of these new tools by researchers, universities and innovative SMEs. 
•  The internet and technology transfer 
The use of the internet as  a  vehicle  for information  exchange and  business 
transactions could  have  a significant impact on technology transfer activities. 
Aimed  at technology transfer professionals, company managers, researchers, 
and policy-makers, this study will  contribute to the understanding of this trend, 
with a view to improving its effectiveness. 
•  Co-operation between the research system and industry to 
promote innovative firms 
This  study  aims  to  identify  the  major  actors  and  mechanisms  of  co-
operation between the research system and industry, and to identify legal, 
administrative and financial frameworks needed to stimulate the creation of 
new firms  by  research institutions. It will  also assess existing co-operative 
schemes  involving  research  organisations  and  their  spin-off  firms,  and 
review  the  incentives  motivating  individuals  to  become  entrepreneurs. 
Finally,  it  will  identify  potential  synergies  and  conflicts  between  research 
organisations and their spin-off employees. 
67 European Commission 
EUR  17043 - Building an innovative economy in Europe 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
2001  - 67 pp. - 21  x 29.7 em 
ISBN  92-894-0788-3 
Price (excluding VAT)  in  Luxembourg: EUR  11.50 Venta  •  Salg  •  Verkauf  •  nwA~ot•c; •  Sales  •  Vente  •  Vendita  •  Verkoop  •  Venda  •  Myynti  •  Forsaljning 
http://eur-op.eu.int/general/en/s-ad.htm 
BELGIQUE/BELGIE 
Jean De Lannoy 
Avenue du Roi 202/Koningslaan 202 
B-1190 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Tel. (32-2) 538 43 08 
Fax (32-2) 538 08 41 
E-mail: jean.de.lannoy@ infoboard.be 
URL: http://www.jean-de-lannoy.be 
La librairie europeenne/ 
De Europese Boekhandel 
Rue de Ia Loi 244/Wetstraat 244 
B-1 040 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Tel. (32-2) 295 26 39 
Fax (32-2) 735 08 60 
E-mail: mail@  libeurop.be 
URL: http://www.libeurop.be 
Moniteur belge/Belgisch Staatsblad 
Rue de Louvain 40-42/Leuvenseweg 40-42 
B-1 000 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Tel. (32-2) 552 22 11 
Fax (32-2) 511  01  84 
E-mail: eusales@just.fgov.be 
DAN MARK 
J. H. Schultz Information A/S 
Herstedvang 12 
DK-2620 Albertslund 
Til. (45) 43 63 23 00 
Fax (45) 43 63 19 69 
E-mail: schultz @schultz.dk 
URL: http://www.schultz.dk 
DEUTSCHLAND 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag GmbH 
Vertriebsabteilung 
Amsterdamer StraBe 192 
D-50735 K61n 
Tel. (49-221) 97 66 80 
Fax (49-221) 97 66 82 78 
E-Mail: vertrieb@  bundesanzeiger.de 
URL: http://www.bundesanzeiger.de 
Ei\i\AL'>A/GREECE 
G. C. Eleftheroudakis SA 
International Bookstore 
Panepistimiou 17 
GR-10564 Athina 
Tel. (30-1) 331  41  80/1/2/3/4/5 
Fax (30-1) 323 98 21 
E-mail: elebooks@netor.gr 
URL: elebooks@  hellasnet.gr 
ESPANA 
Boletin Oficial del Estado 
Trafalgar, 27 
E-28071  Madrid 
Tel. (34) 915 38 21  11  (libros) 
91 3 84 17 15 (suscripci6n) 
Fax (34) 915 38 21  21  (Iibras), 
913 84 17 14 (suscripci6n) 
E-mail: clientes@com.boe.es 
URL: http://www.boe.es 
Mundi Prensa Libros, SA 
Castello, 37 
E-28001  Madrid 
Tel. (34) 914 36 37 00 
Fax (34) 915 75 39 98 
E-mail: libreria@mundiprensa.es 
URL: http://www.mundiprensa.com 
FRANCE 
Journal officiel 
Service des publications des CE 
26, rue  Desaix 
F-75727 Paris Cedex 15 
Tel. (33) 140 58 77 31 
Fax (33) 140 58 77 00 
E-mail: europublications@ journal-officiel.gouv.fr 
URL: http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr 
IRELAND 
Alan Hanna's Bookshop 
270 Lower Rathmines Road 
Dublin 6 
Tel. (353-1) 496 73 98 
Fax (353-1) 496 02 28 
E-mail: hannas@iol.ie 
IT ALIA 
Licosa SpA 
Via Duca di Calabria, 1/1 
Casella postale 552 
1-50125 Firenze 
Tel. (39) 055 64 83 1 
Fax (39) 055 64 12 57 
E-mail: licosa@licosa.com 
URL: http://www.licosa.com 
LUXEMBOURG 
Messageries du livre SARL 
5, rue Raiffeisen 
L-2411  Luxembourg 
Tel. (352) 40 1  0 20 
Fax (352) 49 06 61 
E-mail: mail @mdl.lu 
URL: http://www.mdl.lu 
NEDERLAND 
SOU Servicecentrum Uitgevers 
Christoffel Plantijnstraat 2 
Postbus 20014 
2500 EA Den Haag 
Tel. (31-70) 378 98 80 
Fax (31-70) 378 97 83 
E-mail: sdu @sdu.ni 
URL: http://www.sdu.ni 
OSTER REICH 
Manz'sche Verlags- und 
Universitatsbuchhandlung GmbH 
Kohlmarkt 16 
A-1014 Wien 
Tel. (43-1) 53 16 11  00 
Fax(43-1)53161167 
E-Mail: manz@schwinge.at 
URL: http://www.manz.at 
PORTUGAL 
Distribuidora de Livros Bertrand  Ld.~ 
Grupo Bertrand, SA 
Rua das Terras dos Vales, 4-A 
Apartado 60037 
P-2700 Amadora 
Tel. (351) 214 95 87 87 
Fax (351) 214 96 02 55 
E-mail: dlb@ip.pt 
lmprensa Nacionai-Casa da  Moeda, SA 
Sector de Publicay6es Oficiais 
Rua da Escola Politecnica, 135 
P-1250-1 00 Lisboa Codex 
Tel. (351) 213 94 57 00 
Fax (351 ) 213 94 57 50 
E-mail: spoce@incm.pt 
URL: http://www.incm.pt 
SUOMI/FINLAND 
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa/ 
Akademiska Bokhandeln 
Keskuskatu 1/Centralgatan 1 
PUPB 128 
FIN-001 01  Helsinki/Helsingfors 
P./tfn  (358-9) 121  44 18 
F./fax (358-9) 121  44 35 
Sahk6posti: sps@akateeminen.com 
URL: http://www.akateeminen.com 
SVERIGE 
BTJ AB 
Traktorvagen 11-13 
S-221  82  Lund 
Tit. (46-46) 18 00 00 
Fax (46-46) 30 79 47 
E-post: btjeu-pub@btj.se 
URL: http://www.btj.se 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The Stationery Office Ltd 
Customer Services 
PO Box 29 
Norwich NR3 1GN 
Tel. (44) 870 60 05-522 
Fax (44) 870 60 05-533 
E-mail: book.orders@theso.co.uk 
URL: http://www.itsofficial.net 
iSLAND 
Bokabud Larusar Blondal 
Sk61av6rdustig, 2 
IS-1 01  Reykjavik 
Tel. (354) 552 55 40 
Fax (354) 552 55 60 
E-mail: bokabud@simnet.is 
NORGE 
Swets Blackwell  AS 
0stenjoveien 18 
Boks 6512 Etterstad 
N-0606 Oslo 
Tel. (47) 22 97 45 00 
Fax (47) 22 97 45 45 
E-mail: info@no.swetsblackwell.com 
SCHWEIZ/SUISSE/SVIZZERA 
Euro Info Center Schweiz 
c/o OSEC 
StampfenbachstraBe 85 
PF 492 
CH-8035 ZOrich 
Tel. (41-1) 365 53 15 
Fax (41-1 ) 365 54 11 
E-mail: eics@osec.ch 
URL: http://www.osec.ch/eics 
BALGARIJA 
Europress Euromedia Ltd 
59, blvd Vitosha 
BG-1 000 Sofia 
Tel. (359-2) 980 37 66 
Fax (359-2) 980 42 30 
E-mail: Milena@mbox.cit.bg 
URL: http://www.europress.bg 
CESKA REPUBLIKA 
UVIS 
odd. Publikaci 
Havelkova 22 
CZ-130 00 Praha 3 
Tel. (420-2) 22 72 07 34 
Fax (420-2) 22 71  57 38 
URL: http://www.uvis.cz 
CYPRUS 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
PO Box 21455 
CY-1509 Nicosia 
Tel. (357-2) 88 97 52 
Fax (357-2) 66 10 44 
E-mail: demetrap@ccci.org.cy 
EESTI 
Eesti Kaubandus-Toostuskoda 
(Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry) 
Toom-Kooli 17 
EE-10130 Tallinn 
Tel. (372) 646 02 44 
Fax (372) 646 02 45 
E-mail: einfo@koda.ee 
URL: http://www.koda.ee 
HRVATSKA 
Mediatrade Ltd 
Pavia Hatza 1 
HR-10000 Zagreb 
Tel. (385-1) 481  9411 
Fax (385-1 ) 481  94  11 
MAGYARORSZAG 
Euro Info Service 
Szt. Istvan krt.12 
II emelet 1/A 
PO Box 1039 
H-1137 Budapest 
Tel. (36-1) 329 21  70 
Fax (36-1) 349 20 53 
E-mail: euroinfo@euroinfo.hu 
URL: http://www.euroinfo.hu 
MALTA 
Miller Distributors Ltd 
Malta International Airport 
PO Box 25 
Luqa LQA 05 
Tel. (356) 66 44 88 
Fax (356) 67 67 99 
E-mail: gwirth@usa.net 
POLSKA 
Ars Polona 
Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7 
Skr. pocztowa 1  001 
PL-00-950 Warszawa 
Tel. (48-22) 826 12 01 
Fax (48-22) 826 62 40 
E-mail: books119@arspolona.com.pl 
ROMANIA 
Euromedia 
Str.Dionisie Lupu nr. 65, sector 1 
R0-70184 Bucuresti 
Tel. (40-1 ) 315 44 03 
Fax (  40-1 ) 312 96 46 
E-mail: euromedia@ mailcity.com 
SLOVAKIA 
Centrum VTI SR 
Nam. Slobody, 19 
SK-81223 Bratislava 
Tel. (421-7) 54 41  83 64 
Fax (421-7) 54 41  83 64 
E-mail: europ@tbb1.sltk.stuba.sk 
URL: http://www.sltk.stuba.sk 
SLOVENIJA 
Gospodarski Vestnik 
Dunajska cesta 5 
SL0-1 000 Ljubljana 
Tel. (386) 613 09 16 40 
Fax (386) 613 09 16 45 
E-mail: europ@gvestnik.si 
URL: http://www.gvestnik.si 
TURKIYE 
DOnya lnfotel AS 
1  00, Yil  Mahallessi 34440 
TR-80050 Bagcilar-lstanbul 
Tel. (90-212) 629 46 89 
Fax (90-212) 629 46 27 
E-mail: infotel@dunya-gazete.com.tr 
ARGENTINA 
World Publications SA 
Av. Cordoba 1877 
C 1120 AAA Buenos Aires 
Tel.  (54-11) 4815 81  56 
Fax(54-11)48158156 
E-mail:  wpbooks@infovia.com.ar 
URL: http://www.wpbooks.com.ar 
AUSTRALIA 
Hunter Publications 
PO Box 404 
Abbotsford, Victoria 3067 
Tel. (61-3) 9417 53 61 
Fax (61-3) 94 19 71  54 
E-mail: jpdavies@ozemail.com.au 
BRESIL 
Livraria Camoes 
Rua Bittencourt da Silva, 12 C 
CEP 
20043-900 Rio de Janeiro 
Tel. (55-21) 262 47 76 
Fax (55-21) 262 47 76 
E-mail: livraria.camoes@incm.com.br 
URL: http://www.incm.com.br 
CANADA 
Les editions La Liberte Inc. 
3020, chemin Sainte-Fay 
Sainte-Foy, Quebec G1X 3V6 
Tel. (1-418) 658 37 63 
Fax (1-800) 567 54 49 
E-mail: liberte@mediom.qc.ca 
Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd 
5369 Chemin Canotek Road, Unit 1 
Ottawa, Ontario K1J·9J3 
Tel. (1-613) 745 26 65 
Fax (1-613) 745 76 60 
E-mail: order.dept@renoufbooks.com 
URL: http://www.renoufbooks.com 
EGYPT 
The Middle East Observer 
41  Sherif Street 
Cairo 
Tel. (20-2) 392 69 19 
Fax (20-2) 393 97 32 
E-mail: inquiry@ meobserver.com 
URL: http://www.meobserver.com.eg 
INDIA 
EBIC India 
3rd Floor, Y.  B. Chavan Centre 
Gen. J. Bhosaie Marg. 
Mumbai 400 021 
Tel. (91-22) 282 60 64 
Fax (91-22) 285 45 64 
E-mail: ebicindia@vsnl.com 
URL: http://www.ebicindia.com 
JAPAN 
PSI-Japan 
Asahi Sanbancho Plaza #206 
7-1 Sanbancho, Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo 102 
Tel. (81-3) 32 34 69 21 
Fax (81-3) 32 34 6915 
E-mail: books@psi-japan.co.jp 
URL: http://www.psi-japan.co.jp 
MALAYSIA 
EBIC Malaysia 
Suite 45.02, Level 45 
Plaza MBf (Letter Box 45) 
8 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng 
50450 Kuala Lumpur 
Tel. (60-3) 21  62 92 98 
Fax (60-3) 21  62 61  98 
E-mail: ebic @tm.net.my 
MEXICO 
Mundi Prensa Mexico, SA de CV 
Rio Panuco, 141 
Colonia Cuauhtemoc 
MX-06500 Mexico, OF 
Tel. (52-5) 533 56 58 
Fax (52-5) 514 67 99 
E-mail: 101545.2361 @compuserve.com 
PHILIPPINES 
EBIC Philippines 
19th Floor, PS Bank Tower 
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave. cor. Tindalo St. 
Makati City 
Metro Manilla 
Tel. (63-2) 759 66 80 
Fax (63-2) 759 66 90 
E-mail: eccpcom@  globe.com.ph 
URL: http://www.eccp.com 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Eurochamber of Commerce in South Africa 
PO Box 781738 
2146 Sandton 
Tel. (27-11) 884 39 52 
Fax (27-11) 883 55 73 
E-mail: info@eurochamber.co.za 
SOUTH KOREA 
The European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in Korea 
5th Fl, The Shilla Hotel 
202, Jangchung-dong 2 Ga, Chung-ku 
Seoul 1  00-392 
Tel. (82-2) 22 53-5631/4 
Fax (82-2) 22 53-5635/6 
E-mail: eucck@eucck.org 
URL: http://www.eucck.org 
SRI LANKA 
EBIC Sri Lanka 
Trans Asia Hotel 
115 Sir Chittampalam 
A.  Gardiner Mawatha 
Colombo 2 
Tel. (94-1) 074 71  50 78 
Fax (94-1) 44 87 79 
E-mail: ebicsl@slnet.ik 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Bernan Associates 
4611-F Assembly Drive 
Lanham MD 20706-4391 
Tel. (1-800) 274 44 47 (toll free telephone) 
Fax (1-800) 865 34 50 (toll free fax) 
E-mail: query@bernan.com 
URL: http://www.bernan.com 
ANDERE LANDER/OTHER COUNTRIES/ 
AUTRES PAYS 
Bitte wenden Sie sich an ein Buro lhrer 
Wahl/Please contact the sales office of 
your choiceNeuillez vous adresser au 
bureau de vente de votre choix 
Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities 
2, rue  Mercier 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Tel. (352) 29 29-42455 
Fax (352) 29 29-42758 
E-mail: info-info-opoce@cec.eu.int 
URL: http://eur-op.eu.int 
1/2001 ISBN  92-!94-0766-3 
1111111111111111111111 
9  789289 407885 > 